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CONTENTS

1 Forging the Truth: Creative Deception and National Identity in Medieval Korea
   Remco Breuker
Cover calligraphy Yan Zhenqing 颜真卿, Tang calligrapher and statesman

Cover image Liao warrior depicted on a wall painting. Source unknown.

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FORGING THE TRUTH: CREATIVE DECEPTION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN MEDIEVAL KOREA

Remco Breuker

The forging of documents has a long history; indeed, it is probably as old as the act of writing itself. Forgeries were produced in ancient Egypt, Greece, Persia and China, and the librarians of Alexandria possessed lists that distinguished authentic texts from spurious ones. During the European middle ages newly established states supported their claims of ancient roots with invented genealogies and forged documents. One medieval French bishop forged an entire corpus of land deeds and related documents—the so-called Le Mans forgeries—to prove his see's claim to certain lands.

Although unmasking a hitherto unsuspected document as a forgery has its own pleasures, forgeries are also important for what they tell us about the time and circumstances in which they were created. Forgeries are, by definition, created to pass for something else. Once the forger's intention to have his creations pass for products from another time or place has been revealed, forgeries may be submitted to a different kind of analysis; in this context they must be seen as authentic texts in their own right. Anthony Grafton observes that "[i]f any law holds for all forgery, it is quite simply that any forger, however deft, imprints the pattern and texture of his own period's life, thought, and language on the past he hopes to make seem real and vivid". In this way, the Le Mans forgeries have proved to be valuable for the ideas they contain about state and church land ownership in ninth-century France. The spurious genealogies of medieval nations reveal much about how legitimacy was created and accepted. In some cases, indeed, the term "forgery" is perhaps too harsh. Many were created to borrow the authority of an important figure

This study grew out of a chapter of my PhD thesis and was initially meant to stand on its own. However, although initially a part of my dissertation, the conclusions and size of my inquiry into the Ten Injunctions compelled me to try and publish it as a monograph. The awkward size of this study—too long for an article but too short for a book—and the fact that it dealt with a subject from medieval Korean history made finding a suitable publisher a challenging task. I am therefore deeply grateful to East Asian History for publishing it in its entirety. Writing this study would certainly not have been possible without the support and advice from a number of colleagues and friends. My first debt of gratitude is to my PhD supervisor at Leiden University, Professor Boudewijn Walraven, who encouraged me to pursue the topic of this study. Dr Lewis Mayo, on leave from the University of Melbourne at Leiden University, invested time, and showed patience and amazing erudition in going over the original texts of the injunctions with me and saved me from a number of mistaken translations from the classical Chinese. Dr Koen De Ceuster and Jungshim Lee also offered continued support, suggestions and corrections, while I gained much from discussions with Lennert Breuker, Vincent Breugem, Emiel...
from the past—a king, a saint or a scholar from a previous period—to disseminate the ideas of the forger. Erasmus, who saw it as his Christian duty to root out spurious texts and to protect Christian theology, claimed to have found a very old manuscript in an ancient library that was highly sympathetic to his own theology. It turned out to be a fake, written in the same medieval Latin as his Praise of Folly. He had falsified the records of the church in order to garner support for his theology.  

Drawing attention to the proximity of forgery to the practice of critical historiography, Grafton has proposed that forgery can function as an alternative mode of writing history:

Forgery is only one possible way of dealing with the past; it is no more arbitrary than some of the others. And the structural resemblance between its methods and those of criticism is reasonable enough, given the more basic resemblance between their immediate practical goals.

This study begins from the presumption that a forgery is often an extension and exaggeration of what is genuine, rather than being something that is either false or inauthentic. This, of course, does not mean that the real status of suspicious texts cannot or should not be analyzed but, rather, that determining if a document is what it purports to be is merely the first step in a meaningful analysis. People have forged documents for many reasons, pecuniary profit being only one of them. More often, as in the case of Erasmus, forgeries have been used to create or restore order in an otherwise chaotic and turbulent world. According to Alfred Hiatt, forgeries are “expressions of deeply held beliefs and ideas, derived from a strong sense of the importance of justice and tradition.” Acting from these convictions does not absolve the forger from having committed an act punishable under most, if not all, legal codes but it should alert the historian to the role of forgeries, to their function in a wider historical narrative, and to the fact that they must be taken seriously.

Setting aside the question of the duplicity of the forger, we can redirect our attention to the content and function of the forgery. What role does it play in the historical narrative? And what contribution does it make? A successful forgery depends, in Hiatt’s words, “upon a critical awareness of document culture—of the form, content, and role of documents in medieval society”. This is as true for medieval Korea as it is for the European middle ages. A forgery is intended to interact in a field of already established notions, ideas, texts and historical events. On the one hand, it can support, embellish or even initiate historiography; on the other hand, it may also refer to an earlier historical occasion or text that never existed. In this manner, it may write, restore and invent historiography, “returning potential, surmised, or non-existent histories from the second to the first degree”. It may, in other words, strengthen an idea that is already current or it may forge a truth that was, until that time, merely a potentiality.
The use of a forgery to support a particular point of view is obviously not restricted to Europe. The founder of the Korean Koryō 高麗 dynasty (918-1392) T'aejo Wang Kön 太祖王建 (877-943) left ten instructions to his successors, commonly known as the Ten Injunctions (Hunyo shipcho 訓要十條). The Ten Injunctions is an attractive blend of Buddhist, Confucian, geomantic and other elements, reflecting the peculiar worldview of the dynasty. It occupies a crucial position in the study of early Koryō, its political thought and its ideological constitution. It is also a forgery. The fact that this text is not what it purports to be does not detract from its historical significance: it was not forged in modern times, but in the eleventh century. Since it reflects the circumstances of the forger's period, as well as conveying the message he wanted to promulgate, it is of the utmost importance for the study of early Koryō.

Originally, I set out to re-examine the injunctions and to resolve the questions that had been raised during the colonial period about their authenticity. The doubts raised by Japanese historians during this period required further investigation, as all previous attempts to dispel them had not satisfactorily done so. In the course of re-examining the Ten Injunctions, it became clear that the arguments put forward by colonial historians lacked conviction and were significantly coloured by ideological prejudice. However, at the same time, it was also not possible to conclude that the injunctions were authentic, that they came from the hand of T'aejo Wang Kön himself.

In this monograph, I show that the injunctions are a creation of the eleventh century rather than the tenth and while ascribed to T'aejo, were not written by him. I shall examine questions of motive, means and opportunity: who, how, when and why. Since the original has not been transmitted, a physical examination of the document itself is impossible. Fortunately, the Ten Injunctions was recorded in Koryō's historical annals, so an analysis of its contents is possible. It will be necessary to analyse and to compare the contents of each injunction with the circumstances of T'aejo's period—the first half of the tenth century—and the period when the Ten Injunctions was allegedly rediscovered—almost a century later. How did the forger try to give the text the appearance of having been written by T'aejo? What was he trying to accomplish? Who was he? I conclude with an analysis of the significance of the Ten Injunctions as a reflection of eleventh-century ideas.

The eleventh century played a crucial role in crystallizing Koryō's identity. Late in that century, a vigorous intellectual climate emerged in which different strands of ideology and religion clashed, co-existed and influenced one another. The early Koryō intellectual environment stands out for its unusual tolerance of inconsistency, contradiction and incongruity. Indeed, Koryō individuals at this time often appear to have held incompatible positions drawn from different ways of looking at the world. The early Koryō perception of reality—or perhaps realities—was an odd mishmash,


13 Scholar and philosopher Yi Ik 李滉 (1682–1764), for instance, denounced Tosaŏn’s geomantic theories on the basis of the eighth injunction which forbade people from the south-west to be employed by the state because of the treacherous nature of the landscape there. Since the lineage seat of the royal Yi 李 family was in Ch'onju 金州, in the south, Tosaŏn’s theories concerning the influence of landscape upon people had to be false. The royal family was evidently the most meritorious lineage of the country. See “Yŏjo hunyo” [The Injunctions of the Koryŏ Dynasty] in Sŏngho sasal [Collected Works of Yi Ik] 12: 36b–37a.

14 Early Koryŏ marked the emergence of a new identity. During the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, the idea that Koryŏ was unique and a possible centre of the world, just as China was, took root among its literati. The formation of a pluralist worldview was essential to this conception of Koryŏ’s place in the world and the Ten Injunctions embodies some of the processes that caused these new ideas about Koryŏ’s identity to emerge. In order to analyze the significance of the contents of the Ten Injunctions, I shall use Fredrik Barth’s notion of boundary mechanisms. According to Barth, it is at the boundaries of an identity, and not at its centre, that its essential elements reside. These boundaries guard a group’s identity and become “hard” or “soft”, “impermeable” or “porous”, depending on the pressure that is exerted upon them. Cultures are not self-contained, nor neatly bound or homogeneous, but are fluid and in continuous interaction. It draws our attention to borderlands where identity is formed, where “nothing is thrust out, the good, the bad and the ugly, nothing rejected, nothing abandoned”.

The Ten Injunctions “reappeared” in a period of great instability and uncertainty and played a crucial role in revitalizing the Koryŏ dynasty during a time of domestic strife and foreign invasion. It also constituted the first comprehensive, codified expression of a pluralist approach to the world, sanctified by tradition and by the state. The importance of the Ten Injunctions...
tions is thus twofold. It is a political and ideological forgery of the most successful kind, not having been challenged until the early twentieth century. At the same time, it is also the earliest comprehensive expression of a distinct view on the world, one that would define Koryø for centuries to come.

The Ten Injunctions

T’aejo’s Ten Injunctions is considered his political and administrative will. Sensing death was imminent, the Standard Koryø History (Koryøsa 高麗史) tells us, he summoned his trusted comrade-in-arms Pak Surhui 朴述希 (?–945) and presented him with ten instructions to pass on to the future rulers of the Koryø state. They have traditionally garnered much attention, not the least because of the captivating manner in which they were recorded and transmitted. It is also the case, however, that their contents are a hodgep-

Figures 1 & 2

The Ten Injunctions (Hunyo shipcho 調要十條).
From: Standard Koryø History (Koryøsa 高麗史)
(Seoul: Asea munhwasa, 1983) 3 vols

dge of Buddhist, Confucian, geomantic and other elements, which makes them notoriously difficult to interpret. As the political and ideological testament of the founder of the dynasty, the Ten Injunctions is naturally of great consequence for the study of early Koryô. It not only presents the variety of Koryô’s ideological landscape, but does so in a codified format. Important concepts, beliefs, and historical themes referred to in the injunctions came to play crucial roles in the five-hundred-year history of the dynasty. It is reasonable, then, that the Ten Injunctions is commonly regarded as a kind of spiritual constitution of the Koryô dynasty.

However, serious doubts have been cast on the authenticity of the injunctions, most prominently by Japanese historian Imanishi Ryū 今西龍 (1875-1932). Imanishi’s analysis of the injunctions and his conclusions must be seen against the background of the general nature of colonial historiography, with its emphasis on Korea’s alleged lack of independence throughout history. Japanese colonial historians gratefully seized upon the old idea that forgery flourishes when creativity is absent to undermine the significance of Koryô’s long history. Nonetheless, Imanishi’s studies are still referred to: his meticulous approach to Korean history has shed light on important historical questions and his studies are not generally so politicized as to make them unreadable. Nonetheless, his research on the Ten Injunctions was shaped by assumptions about Korean history prevalent in colonial historiography. His emphasis on, and interpretation of, the eighth injunction which warns against people from the south-west unduly stresses the role regional divisions have played in Korean history. In doing so, he effectively projected a contemporary phenomenon back onto the Koryô period. While Imanishi’s research is almost 100 years old—his two articles date from 1912 and 1918—he is still the first to be cited and refuted by modern scholars.

His emphasis on the eighth injunction, too, has been influential. The three most recent studies on the Ten Injunctions are in fact studies of the eighth injunction—the other nine figure as mere props. The academic debate has, thus, turned into a one-sided dialogue with the long-deceased Imanishi. This is both an indication of the strength of his arguments and of the contemporary sensitivity to regional fault lines. The need to discredit Imanishi’s conclusion about Koryô’s regional divisions has gone hand in hand with the necessity to prove that Taejo’s injunctions are authentic. This has obliged most historians to assume an uncomfortable balancing act between that position and reinterpreting the eighth injunction. In most other areas of modern Korean historiography the distortions of Japanese colonial historians have been refuted and it has become possible to assume a more balanced view of their work.
about the *Ten Injunctions*. Denying its authenticity is tantamount to denying Korea's history.

Given the sensitivity of the subject, some care must be taken in proceeding. In the remainder of this monograph, I analyse the injunctions in turn and connect them with their author, placing them in their proper context of the first half of the eleventh century. The *Ten Injunctions* is of exceptional significance for the study of early Koryŏ; not as the will of T'aejo, but in its own right, as an authentic creation that borrowed the authority of T'aejo to convey a message. This message was considered important enough to warrant the blasphemy of counterfeiting the dynastic founder's last words. In this study, I also aim to liberate the eighth injunction from the pre-eminence Imanishi gave it and which has plagued Korean historiography ever since.

It is clear that the colonial context of Imanishi's research shaped it to a considerable extent. While doubt may be cast on his motives and arguments, his historical instinct that something did not quite add up cannot be

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Figure 3
Imanishi Ryū 今西龍 (1875–1932). Photographic collection, National Institute of Korean History Archives
These are the studies of Yi Chaeböm (1997), Kim Kaptong (2002) and Shin Hoch’ol (2003). The only recent study of the injunctions that does not mainly focus on the eighth injunction is from Yi Chongshin (2002).

According to Yi Chaeböm, no historian has yet succeeded in preserving the authenticity of the injunctions and in getting rid of the sting in the eighth although he seems intent on defending both positions. He goes so far as to lament that one historian besides Imanishi (indeed, a fellow Korean!) has concluded that some of the injunctions may not have been written by T’aejo. This historian is Mun Kyonghyon, who noted several anachronisms in some of them. Mun, however, did not consider the status of the Ten Injunctions as a whole, nor did he attempt to place it in its proper context or determine its significance as a forgery. See Mun Kyonghyon, Koryô T’aejo-t’i Hu Saengak-t’ongil yǒn’gǔ yǔl’A Study of Koryô T’aejo’s Unification of the Later Three Kingdoms] (Seoul: Hyongsol, 1987), pp.310-20; Yi Chaeböm, “Koryô T’aejo-Ciichunyo shipcho-e taehan chaegomt’o,” p.90.

For an excellent review article on the influence of the colonial period and Japanese colonial historiography on Korean historians, see Kwôn Taeök, “Kûndaehwa, tonghwa, shing-minji yusan” [Modernisation, Assimilation, Relics of the Colony], Han’gûksa-yôn gu[ Korean Historical Studies] 108 (2000): 115–40


Grafton, Forgers and Critics, p.58.

This story of the provenance of the Ten Injunctions encourages suspicion. Establishing the pedigree of a forgery is of the highest importance in having it accepted as authentic, the most desirable location for its “discovery” being an archive or ancient library. Erasmus claimed to have found his very old text in a notable library; priests of Israel claimed to have found the book of the law in the temple; the inventor of medieval England’s Trojan roots, Geoffrey of Monmouth, claimed to have read the legends in an old British book belonging to Archdeacon Walter. The pedigree of the Ten Injunctions is similar: Ch’oe Hang (?–1024) had been a famous statesman and historian. However, a number of oddities in this account are immediately noticeable. First, this epochal event is added to the end of the record almost carelessly, as if it were a trivial afterthought. What makes this even stranger is that Ch’oe Cheun’s (?–1046) biography is appended to the biography of Ch’oe Sûngno, a towering political and intellectual figure of early Koryô, who himself never mentioned T’aejo’s injunctions in his writings, although he referred to other works by T’aejo that are now lost. It is hard not to wonder whether the report that the
rediscovery of the document took place in Ch’oe Hang’s house was not partly motivated by the hope that the reputation of his grandfather would somehow rub off on it.

Another reason to question the authenticity of this account is the use of the expression “transmitted to the world”. As a personal testament to his descendants, the Ten Injunctions was never meant to be circulated throughout society. At most, high officials might have been meant to know of the injunctions, so as to enable them to assist the ruler. In addition, the way an important document like this was found in the house of a deceased minister of state and retired state historian stretches credulity.

The injunctions themselves were not recorded, however, with this account of their rediscovery. To read them in their entirety one has to consult the annals of the Standard Koryŏ History for the year 943, the year T’aejo died, where they are included as if they had never been missing. The account of the creation of the Ten Injunctions in the annals section of the Standard Koryŏ History reads as follows:

In the fourth month, summer, in the twenty-sixth year of T’aejo’s reign [943], the king went to the inner court, summoned taegwang Pak Surhôi and personally gave him the injunctions, saying: “I have heard that when great Shun was cultivating at Li-shan he inherited the throne from Yao. Emperor Kao-tsu rose from humble origins and founded the Han. I too have risen from the humble people and received undeserved support for my rule. In summer I did not shun the heat and in winter did not avoid the cold. After toiling, body and mind, for nineteen years, I united the Three Han and have held the throne for twenty-five years. Now I am old. I only fear that my successors will give way to their passions and greed and destroy the principle of government. This would be truly worrisome. I therefore write these injunctions to be passed on to later ages. They should be read morning and night and forever used as a mirror for reflection.”

This introduction to the Ten Injunctions, which is found in the Standard Koryŏ History (based on the earlier contemporaneously compiled Veritable Records) sounds plausible and has always been cited as proof of the genuineness of the injunctions. Its position at the end of the annals dealing with T’aejo is also to be expected. However, since the Ten Injunctions is recorded in its entirety in the Standard Koryŏ History, its inclusion in the Veritable Records must have taken place after their rediscovery, or, alternatively, after their forgery. Since most archival materials dating from the early days of the Koryŏ dynasty were destroyed when the invading Liao armies ransacked Kaegyŏng in 1011, the Veritable Records for the early period had to be recomplied. This was accomplished partly by interviewing elderly people who had lived through the early years of Koryŏ. The interviews and the process of compiling and editing the new Veritable Records was started in 1013 by
Hwang Churyang 黃周亮（fl. early eleventh century), Ch’oe Ch’ung 崔沖 (984-1068), Yun Chinggo 尹徵古 (?-1021) and Chu Chö 周悖 (?-1024). Both Hwang and Ch’oe had passed the state examinations in 1004 and 1005 respectively under the supervision of Ch’oe Hang, in whose house Ch’oe Chean allegedly found the injunctions. Both passed at the top of their year. It is not known under whose supervision Yun passed the examinations (if indeed he did).25 Ch’oe Hang was also the supervising state historian at this time and more or less handpicked his own staff. 26 Whether the Ten Injunctions is authentic or forged, some coordination must have taken place between the compilers over its inclusion in the Veritable Records and the reference to it in Ch’oe Chean’s biography. The Standard Koryo History annals were put together based on the early eleventh-century compilation of the new Veritable Records completed by Hwang Churyang, who was generally considered reliable,27 Ch’oe Hang supervised much of the work.28 It is interesting to note, in this context, that Ch’oe Hang was active not only as a historian, but also as a writer and printer of Buddhist texts. His biography mentions that he had turned his residence into a Buddhist temple and that he produced Buddhist sutras and statues at home.29 One would expect to find many documents at a house of this sort, those from the state archives as well as locally produced ones. The circumstances surrounding the recompilation of the Koryo Veritable Records provided an obvious opportunity to change or supplement the historical record, especially since oral transmission was used as an important source. The sources do not divulge how or whether Ch’oe Chean was involved, but he was a close associate of Hwang Churyang. They were often promoted at the same time and to similar posts, usually with Ch’oe Chean in a slightly higher position.30

The Ten Injunctions was not the only set of instructions T’aejo dictated just before he died. The account of the transmission of the Ten Injunctions is followed by entries in the Standard Koryo History and the Essentials of Koryo History (Koryōsa chōryo 高麗史節要) that describe the circumstances of the dictation and promulgation of T’aejo’s official will as Koryō’s ruler, referred to in the sources as “bequeathed instructions” (yujo 遺詔). The fact that T’aejo left an official will in addition to the Ten Injunctions is not often considered, but the more detailed account of the dictation of his bequeathed instructions from his deathbed gives a precise picture of how the transmission of T’aejo’s wishes was accomplished. In this record, the transmission of the Ten Injunctions to Pak Surhū takes place first. This fact is, incidentally, not mentioned in Pak’s biography, where his recommendation and later protection of Prince Mu as the heir apparent is regarded as his most impressive feat (a fact that is also mentioned in the Standard Koryo History’s annals section).31 Pak’s biography also records that T’aejo’s last request to him was that he should look out for Mu, T’aejo’s son and successor.32 According to the account in the annals

25 KS 3: 33b. It is likely that Yun was also supervised by Ch’oe Hang, who was at this time the obvious person to be in charge of the state examinations. Chu Chö was a native of the Song dynasty and had taken the civil examinations there. He arrived in Koryo in 1005, the year Ch’oe Ch’ung passed the state examinations.

26 Ch’oe Hang was promoted to the highest historiographical office in 1012. At the same time Hwang Churyang and Ch’oe Ch’ung were appointed as editors. KS 4: 15a.

27 Yi Chehyon 李齊賢 used Hwang’s Veritable Records to contradict Kim Kwanui’s 金寛奴 genealogy of the Koryo ruling house (Koryosa Choryo 高麗史節要), which he considered spurious. Yi discredits a statement by Kim by pointing out that it was not mentioned by Hwang, which according to him certainly would have been the case if the statement had been true. Yi also mentions that his confidence in Hwang’s historical compilation was based on the fact that Hwang had lived in a time when he was still able to collect information from people who had been in direct contact with T’aejo. Hwang was also considered reliable by the Neo-Confucian Choson compilers of the Standard Koryo History; his account is singled out for its reliability. See KS 1: segye.

28 Hwang did not complete the Veritable Records of Seven Reigns (Ch’ilsae shillok 七代實錄) until 1032. Ch’oe Hang had died in 1024. Roughly half of the work was done under Hwang’s own supervision.

29 KS 93: 29b–31b. The biography does not mention whether Ch’oe wrote or printed sutras and indeed both possibilities are feasible. The printing technology of early Koryo was well-developed and a rich state official, who had his own Buddhist statues made on his property, would also have been capable of printing texts.

30 Entries in the Standard Koryo History and the Essentials of Koryo History allow us to piece together a partial reconstruction of the careers of Ch’oe and Hwang. See KS 4: 15a; KSC 3: 22b; KS 4: 34b; KSC 3: 41a; KS 5: 4b; KS 5: 7b; KSC 3: 55a; KS 5: 13b; KS 5: 15a; KS 5: 19b–20a; KS 5: 23b; KSC 4: 1b; KS 5: 24a; KSC 4: 2a; KS 5: 26b; KSC 4: 3b; KS 5: 28b; KS 5: 50b; KSC 4: 6a; KS 5: 31b; KSC 4: 8b; KS 6: 6b; KSC 4: 12a; KNS: /over
of the Standard Koryô History, then, Pak Surhüi first received the Ten Injunctions. The next month, when T’aego was too ill to attend to affairs, his ministers gathered around him, but Pak Surhüi was not present; those in attendance were Yöm Sang (廉相), Wang Kyu (王規), and Pak Sumun (朴守文). T’aego then eloquently and eruditely spoke about his imminent death and the transitoriness of life. He concluded this meeting with his ministers gathered around him, but Pak Surhüi was not present; those in attendance were Yöm Sang (廉相), Wang Kyu (王規), and Pak Sumun (朴守文).

T’aego then summoned Academician (baksa 學士) Kim Ak (金岳) (fl. mid-10th c.) and had a preliminary draft of his official will (yumyông 遺命) drawn up. T’aego died shortly thereafter and his will was read out to the officials, both capital and provincial, who had assembled in front of the chancellery. The will named Crown Prince Mu as the new ruler and he ascended the throne the same day. T’aego’s wishes regarding his burial were also made known to the officials: in emulation of the ancient Chinese emperors of Han (206 BCE–220 CE) and Wei (384–535), the will specified that T’aego’s funeral be austere and that his tomb be modest.

This account prompts several questions regarding the transmission of the Ten Injunctions to Pak Surhüi. First, one would have expected Pak to have been present at T’aego’s deathbed. T’aego’s death was expected and Pak was, after all, the person who had, allegedly, received the Ten Injunctions. In this capacity, he would have fulfilled the role of guardian and confidant for the new ruler. Instead, Wang Kyu, who was openly hostile to Pak, was present at T’aego’s deathbed and read the royal will to the assembled officials. Secondly, Pak’s biography does not mention the fact that he received the Ten Injunctions. Instead, it focuses on his recommendation of Prince Mu as the heir apparent. It is also noteworthy that T’aego’s last request to him had been to take care of Mu, yet there is no mention of the Ten Injunctions, the transmission of which also qualified as a “bequeathed instruction”. A third problem lies in the fact that T’aego relied on an academician to write his official will, while he apparently did not for the Ten Injunctions, despite the fact that they appear to have been written by a scholar. Finally, it appears strange that T’aego would notify officials of his preferences for burial in his will—the only other issue he explicitly mentions there is the imperative matter of his chosen successor—but makes no reference to royal burials in the Ten Injunctions. These points all give cause for reconsideration of the status of the Ten Injunctions but none of them is sufficient to conclude that the injunctions are indeed a forgery.

However, there is an additional external reason for maintaining a sceptical attitude to the authenticity of the Ten Injunctions. For the Koryô period, as for others, the use of fakes and forgeries for political use is well attested. Forged title deeds, proofs of ownership and even royal commands were not unknown. Even the royal family was not averse to resorting to these “skillful means” when necessary. Wang Kôn’s emergence
Wang K6n and his supporters first had the king told an erroneous interpretation of the inscription. Brought into Taebong, it was quickly established that the mirror contained a prophecy predicting that Wang K6n would ascend the throne. Fearing that Kungye would kill him if the prophesy were explained to him, Wang K6n allowed himself to be convinced by the other generals to depose Kungye and ascend the throne. This story has been recorded in several sources such as the Standard Kory6 History, the Essentials of Kory6 History and the Histories of the Three Kingdoms (Simaguk sagi 삼국사기), but the story in the Standard Kory6 History is the most elaborate. See KS1: 6a–8a.

Ten Injunctions, the annexation of Shilla by Koryo also involved the transmission of three sacred objects: a golden Buddha statue, the nine-story pagoda of Hwangnyong-sa Temple 黃龍寺 and the sacred jade girdle (sŏngjedae 聖帝帶) that Chinp’yŏng-wang 廉平王 (r. 579–632) had received from heaven. When T’aejo asked for the sacred girdle after the Shilla king had surrendered to Koryo, no one in Shilla knew what he meant. After diligent searching, however, the Shilla envoy at the Koryo court (who had been embarrassed by his ignorance) found a monk from the Hwangnyong-sa Temple who was over ninety years old and apparently knew about these things. The monk told the envoy that the girdle could be found in the South Depot 南庫 in Kyŏngju 慶州. However, it was not easy to locate. In order to dispel the wind, clouds and dark skies that made searching for it impossible, a date had to be carefully selected and the proper ritual abstinences observed. After it had been found, it was presented to T’aejo as the legitimate ruler of the peninsula. A particularly notable forgery for the study of the Ten Injunctions was the letter from Kang Cho 康兆 (974–1010), the general who killed the usurper Kim Ch’i’yang 金致陽 (?–1009) and Mokchong 穆宗 (980–997–1009), who put Hyŏnjong (992–1010–1031) on the throne, and who had been captured by the Khitan. The Khitan sent a letter to Hŭnhwa Fortress 興化鎭 supposedly written by Kang telling the commander to surrender. Commander Yang Kyu 楊揆 declined, citing the royal orders he was under, doubting the authenticity of Kang’s command. Finally, and somewhat ironically, Pak Surhui, T’aejo’s trusted minister and supposed recipient of the Ten Injunctions, met his death due to a royal order that was forged. Exiled to a remote place by Chŏngjong 定宗 (923–945–949), Koryo’s third ruler and one of T’aejo’s sons, he was murdered by his rival Wang Kyu 王規 (?–945), who claimed he was acting on behalf of Chŏngjong.

External evidence, then, suggests that the Ten Injunctions may not be authentic. The story of its provenance is suspicious, an opportunity to forge it was available, and the use of forged documents and fake objects for political gain in this period is well-attested. To add to concerns over its authenticity, no references were made to the Ten Injunctions until the second half of the eleventh century during the reign of Munjong. An examination of the contents of the Ten Injunctions will determine whether it is more consistent with the history and concerns of T’aejo’s reign or of a later period. I shall, therefore, compare the contents of each injunction with the circumstances during the reign of T’aejo and, if necessary, with the circumstances in later reigns. For some injunctions a convincing case can be made for the reign in which it was written; for others it is more difficult to offer definitive conclusions.
**Number One**

The first injunction reads as follows:

First injunction: The great enterprise of our state inevitably depends on the protective power of the Buddhas. I have therefore built temples and monasteries for both the Meditational and Doctrinal schools, despatched abbots to the temples of both schools to burn incense and practice the Way, and caused each to manage their respective estates properly. If, in the future, villainous courtiers attain power and get swayed by the entreaties of monks, the temples of the various schools will fight among themselves in order to seize one another. This must be prevented at all costs.  

Injunction one warns T’aejo’s successors that they should honour Buddhism since the dynasty was established by relying on the power of the Buddhas. In their honour, T’aejo built temples and monasteries for the Meditational and Doctrinal schools according to one recent analysis, “the power of the Buddhas” referred, on the one hand, to the king “as a monarch in the Chinese tradition who uses Buddhism as an instrument to pacify his realm”, while on the other, “the king also relied on more explicit Buddhist symbols to consolidate and legitimise his power”, targeting a much larger segment of the population. The role of Buddhism as legitimising ideology in early Koryo has never been in dispute and the first part of the injunction was as valid, for example, for Munjong’s reign in the second half of the eleventh century as it was for T’aejo’s.  

T’aejo continues with a prophetic statement about villainous courtiers and schisms in the future Buddhist community. The use of prophecies in a text that purports to come from an earlier time in order to denounce something in the past is a well-known device of forgers, and is given the name *vaticinium ex eventu* or “prophecy from the event”. Such prophecies are phrased in such a manner that they appear to have been written before the events they claim to predict, but the messages they communicate are typically directed towards contemporaries, warning them against past mistakes.  

While T’aejo was aware of the schism between the Meditational and Doctrinal schools, the phrasing of the last part of the injunction would seem to exaggerate his concerns in this direction. If anything, he was actually more worried about the degree of power large monasteries wielded. He actively pursued conciliatory policies toward eminent monks (irrespective of their doctrinal affiliations) and his indirect yet strict control of the sangha precluded any worsening of existing divisions. He gave preferential treatment to the Meditational schools, probably because of their long association with local powerful clans but the Doctrinal schools also enjoyed his personal attention. Since clashes between the Meditational and Doctrinal schools did not take place during his reign, the need to warn of future villainous courtiers and schisms in the sangha seems out of

with Buddhism, both ideologically and institutionally, see Vermeersch, “Power of the Buddha”.  


47 Inscriptions mention that T’aejo established over five hundred Són temples and monasteries but as Sem Vermeersch argues, this probably means that he officially recognized existing temples and granted them lands from which to derive their incomes. This reveals how closely T’aejo was involved with the Buddhist community. When it was still impossible to dispatch centrally
appointed officials to the provinces, loyal monasteries were of great importance to T'aejo to control the provinces. See Vermec-


49 See Adrian Buza and Tony Prince, Kyunyŏ-jŏn: The Life, Times and Songs of a Tenth Century Korean Monk (Sydney: Wild Peony, 1993), University of Sydney East Asian Series 6. For an account of Kyunyŏ's thought, its historical background and especially Kyunyŏ's relations with the meditational school, see Ch'oe Yŏnshik, "Kyunyŏ Hwaom-sa-sang-yŏng ge kyŏp'allon-tilch'angshim-ŭro" [The Avatamsaka Philosophy of Kyunyŏ] (PhD diss., Seoul National University, 1999).

place in the first injunction. If we seek, on the other hand, a later period in which this concern would have had relevance, one obvious possibility would be the beginning of the eleventh century.

The Doctrinal schools had regained much lost ground during the reigns of Hyejong 惠宗 (912-943-945), Chŏngjong and Kwangjong 光宗 (925-949-975), all of whom had consistently favoured them at the expense of the Meditational schools. Under the protection of Kwangjong, National Preceptor Kyunyŏ 坤如 (923-976) worked with considerable success to integrate the Doctrinal and Meditational schools, but Kwangjong's untimely death and the ineffectual policies of his successors meant that these branches of Buddhism would remain in conflict for another century.49 It was not until Uich'ŏn 義天 (1055-1101) began to bring Koryŏ's divergent Buddhist sects together in the late eleventh century that the confrontation between Sŏn and Kyo 教 Buddhism would end, if only for a short time.

Thus, clashes between the two main Buddhist schools were common during the reigns of Kyongjong 景宗 (955-976-981), Sŏngjong (960-982-997), Mokchong and Hyŏnjong, and these clashes could sometimes be very serious. When Hyŏnjong built the Hyŏnhwa-sa Temple 玄化寺 to honour the memory of his parents, he exacerbated the divisions between the schools. Hyŏnjong appointed Pŏpkyŏng 法鏡 (fl. early eleventh century) who was National Preceptor of Great Wisdom (Taeji kuksa 大智國師) to be abbot of this new temple complex, which would soon rival all other Koryŏ temples in size and splendour. Pŏpkyŏng, who had been abbot of the Samch'ŏn-sa Temple 三川寺, had helped Hyŏnjong when he was hiding in a temple at Mt Samgak 三角山, where Samch'ŏn-sa Temple was located. Thus, his appointment may have been a gesture of concurrence. Concurrent to Pŏpkyŏng's appointment as abbot to the Hyŏnhwa-sa Temple, he was appointed "royal preceptor" (wangsa 王師).50 The Hyŏnhwa-sa Temple belonged to the Mere-consciousness School (Pŏpsangjong 法相宗), to which Hyŏnjong had become attached both through marriage alliances and through the fact that some of his closest ministers had intimate ties with this school.51 This sudden rise of the Mere-consciousness school came at the expense of other schools, which predictably caused trouble.52

These events are complicated by the reason Hyŏnjong had hidden in the mountains before he became king. In the early eleventh century Mokchong was on the throne but was too young and inexperienced to free himself from his mother, the Dowager Honae 猷哀 (964-1029, posthumously known as Queen Ch'ŏnch'u, 千秋), and her more-or-less secret lover Kim Ch'iyang 金致陽 (?-1009). Kim Ch'iyang estranged the mainstream Buddhist community by sponsoring the establishment of temples with strong Daoist leanings and by his behaviour in general.53 At the same time, the heir to the childless Mokchong, Wang Sun 王詢, Prince of Taeryang Palace 大良院君 who later became King Hyŏnjong, was banished to
a Buddhist monastery. The illicit liaison between Queen Hōnae and Kim Ch'i'yang had also produced a son who they intended to take the place of Wang Sun. Several attempts on Wang Sun's life were made by assassins sent by his aunt, Queen Hōnae, but these all failed due to the protection the young prince received from the monasteries where he resided. In 1009 Kang Cho revolted, advanced on the capital, killed Kim Ch'i'yang and banished Queen Hōnae. He then deposed Mokchong and put Hyŏnjong on the throne.\footnote{Kim Tujin, "Hyŏnjong-dae," p.52.}

Hyŏnjong reigned for twenty-two years, during which he favoured Buddhism, in particular the Mere-consciousness school. During his reign, the Assembly of the Eight Prohibitions (Ｐ'alguenboe 八闡會) and the Lantern Festival (Ｙŏndŭngboe 燃燈會) were revived, he had the first Koryŏ Tripitaka carved and established the Hyŏnwha-sa temple complex. At the same time, Hyŏnjong took care to limit the growth of Buddhism by keeping tabs on adulterous monks, prohibiting the donation of private houses to be transformed into temples and countering other excesses. Hyŏnjong's policies were no doubt inspired by his own background and the protection that Buddhist monasteries had provided him, but he also made sure that the Buddhist community worked for the state and not against it. Hyŏnjong had survived because the monks of the monasteries in which he stayed had considered him one of their own, however the Buddhists priests at court were at the beckoning of Kim Ch'i'yang and his aunt the Dowager Hōnae. Hyŏnjong knew from first-hand experience the dangers of schisms in the Buddhist community and how these could be exacerbated by those in power. In this sense, the second part of the first injunction with its references to villainous courtiers—Kim Ch'i'yang, for example—and corrupt monks seems more relevant to Hyŏnjong's reign than to T'aejo's.

\textit{Number Two

The second injunction reads as follows:

Second injunction: As for the temples and monasteries, Tosŏn established them all according to his divination of the mountains and rivers. Tosŏn said: “If temples and monasteries are arbitrarily built on sites apart from those I have nominated through divination, this will damage and dilute the terrestrial force and the blessed enterprise of the state will not
Theories and the Foundation of the Koryō
[Some Thoughts on the Political Upheavals
scholars working under the aegis of the county (Ch’oe Pyong-hon), “Toson’s Geomantic
chirisor-Cii kwan’gye-rCd chungshim-Oro” [Edict of the
han (Ch’oe Pyong-hon), “Toson’s Geomantic
Essays on Korea]
[Anthology of Korean Literature] [hereafter
Kuksagwan noncb ‘ong
Toson has been researched extensively,
death of historical sources. Several
scholars working under the aegis of the county in
which his temple of origin was formerly
located have attempted a comprehensive re-
evaluation of Toson and the reliability of the
sources concerning him. See Sŏngak kuska
Tosŏn-uuidin yŏn’gu [New Studies of National
Preceptor Sŏngak Tosŏn], ed. Yŏngam-gun (Yŏngam County) (Yŏngam: Yŏngam-gun,
1988). Ch’oe Pyŏng-hŏn’s studies are still
the most authoritative. See Ch’oe Pyŏng-hŏn,
“Tosŏn-ŭi saengue-wa Namal Yŏch’ŏ-ui
p’ungsu chirisŏl: Sŏnjong-gwa p’ungsu
chirisŏt’ui kwan gye-rŭl chungshim-ŭro” [The Life of Toson and Geomantic Theories
in Late Shilla and Early Koryŏ: On the
Relationship between the Meditation School and Geomancy], Han’guksa yon’gu [Korean
Historical Essays on Korea] 18, ed. Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, pp.227–39 (Kwachŏn: Kuksa
p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, 1988); Choi Byŏng-
hŏn (Ch’oe Pyŏng-hŏn), “Toson’s Geomantic Theories and the Foundation of the Koryŏ
Dōsen ni tsukite;” pp.32–49.

“Ongnyong-sa wangsa Tosŏn kabong
Sŏngak kuska kyosŏ” [Edict of the
Appointment of Royal Preceptor Tosŏn
from the Ongnyong-sa Temple as National
Preceptor Sŏngak], in Tong mun son
[Anthology of Korean Literature] thereafter
TMS 27: 9a–9b.

Ongnyong-sa wangsa Tosŏn kabong
Sŏngak kuska kwango in TMS27: 9b–10b.

According to an edict from Injong (仁宗 (1109–1123–1146), Tosŏn was
posthumously appointed as National Preceptor due to the importance of
his geomantic thought and the Buddhist merit he accrued during Injong’s
reign. The same document also reveals Tosŏn’s posthumous career in later reigns, mentioning that “Hyŏnjong revered Tosŏn and Sukchong
Tosŏn elevated him to the precious status of Royal Preceptor”. T’aejo is not
mentioned in this context, and Tosŏn’s merits with regard to the founding
of the dynasty do not occupy a conspicuous place. It is only in the accom-
panying letter of appointment that the story of Tosŏn’s prophecy of the
birth of Wang Kŏn is related. Tosŏn, as he emerges from this inscription,
is a figure of enormous stature. His thought is clearly important to the con-
temporaries of the people who erected his stele in the eleventh century.
This is corroborated by the fact that T’aejo is not mentioned in the text.

Despite the alleged importance of Tosŏn for T’aejo and despite Tosŏn’s
fame during his lifetime, it is apparently only from the reign of Hyŏn-
jong onwards that he was recognized as an important figure. Hyŏnjong is
known to have had a considerable interest in geomancy and related
arts of divination. According to the Standard Koryŏ History, Hyŏnjong
habitually consulted a geomancer (sulsa 衛士 or iimyangsa 陰陽師) to
last long.” I fear that future kings, princes, members of the aristocracy,
queens and princesses, and courtiers may designate [existing temples] their
private temples or build new temples and monasteries. If this happens, it
is a matter of great concern. In the last days of Shilla, people competed to
build Buddhist pagodas, which weakened and damaged the terrestrial
force which sank so low as to have disappeared. Is this not a sure warning?

This injunction is problematic in several respects. Tosŏn (827–898)
is famous for this geomantic theories and the influence he exerted upon
the Koryŏ dynasty. References to his theories, appeals to his authority, or
people calling themselves his disciples are well attested throughout Koryŏ
history. No reference, however, dates from early Koryŏ and despite the
large amount of scholarship on Tosŏn and his ties with the Wang lineage
before it became Koryŏ’s royal family, there is no contemporary evidence
that explicitly links Tosŏn and the Kaesŏng
oused

60 KS 4: 1b. This dream was explained as an omen that Hyŏnjong would succeed to the
throne. Kang Ogyŏp (廉玉葦) identified the unnamed tŏm-yang master as Chin Hamjo
(a pet name for the great diviner Chin Hamjo-Wŏn, who was also a yin-yang master) who
formed the famous geomantic school. He named him after the famous geomantic school
leader Tae-bok-ta, who is said to have been a great geomancer. The Tae-bok-ta
School taught the theories of yin and yang and the five phases. Highly esteemed
by some, he was laughed at by others (KS 5: 15a). Chin’s important role at the heart of
the state confirms the significance Hyŏnjong attached to these techniques. See Kang Ogyŏp,
“Koryŏ Sŏgyŏng-ui p’ungsuisirijok koch’al” (A Geomantic Consideration of Koryŏ’s Western
69–101, at pp.87–8.)
have his dreams explained. Combined with the absence of contemporary and reliable sources that link T’aejo and Toson, it must be concluded that Toson became important on a national level only from the reign of Hyönjong. Other sources on Toson confirm this. The stele inscription of Ch’oe Yuch’ong 崔惟濬 (1094–1173) on the occasion of the posthumous Bestowal of the title of National Preceptor Son’gak 先覺 to Toson dates from 1150; it is the first generally reliable source on Toson’s life, but dates from the twelfth century.

Toson’s biography is elaborated in Kim Kwanŭi’s Dynastic Genealogy of Koryô (Koryô segye 高麗世系), a genealogy of the Wang lineage included in the Standard Koryô History, which dates from the twelfth century and which is not reliable as a historical source. Its account of Toson’s visit to Kaesong and his prophecy of Wang Kôn’s unification of the Three Han is clearly of a later date.

Later sources on Toson are completely unreliable in historical terms; in them, he is gradually transformed into a figure of myth. Furthermore, as recent research has convincingly shown, the much-vaunted relationship between Shilla Son Buddhism and geomancy, of which Son monk Toson was supposed to be the representative, turns out to be non-existent.

In this light, the accepted interpretation of this second injunction, which confirms the cardinal role played by Toson’s thought in the founding of Koryô, must be reconsidered. Despite the fact that T’aetjo may have been aware of Toson and his teachings, the historical figure Toson was not important enough to T’aetjo to merit inclusion in the injunctions.

The precise relationship between Toson and the Wang lineage may be unclear, but the relationship between the local terrain and Buddhist temples in the second injunction was not invented. When King Wŏnsong 元聖王 died in 798, his burial spot at the Sungbok-sa Temple 崇福寺 was chosen with much care. The stele inscription for this temple by Ch’oe Chi’wŏn 崔致遠 explicitly links the presence of a Buddhist temple at this proper site with the longevity of the dynasty. Another stele by Ch’oe Chi’wŏn more generally confirms the relationship between the presence of Buddhist artefacts and the protection of the territory. Most telling, however, in this respect is that when T’aetjo had the head-temple of the Vinaya school built, he had a site selected by a geomancer. Thus, the relationship between Buddhist temples and terrain was considered to be of national importance. Importantly also, this anecdote implies that as late as 935 T’aetjo did not refer to Toson’s geomantic principles, even if the occasion was outstanding.

Furthermore, the prohibition on the arbitrary construction of temples was not something unique to Koryô: it had been prohibited in Shilla on several occasions. The economic disadvantages for the state of a multiplicity of temples and monasteries included additional burdens on the peasant

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**Figure 6**
The second injunction. From: Standard Koryô History
T'aejo probably had knowledge of Toson since it is recorded he met one of Toson's disciples. Yi Pyöngdo makes an elaborate argument that, when summarized, boils down to the assertion that since T'aejo knew Toson's disciple, he must have been a follower of Toson himself despite the fact that there is no historical evidence linking the two (Yi Pyöngdo, 

Koryŏ shidae-ti yŏn'gu, pp.61-3). Geomancy was so widely accepted at the time that T'aejo would have been able to consult a great many geomancers, whether monks or not; there was no need for him to rely on Toson's ideas for geomantic counsel.


Vermeersch, "Power of the Buddha," p.75. Interestingly, one Chosŏn literatus interpreted the second injunction as and order to build temples. See Ch'oe Pu, Tongguk onggammun Yŏjo bun'yo [The Koryŏ Injunctions in the Historical Mirror of of Korea], in Kŭnnum sŏansaenggup [The Collected Works of Ch'oe Pu] 016: 396a.


In his refutation of the authenticity of the second injunction iManishi pointed out that Kwangjong built many temples seemingly unhindered by T'aejo's injunctions, that
hibitions during his reign in disgust—he put a stop to it not long after.\footnote{KS\textsuperscript{3}: 32b--34b, KS\textsuperscript{94}: 7b. Kim Haengson succeeded in passing the Song civil examinations and returned to Koryò after two years.} He also—once again—proscribed the transformation of private residences into temples.\footnote{KS\textsuperscript{3}: 10a.} Hyŏnjong had to reissue the same prohibition, presumably because Songjong's edict had often been transgressed (even the senior statesman and scholar Ch'oe Hang had violated it). However, despite the fact that both Sŏngjong and Hyŏnjong issued such prohibitions, and that it was customary practice for them to be ignored, neither referred to any injunctions by T'aejo when they made their official pronouncements.

The unbridled building of temples and other edifices was a recurrent problem, indeed in 1002, Mokchong issued an edict in which he took responsibility for having wasted the precious strength and time of farmers and soldiers to construct temples, monasteries and pavilions.\footnote{KS\textsuperscript{3}: 33a--34b.} Ch'oe Sŏngno had already strongly warned Sŏngjong about the disastrous effects this had on the resources of the people in his \textit{On Current Affairs} (Shimuch'aek 時務策).\footnote{KS\textsuperscript{93}: 15b--19b. A translation can be found in Peter Lee, \textit{Sourcebook}, pp.289--92.} Ch'oe (or any other scholar of this period), however, made no mention of the second injunction and, perhaps more significantly, no indication is given that this problem dated from T'aejo's reign; it is considered to be a problem that emerged under T'aejo's successors. The second injunction is first mentioned only when, during Munjong's reign (1009--1046--1083), Ch'oe Yusŏn (崔惟善, 1075, Ch'oe Sŏngno's grandson) objected to the proposed building of the Hŭngwang-sa Temple 興王寺:

/Sŏngjong had once again to prohibit turning residences into temples, and that Ch'oe Sŏngno fails to mention this injunction when he criticizes the rampant building of temples all over the country. See Imanishi, “Kōra Daisho,” pp.25, 27. For a summary of Kwangjong's temple building, see Kamata Shigeo, “Buddhism during Koryŏ,” in \textit{Buddhism in Koryo: A Royal Religion}, eds. Lewis R. Lancaster, Kikun Suh and Chai-shin Yu (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1996), pp.40--1. Again, Hō Chunggwŏn presents a reductionist view of the second injunction: according to him, it was merely meant to warn against the dangers of the veneration of the Buddha. See Hō Chunggwŏn, “Koryŏ ch'ogi yugyojŏk chŏngch'i sasang-ui hyŏnsŏng kwajŏng,” pp.137--38.

\textbf{Figure 8}

The Koryŏ landscape: remnants of a defensive wall from Koryŏ on a hilltop. Photographer unknown
Toson, most prominently the polygon yon'gu, Toson was known—and “national preceptor” whether buildings should be high or low (KS
28: 28a-b).

The Standard Koryŏ History tells us of some instances. A book written by Toson called the Secret Records of Toson [Toson pigi 道院秘記] is mentioned with regard to the question whether buildings should be high or low (KS
28: 28b). Toson was also said to have written a geomantic survey of Kaesong, called the Record of Auspicious Places in Kaesong [Kongak myŏndanggi 松岳明堂記] (KS56: 5b).

Since “pi” 秘 and “mil” 密 often appear as alternate characters, it is possible that the two titles mentioned above are in fact one and the same book. In general, however, scholarship on Koryŏ has distinguished between them. Myoč'6ng 約通, the twelfth-century rebellious geomancer monk claimed to be a student of a student of Toson, despite the chronological impossibility which would have three generations span almost three centuries (KS 127: 30a). For more details on /over

Construction on the Húngwang-sa Temple started in 1056 and finished in 1067, thus Ch’oe Yusŏn’s comment was probably made sometime during the second half of the 1050s. Munjong was pleased with the honest comments of his minister, but decided nonetheless to disregard them and build the Húngwang-sa.78

Thus, the second injunction is not mentioned for more than a century after T’aejo’s death, nor does it appear in Ch’oe Sŏngno’s On Current Affairs, in which he criticized the lavish support Buddhism received.79 Ch’oe had known T’aejo personally and was the towering figure of Koryŏ politics and scholarship at the time he wrote his memorial to Sŏngjong so his failure to appeal to T’aejo’s injunctions is puzzling—the argument that Ch’oe Sŏngno knew of the injunctions, but kept them secret is not convincing and, indeed, Ch’oe’s reticence sits strangely with his grandson’s candour in this matter.80 We should also note that Ch’oe Sŏngno did not refrain from mentioning other instructions (now lost) left by T’aejo for his successors in his memorial, a genre of document that would have been directed precisely to the audience the Ten Injunctions targeted, namely, the ruler and his most trusted ministers.

Thus, the second injunction was not written by T’aejo. The connection between the royal family and Toson is something that was imagined much later, probably for the first time during Hyŏnjong’s reign. Geomancy does not seem to have been exclusively associated with Toson during late Shilla and early Koryŏ—his popularity later in the dynasty may perhaps be explained by the fact that he left a corpus of writings, unlike his contemporaries. In this way, a claim to his authorship was easily made, either by forging a text in the name of Toson (which certainly occurred) or, more commonly, by using his theories.81 Restrictions on temple construction were also more appropriate for later reigns than T’aejo’s. Hyŏnjong in particular needed to control the Buddhist community as well as the apparently popular practice amongst the aristocracy of constructing temples, and his prohibition against arbitrary temple construction seems to have been successful. It has been noted, indeed, that his successors tended to tour exist-

77 KS95: 6h–7a.
78 Imanishi Ryū pointed out a glaring anachronism in Ch’oe’s comment: Ch’oe calls Toson “National Preceptor”, while this title was only bestowed upon him by Injong. This anachronism may simply be a clerical error since Toson was known as a National Preceptor when the Standard Koryŏ History was compiled. The difference between Meditation Master (Sŏnsa 慈師), Royal Preceptor (Wangsa 王師) and Great Master (T’aeasa 太師) all titles under which Toson was known—and “national preceptor” (kuksa 國師) consists of only one character. See Imanishi, “Koryŏ Daisho,” p.28; KS 15: 28a–b; TMS 117: 16b–22b.
79 Numbers two, four, eight, ten, thirteen, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen of the twenty-two extant points of On Current Affairs deal with the economic excesses associated with Buddhism. For Ch’oe Sŏngno’s writings, I have relied on the excellent annotated edition by Yi Kibaek. See Yi Kibaek, ed., Ch’oe Sŏngno sangsŏmun yon’gu [A Study of the Memorials of Ch’oe Sŏngno] (Seoul: Iljogak, 1992).
80 Yi Pyŏngdo, Koryŏ shidae-ui yon’gu, p.71; Kim Sŏngjun, Han’guk chungse chŏngch’i pŏpcheosa yon’gu, pp.6–8.
81 The Standard Koryŏ History tells us of some instances. A book written by Toson called the Secret Records of Toson [Toson pigi 道院密記] is mentioned with regard to the question whether buildings should be high or low (KS 28: 28b). Toson was also said to have written a geomantic survey of Kaesong, called the Record of Auspicious Places in Kaesong [Kongak myŏndanggi 松岳明堂記] (KS56: 5b). Kim Wije 金惟 İş, a famous twelfth-century geomancer repeatedly referred to writings by Toson, most prominently the Confidential Records of Toson [Toson mjogu 道院密記] (KS58: 9b; KS 112: 41a; KS 122: 1a–122–3b). Since “pi” 秘 and “mil” 密 often appear as alternate characters, it is possible that the two titles mentioned above are in fact one and the same book. In general, however, scholarship on Koryŏ has distinguished between them. Myoč’6ng 約通, the twelfth-century rebellious geomancer monk claimed to be a student of a student of Toson, despite the chronological impossibility which would have three generations span almost three centuries (KS 127: 30a). For more details on /over
ing temples rather than build new ones.\textsuperscript{82} As with the first injunction, then, the reign of Hyŏnjong is the most likely period for the compilation of injunction two.

\textit{Number Three}

The third injunction is usually not disputed when the authenticity of the Ten Injunctions as a whole is under discussion. It reads as follows:

Third injunction: Handing over the state to the eldest son is called correct ritual practice, yet when emperor Yao let Shun succeed him, because [his own son] Dan Zhu 夏朱 was not worthy to succeed his father, this truly was public-spirited. Therefore, if the eldest son is not worthy to succeed his father, let the second eldest succeed to the throne. If the second eldest, too, is unworthy of the throne, let the brother who has the most officials supporting him succeed to the royal lineage.\textsuperscript{83}

At first sight, this injunction seems to be legitimate. It is a rationalization of patrilineal succession which would probably have been welcome after scores of Shilla kings succeeded one another on the flimsiest pretence of legitimacy and were often supported \textit{manu militari}. However, a closer inspection of the third injunction may yield a different perspective. First, T'aejo had no brothers who could compete with his sons. In fact, T'aejo had so few direct relatives that he did everything to enlarge his lineage (he had twenty-nine wives and fathered more than fifty children). The injunction may, however, have been aimed at his children, who did have brothers but, as it happened, the succession the rulers during the first century of the Koryŏ dynasty did not follow the instructions laid down in this injunction. T'aejo was succeeded by his son Hyejong, but Hyejong was succeeded by his brother Chŏngjong, and Chŏngjong by his brother Kwangjong. Kwangjong was succeeded by his son Kyŏngjong; Kyŏngjong by his brother Sŏngjong; Sŏngjong by his nephew and Kyŏngjong's son Mokchong. Mokchong, finally, was succeeded by Hyŏnjong, his cousin twice-removed. Hyŏnjong was a grandson of T'aejo, but his father had never sat upon the throne, whereas Mokchong was a great-grandson of T'aejo by way of two other kings—Kwangjong and Kyŏngjong. Hyŏnjong was succeeded by his eldest son Tŏkchong; Tŏkchong by his brother Chŏngjong and Chŏnjong by his brother Munjong. Direct patrilineal succession did not become the norm in Koryŏ until Sukchong ascended the throne in 1095. It was often aspired

\textsuperscript{82} Kang Ogyŏp, “Koryŏ Sŏgyŏng-ui p’ungsujirijok koch’al,” p.88.

\textsuperscript{83} K3 2. 15b. This is the original injunction: 其三曰，傳國以嫡，雖常常禮，然丹朱不肖， 堯揮於舜，實為公心，若元子不肖，與其次 子，又不肖，與其兄弟之眾，所推戴者，傳承 大統. The \textit{Essentials of Koryŏ History} has a slightly different version of the second /ovtr
to, as patrilineal descent and primogeniture are more clearly defined and should have given less occasion for power struggles than Koryŏ's old customs, according to which the most powerful brother or son won the throne. The section of this injunction that promised the throne to the most suitable son was, of course, a complicating factor, open to interpretation and, thus, struggle. Nonetheless, patrilineal succession by the eldest son was a desideratum throughout much of the Koryŏ dynasty.\footnote{Succession according to the method described in this injunction was deemed desirable in early, middle and late Koryŏ. Thus, it is reasonable to imagine that T'aejo himself could have written this injunction even if the actual pattern of succession did not follow the third injunction.}

If this injunction is seen against the background of the struggle that put Hyŏnjong on the throne, however, and of the problems that arose because of Hyŏnjong's irregular ascension, his fall from power, and his policies, a different and more persuasive interpretation of the third injunction becomes apparent. When Sŏngjong died at thirty-eight, the throne reverted to the line of his older brother, Kyŏngjong, in the person of Sŏngjong's nephew, Mokchong, who was eighteen when he became Koryŏ's ruler. Mokchong was a weak and ineffectual ruler who, according to the Standard Koryŏ History, preferred hunting to government. He was effectively dominated by his mother, the Dowager Hŏnae who, with her lover, Kim Ch'iyang, ruled the country, as we saw above. In 1003 a son was born from this union; as a consequence Wang Sun (the future Hyŏnjong) was forced to become a monk in order to clear the path to the throne for the newborn. When Hŏnae and Kim Ch'iyang wanted to secure their power by appointing their own illegitimate son as the heir to the throne, and tried to murder Wang Sun, high officials loyal to Mokchong called in the help of Kang Cho, a military commander on duty in the north. He marched on the capital with an army of five thousand armoured men, killed Kim Ch'iyang, banished Hŏnae and deposed Mokchong. He then enthroned Hyŏnjong and had his men kill Mokchong as he fled to the south.\footnote{Hyŏnjong's legitimacy was, therefore, far from established, having gained the throne in such circumstances.}

The urgent need for legitimization of Hyŏnjong's rule is also evident in the Standard Koryŏ History when it describes the preamble to the coup d'état. The high officials whose actions led to the installation of Hyŏnjong were staunch adversaries of the Dowager Hŏnae and Kim Ch'iyang but their loyalty was first to the throne and only then to the ruler. They came from different backgrounds but shared the conviction that the throne needed rescuing from Kim Ch'iyang.\footnote{The best way to guarantee this was to install an able ruler in the place of the weak Mokchong. When Ch'oe Hang called...}

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on Kang Cho for assistance, he may not have not foreseen that Mokchong would be killed, but his deposition was already a fait accompli. The biography of Ch'ae Ch'ungsun 蔡忠順 (?–1034) indicates this when Ch'ae was visiting the ill Mokchong to confer about Kim Ch'iyang’s plot to overthrow him:

“My physical condition is slowly getting critical and it seems that I will be in the ground before the morning. The only living grandson of T'aejo is the prince of Taeryang Palace. You, my lord, and Ch'oe Hang have always cherished loyalty and righteousness. Now exert yourself fully to help [Ch'oe] to prevent this country from passing into the hands of another family!” Ch'ungsun left the palace and conferred with Ch'oe Hang. Ch'oe Hang said: “I have always been worried that this might happen, but that His Majesty now holds this view is a great blessing for the state”. Yu Ch’ungjong 劉忠誘 sent inspecting censor Ko Yonggi 高英起 who told Ch'ae and Ch'oe: “His Majesty is lying in his sickbed and worried that the state may fall into the hands of another family, now that villains are waiting for an opportunity. If His Majesty’s condition becomes critical, we have to make a grandson of T'aejo his successor”. Ch'ae and Ch'oe pretended to be surprised and asked: “Where can we find a grandson of T'aejo?” The answer was: “The prince of the Taeryang Palace is a grandson of T'aejo. He can be made ruler”. Ch'ae then said: “For us too it has been a long time since we heard these words. We will act in accordance with the will of heaven”.88
Wang Sun was the only living grandson of Taejo. His late father Wang Uk (王郁?) (known posthumously as Anjong 安宗) was one of Taejo’s many sons. With Wang Sun, then, the throne of Koryo would go to an undisputed descendant of Taejo who was actually closer to Taejo than Mokchong, who was, after all, Taejo’s great-grandson. Wang Sun’s claims to the throne, or perhaps the claims made in his name, solely rested on this direct relationship to the dynasty’s founder. In this conversation, as in subsequent references to the suitability of Wang Sun as the successor to the throne, the question of legitimacy is phrased in terms of his patrilineal descent from Taejo. This, and this alone, it seems, qualified Hyonjong for the throne.

The historical annals which were used to compile the Standard Koryo History were compiled under the supervision of Ch’oe Hang and it is his version of the coup d’etat that has become official history. Nowhere are the obvious attempts at legitimizing the future Hyonjong and playing down the coup d’etat more visible than in Ch’ae Ch’un-gsun’s biography: a few sentences earlier than the passage cited above, and in the same conversation between ruler and servant, the following exchange takes place:

[The king:] “I am gradually recovering, but I have heard that there are persons from outside who are waiting for an opportunity to replace me. Do you know about this?” Ch’un-gsun answered: “I have heard rumours, but I have not been able to substantiate them”. The king then took a sealed letter from his pillow and handed it to him. It had been written by Yu Ch’ungjong and said: “Right Executioner of the Department of Ministries Kim Ch’iyang has an eye on the throne. He has sent his men to me bearing gifts and has revealed his secret plans, earnestly asking for my cooperation. I have admonished him and refused to take his offer, but I dare not hide this affair from Your Majesty”. The king picked up another letter and gave it to Ch’ae. It was from Wang Sun, prince of the Taeryang Palace and it read as follows: “Villains have sent men here who surrounded me and pressured me into having food and drink they brought with them. Suspecting that it might be poisonous I did not eat it, instead feeding it to some crows and sparrows. The birds all died. Now that the conspiracy has become this dangerous, I beseech Your Majesty to have pity on me and save me”. Ch’un-gsun read the letter and said: “Seeing that the affair has become this urgent, I will have to do something about it immediately”, 89

As we saw earlier, in the course of this conversation, Mokchong’s condition changed from “recovering” to “dying”. Whether this is due to a clerk’s error, a sloppy interpolation or alteration of the original biography can no longer be known. Mokchong’s illness, though, is suspect, especially since he suddenly fell ill after seeing that Kim Ch’iyang had set fire to a palace building to force a confrontation. The emphasis on the critical condition of Mokchong plays down the coup d’etat and disguises
it as a more or less officially sanctioned change of power. The king himself, after all, realized that he was not fit to rule and decided that Wang Sun, a grandson of T'aejo, should succeed him.\textsuperscript{90} When it had become clear that Wang Sun would be the next Koryŏ ruler and Mokchong would be forced to abdicate, he confided in Ch'oe Hang:

Recently, a fire broke out in the palace depot and a coup d'\textsc{e}tat took place due to my carelessness. Everything was caused by my lack of virtue, so who am I to blame for this? My only wish is to return to the country and grow old quietly. Tell the new ruler what has happened and assist him to the best of your ability!\textsuperscript{91}

The shock of the coup d'\textsc{e}tat was, thus, softened by simultaneously focusing attention on the danger that Kim Ch'i yang (the other “family” or \textit{t'asong} 姓) posed to the continued existence of Koryŏ, on Mokchong's admitted unsuitability for the throne and on Wang Sun's credentials. This strategy seems to have worked. Yi Chehyŏn, whose commentaries in the \textit{Standard Koryŏ History} are often critical, was certainly convinced. In his commentary to the annals of Mokchong in the \textit{Standard Koryŏ History}, he harshly criticizes the king for the ruin he almost brought upon Koryŏ. He does not even mention Kang Cho's regicide, but ends with the unsympathetic conclusion that “the misfortune of giving up the throne was actually no misfortune”. For Koryŏ, Mokchong's forced abdication was an instance of good fortune.\textsuperscript{92} Seen against this background, the third injunction takes on a new and explicit meaning. Hyŏnjong, as the son of a prince of the blood, had legitimate claims to the throne. In the family hierarchy, he was one generation senior to Mokchong, something Hwang Churyang later also hinted at in a debate surrounding the proper arrangement of the ancestral tablets in the royal shrines.\textsuperscript{93} Thus, taking into account Mokchong's proven ineptitude in ruling the country, the throne was, therefore, legitimately given to the royal grandson “who had the most officials supporting him”.

However, the question of Hyŏnjong's legitimization as a ruler has more complexities than simply the manner in which he came to occupy the throne. Hyŏnjong may have been a son of a prince of the blood, but he was also the illegitimate result of a secret liaison between Wang Uk and the Dowager Hŏnjong 賦貞 (929-992, posthumous name Hyosuk 孝肃) who was one of the widows of his brother Kyŏnjong.\textsuperscript{94} Hŏnjong was a granddaughter of T'aejo and a sister of the Dowager Hŏnae.\textsuperscript{95}
When Sŏngjong found out about the liaison, he exiled Wang Uk, and had the child (Wang Sun, later Hyŏnjong) raised after Hŏnjŏng died in childbirth.

Hyŏnjong, then, had two different legitimacy issues to deal with when he became Koryŏ's ruler: the means by which he ascended the throne and the illegitimacy of his birth. While the emphasis on his direct patrilineal descent from T'aejo was used to deflect criticism of his ascension, it could also, ironically, draw attention to the circumstances of his birth. Thus, Hyŏnjong undertook the time-honoured measure of elevating the status of his deceased parents, bestowing posthumous names and titles on them and reburying the coffin of his father in the surroundings of Kaesŏng, Koryŏ's traditional royal burial ground. His most trusted ministers were in charge of these important affairs. Hyŏnjong even established a new, large temple complex—the Hyŏnhwa-sa Temple—in their memory. This was where he held memorial rites for them, and where his children held the memorial rites in his own honour. Much has been written about the establishment of the Hyŏnhwa-sa Temple; all that needs to be said here is that Hyŏnjong's most important motive in its establishment was the procurement of lasting legitimacy for his parents, and accordingly for himself. The carving of the Tripitaka undertaken in 1011 served a similar purpose. Its main purpose was to expel the Khitan invaders or to stop them from invading Koryŏ again but it was also partly an act of filial piety to commemorate his dead parents.

Hyŏnjong and his ministers undertook strenuous efforts to free him from the blemishes of double illegitimacy. The treatment these events receive in the Standard Koryŏ History is revealing. Whereas Mokchong is portrayed as a self-conscious, guilt-ridden ruler who is fully aware that he does not deserve to sit on the throne, Hyŏnjong (with the exception of the account of his flight south in 1010) is portrayed as a strong ruler. Other sources also point to Mokchong's deficiencies as a ruler, but he never had to suffer Liao invasions and the sacking of the capital, as Hyŏnjong did. Hyŏnjong was not, indeed, completely innocent with regard to the Liao invasions: word had reached Liao that Mokchong had been assassinated and they equipped a punitive expedition to Koryŏ to right this wrong yet the Standard Koryŏ History gives no clue as to Hyŏnjong's opinion about the invasions and his role in them. I shall consider the Liao invasions later but it is important to note that Hyŏnjong never received investiture as King of Koryŏ from Liao, Koryŏ's suzerain, since Sŏngjong had recognized them in that role. This lack of approval from Liao meant that Hyŏnjong even had to feign his own death in order to rule undisturbed. A cloud of illegitimacy, then, hung over Hyŏnjong and this had direct consequences for his rule. Under these circumstances, his quest for legitimacy is easily understood.
To summarize, the third injunction may have been written by T'aejo but it is more likely that it was written during Hyŏnjong's reign. Hyŏnjong had to wage a battle on three fronts: first, he had to establish his legitimacy as a ruler. He did this by emphasizing he was T'aejo's last living grandson. While the third injunction explains the importance of patrilineal succession, it also provides a justification for unsuitable persons to be excluded from succession, which is precisely what happened. Secondly, Hyŏnjong had to establish the legitimacy of his birth through his parents, thus he built a temple complex in their memory, and took other measures outlined above. Thirdly, he had to convince Koryŏ's suzerain that he was the legitimate sovereign of Koryŏ, so as to obtain their investiture and a further legitimization of his own rule. In this he failed and, as a result, had to fake his own death. Securing legitimacy was one of the most important tasks of Hyŏnjong's reign. This is reflected in the historical annals for this period which had been edited by Ch'oe Hang and his protégé Hwang Churyang, both of whom are likely suspects to have forged the Ten Injunctions.

Number Four

The fourth injunction reflects T'aejo's policies toward other countries. It reads as follows:

Fourth injunction: Our eastern country has long cherished Tang traditions and followed all of its institutions with regard to writing, material objects, music and ritual. However, where location and soil is different, the character of the people will be as well. There is no reason to exert ourselves to be the same. The Khitan are a state of birds and wild animals. Their customs are not like ours, and their language is different. We should take great care not to model our dress and ceremonies on theirs.101

When a Khitan mission came to seek Koryŏ's submission in 942, T'aejo banished the thirty envoys to an island and tied the fifty camels they had brought as a gift under the Manbu Bridge 萬夫橋, where they starved to death.102 T'aejo's virulent anti-Khitanism is regarded as axiomatic by most Koryŏ historians.103 It should be noted, however, that Ch'oe Sŏngno discussed T'aejo's policy towards Liao and the camel incident in particular in a very positive manner. In his memorial to Sŏngjong he praised T'aejo for his firm stance with regard to the Liao, nominating the camel incident as the action that defined T'aejo's attitude toward the neighbouring state. Ch'oe wrote this memorial during the reign of Sŏnjong, at a time when the Khitan threat at the borders had become real.104 Rather than simply judging T'aejo's Liao policies, Ch'oe's interpretation of them in all likelihood reflected the new and very real Khitan threat. T'aejo's independence, his distrust of the Khitan and his sympathy for Parhae 帕海 are generally considered to be linked.105 Much attention is given to Koryŏ's policy of seeking investiture from "legitimate" Chinese dynasties, but it should be
Figure 13
The fourth injunction.
From: Standard Koryo History

remembered that dynasties such as the Later Zhou were not Han Chinese, but of Turkic or other ethnicity. As I have argued elsewhere, the distinction between barbaric Northern dynasties and admirable Han Chinese dynasties that is often attributed to Koryo statesmen and scholars is largely fictional and purely rhetorical: Koryo could not afford to use such narrow categories when dealing with powerful dynasties over the border. Although T’aejo was indeed lukewarm with regard to the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with Liao, some points need reconsideration. Immediately after the fall of Parhae in 926, the Koryo court sent an embassy to the Liao emperor to congratulate him on his birthday. The next year another tributary mission was sent to the Liao capital. After 927, two more Liao embassies reached Koryo: in 937 and in 939. Neither was turned back, nor were the envoys mistreated. T’aejo’s warm welcome of Parhae’s refugees and the hospitable reception that he accorded the Parhae crown prince were not, as is often suggested, inspired by a sense of being related. On the contrary, T’aejo defended his pro-Parhae policy by rhetorically according Parhae the status of Koryo’s in-laws which, in the context of royal families, is not always a comfortable position. The rhetoric concerning Parhae seems to have been for domestic consumption only. One important reason why T’aejo treated the Liao envoys and their camels so badly was that he needed to signal to the 200,000 Parhae refugees and a large number of Jurchen cavalry within Koryo’s borders that they would be safe from Liao. If the camel incident is understood in this context, it cannot be regarded as a simple expression of T’aejo’s hatred of the Khitan. Thus, there is little left to suggest that T’aejo wanted to destroy Liao. Another argument that refutes T’aejo’s anti-Khitanism is that during the early tenth century the Liao empire was still in a consolidating phase. Despite the fact that Koryo and Liao had come closer to each other, they did not yet formally share a border and there was little direct contact between them. Jurchen tribes were still in practical control of the border areas (which were themselves not well defined in this a Korean nation. A representative study that takes this approach is that of Kim Sanggi, “Tan’gu-gwa-Oi hangjaeng” [The Resistance Against the Khitan], in Kuksasang-qi cheonjung (Seoul: Kuksa p’yŏnch’ŏn wiwonhoe, 1959), Vol.2, pp.1–175. A similar approach can be found in Michael C. Rogers’s studies of the Koryo period, “National Consciousness in Medieval Korea: The Impact of Liao and Chin on Koryo,” in China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and its neighbors, 10th to 14th centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi, pp.151–72 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). These studies have undermined the image of a defenceless and passive Koryo casu quo Korea but they can be critiqued for their exces- sive tendency to make dichotomies between the objects of their research. Resistance to foreign invaders does not equal nation formation and certainly not nationalism; often, resistance was purely a matter of life and death. Foreign pressure can act as a catalyst or a contributing factor to the formation of new kinds of identity but it cannot assume sole responsibility for it. These and similar studies also display a tendency to credit Koryo nativism with the formation of a national consciousness, while Koryo’s sinicized literati are understood as obstacles on the road to a nation. For a critique of this kind of reasoning, see Breuker, “Independent Realm”./ovE
period). Remnants of Parhae's ruling stratum had established a new state called Chongangguk (Chin. Dingangguo 定安国) on the borders of Koryŏ and the former Parhae territories (see Fig. 16). Liao influence did not stretch as far as Koryŏ during Taejo's lifetime, which is why Liao needed Koryŏ's active approval for establishing a suzerain-vassal relationship. It was only during the reign of Sŏngjong that Liao power came to be felt in Koryŏ, leading to invasions and Sŏngjong's recognition of Liao as Koryŏ's suzerain. There was no need, then, in the tenth century to warn against Khitan influence.

There is clear evidence that there was considerable trade with Liao from the late tenth century onwards, to some extent through embassies, but mainly in the frontier market established at the border in Poju 保州 (Űiju 義州) between 1008 and 1010 (see Fig. 17). Liao had conquered the traditionally Chinese region where metal was worked, and these products were in much demand in Koryŏ. Other products that were imported were riding equipment and silk. Khitian customs and products were also spread within Koryŏ by the large presence of naturalized Khitians there (all through early Koryŏ, small groups of Khitians came to surrender to Koryŏ in order to live within its borders). Liao Buddhist knowledge and paraphernalia were much in demand. Liao influence even stretched into the field of wooden architecture and construction, Koryŏ, then, had cause to be worried about increasing Liao influence, not merely militarily, but also commercially and culturally.


Figure 14
Liao or Khitan officials on a wall painting. Photographer unknown

104 Yi Kibaek, Ch'oeSŏngno, pp. 10–11, 14–15. According to Ho Chunggwon, as far as Ch'oe Sŏngno was concerned, the only blemish on Taejo's record as an ideal ruler was that Taejo had allowed Khitan customs to enter Koryŏ, despite his resolute stance on diplomatic relations. See Ho Chunggwon, "Koryo ch'og'i yuyojok ch'ongch'i sasang-ui hyŏngsŏng kwajŏng," pp. 154–5. A similar instance can be found during Injong's reign. In 1129, when the Khitan threat had been replaced with the Jurchen threat, Injong issued an edict criticizing the widespread adoption of Khitan customs. According to the edict, Taejo had propagated Sinitic culture and prohibited the customs of the "Khitan barbarians". The term "Khitan" had by now become a generic term for "northern barbarians". This interpretation of Taejo's instructions is clearly at odds with the original text that prohibits the adoption of Khitan customs and also establishes limits on the adoption of Sinitic culture. At a time when the decaying Song dynasty was /over
Following the Liao conquest of regions at the Song frontier and the ongoing stabilisation and centralisation of the Liao state apparatus, Koryŏ started to feel the pressure of growing Liao influence. Even after Sŏngjong’s recognition of the Liao emperor, relations between Koryŏ and Liao remained strained. Frequent border incursions back and forth kept the frontier situation tense and both sides built fortifications at places the other side found threatening, refusing to give in. A Koryŏ envoy to the Song in 999 told the emperor that “the people in Koryŏ took Chinese culture as their example” and that they were “still being pressured by the Khitan.” Pressure from Liao mounted until the enthronement of Hyŏnjong offered them the perfect causus belli: Mokchong, a vassal of the Liao emperor, had been murdered. The Liao emperor himself led his armies into Koryŏ to find out what had happened and who was guilty (see Fig. 19).

Palaces, temples, monasteries, libraries and archives were not spared the wrath of the Liao emperor. In addition, however, while Hyŏnjong fled south on his dismal odyssey, the Liao armies defeated Kang Cho’s army and captured the commander and his second-in-command Yi Hyŏnun.

Figure 15
The Liao conquest of Parhae in 926.
Map by author
The Khitan emperor loosened Kang Cho’s bonds and asked him: “Will you become my servant?” Kang Cho answered: “I am a native of Koryo (Koryoん高麗人), how could I become your servant?” The emperor asked again, but the answer was the same. He then had flesh cut from Kang’s body with a sword, but when he asked again, the answer was still the same. However, when the emperor asked Yi Hyŏnun, he answered: “Now that I have seen the bright new sun and moon with my own two eyes, how could I persist to think of the old streams and mountains?” Kang Cho was enraged when he heard this and kicked Hyŏnun with his feet, saying: “You are a native of Koryo, how can you say that?” In the end, the Khitan killed Kang Cho.127

Chŏngan-guk and the situation after the Liao conquest of Parhae in 926. Map by author

These statements in the Liaoshi, none of which appear in the Standard Koryo History. This in itself is not remarkable. Given the destruction of many historical materials dating from early Koryo, significant omissions must be expected in the entries of the Standard Koryo History. Continued relations between Koryo and Liao, however, strongly imply that the fourth injunction is suspect in its overt hatred of the Khitan. In order to remedy this, theories have been proposed ranging from intentional forgery on the part of the compilers of the Liaoshi, a case of mistaken identity (where Later Paekche, T’aebong or Small Koguryo were intended) or simply scribal error. None of these theories, however, addresses the question of why these entries should be suspect; historians, after all, happily use Chinese texts to supplement Koryo sources. For a treatment of the different theories, see Song Kihô, “Parhae myŏlman-gi-ŭi taeoe kwan’gye: Kŏran, Hasangug-ŭi kwan’gye-rul chungshim-ho” [Foreign Relations during the Period of Parhae’s Destruction: On the Relations with the Khitan and the Later Three Kingdoms], Han’guk saron 17 (1987): 47-97, at pp.8-10.

T’aejo explained in a letter sent to the Later Jin emperor that Koryo and Parhae were related to each other by marriage. See Zizhi tongjian [Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government] 285: 9298.


Kim Kaptong has argued that the foundation of the Kaet’ae-sa on Later Paekche territory can partly be explained by T’aejo’s ardent wish to destroy the Khitan. According to Kim, this is clear from the prayer text T’aejo himself wrote for the dedication ceremony of the temple. Kim’s translation of the relevant passage, though, is somewhat misleading. His translation refers to “Khitan”, while the original text simply says “evil people” and the context makes it clear that T’aejo is referring to the soldiers of Later Paekche, mentioned in the preceding sentence. Furthermore, it is not, as Kim suggests, an oath by T’aejo to cleanse the country from the Khitan (who were nowhere near Koryo at this time), but rather a reference to an oath he had pledged earlier to rescue the people from the evil soldiers of Later Paekche, which he had just done. This interpretation is supported by the words of T’aejo recorded in Supplementary Jottings in Idleness (Pohan chip補闕集) where he clearly links his victory over Later Paekche, the establishment of the Kaet’ae-sa and the elimination of the evil rebels mentioned in the prayer text. See Pohan chip 1: 1b-2a (translation in Peter Lee, Sourcebook, p.433; Shinjŏng tongguk (New and Expanded Korean Geographical Dictionary) 18: 16a-b; Kim Kaptong, “Wang Kŏn-ŭi ‘hunyo shipcho’ chaehaesŏk,” p.259.

Figure 17

Tenth-century wooden Liao Buddha. Photographer unknown

If they did not occupy it and opted instead for the establishment of a semi-dependent protectorate, which preserved Parhae's reign names. At the end of T'aejo's reign, Liao was busy consolidating their expanding empire. In 942, relations with the Later Jin deteriorated to the point of open warfare. The fighting lasted for more than three years and although the Khitan armies triumphed in the end, their victory was not achieved without major Liao defeats. The Khitan then invaded far into Later Jin territory, paying a high price for such an ill-advised plan to enter unknown territory with a hostile population. Liao had little real interest in Koryo until the 980s. The Later Jin proved to be a worthy opponent and so did the Tangut empire and the various tribes Liao encountered. The most authoritative study on Liao (by Twitchett and Tietze) concludes that, "the Chitin's relations with Korea until the 980s had been of minor importance". Far from preparing an invasion of Koryo, then, Liao had its hands full with the Later Jin during the 930s and 940s. It was not until the reign of Songjong that Liao directed its attention to Koryo. See Twitchett and Tietze, "The Liao," p.66, pp.72-5, p.100.

According to Yi Chongshin, the fact that Koryo and Liao did not share a border at the time is an indication that the Liao presence frustrated T'aejo's expansionist policies to the north. However, in the light of available sources, the lack of boundary disputes and the absence of a shared border should rather be seen as evidence that neither country had concrete and immediate plans to invade the other. Yi sees T'aejo's distrust of the Khitan, the emphasis on the Western Capital in the fifth injunction, and the emphasis on strong borders in the ninth injunction as part of the same ambition to reconquer Koguryo's territory. Despite the attractive coherence of Yi's reasoning, there is no evidence to demonstrate that T'aejo's statements with regard to a northern expedition were anything but rhetoric. T'aejo never went beyond the Yalu and Tumen rivers in his expansion of Koryo territory in the north, nor did he show any signs that he was inclined to do so. Hugh Kang persuasively suggests that the Western Capital had developed into a powerbase for disgruntled nobles of Shilla origin during T'aejo's reign. These resettled nobles were pushing for a northwestern expansion, while T'aejo strove to prevent the Western Capital from gaining too much power and influence. See Yi Chongshin, "T'aejo-ui tae-Koran ch'ongchae," pp.27-31; H.W. Kang, "The First Succession Struggle of Koryo, in 945: A Reinterpretation," The Journal of Asian Studies 36 (1977): 411-28.

Chongan-guk was conquered by Liao probably somewhere during the two last decades.
pretended to have surrendered when Liao held him captive.\footnote{130} He tried to escape, but failed and was killed when he refused to swear loyalty to the Liao emperor (and did so in increasingly foul language). Supposedly, Khitan soldiers then ate his heart and liver.\footnote{131} Kang may have died as a hero but his past was tarnished. Ha, on the other hand, had fought the invaders valiantly and died a hero’s death, while he could have chosen to become a Liao general:

This time Ha answered the Khitan emperor sincerely: “I cannot have two minds about my fatherland. Even if I have to die ten thousand deaths, I do not wish to live to serve your dominant country (saedae 事大).”\footnote{132}

Ha’s descendants received high appointments and privileged treatment; as late as the twelfth century his great-great-grandson was given a promotion on the basis of his forefather’s merit.\footnote{133} The honours that befell Ha were also bestowed on Sŏ Hŭi 徐熙, the successful negotiator of the 993 peaceful settlement with Liao, and on Kang Kamch’ān 姜邯贊, the general who had inflicted a disastrous defeat on Liao troops in 1018.\footnote{134} No other meritorious subjects were honoured as frequently and as long as those who fought against the Khitan.

With regard to the fourth injunction, it should be noted that in 983 Yi Chibaek 李知白 (fl. late tenth century) had already submitted a memorial to Sŏngjong, in which he protested against the ruler’s sinophile policies and urgently advised him to rely on Koryŏ’s native traditions to defeat the Khitan threat. Yi Chibaek’s advice was not heeded at that time, but his ideas seem to figure prominently in the injunctions:

of the tenth century. This is thought to have happened either just after 985 or just after 991. For a discussion, see Yi Kibaek, Ch’oe Sŏngmo, pp.11–12.


\footnote{118} An Kwisuk, “Koryŏ shidae kūmsok kongye-ŭi tae-Jung kyosŏp” [Chinese Contacts in Koryŏ Arts and Crafts], in Koryŏ misır-u taeoe kyosŏp [Foreign Contacts and Koryŏ Fine Arts], ed. Han’guk misulsa hakhoe (Seoul: Yegyŏng, 2004), pp.156–58.

\footnote{119} An Kwisuk, “Koryŏ shidae kūmsok kongye,” p.155.

\footnote{120} An Kwisuk, “Koryŏ shidae kūmsok kongye,” p.157.

\footnote{121} Song envoy Xu Jing remarked in his Illustrated Account of Koryŏ (Gaoli tujing 高麗圖經) that there were tens of thousands of Khitan within Koryŏ’s border, a large number of whom were employed in the metal working trade. See Gaoli tujing 19.

\footnote{122} Kim Yŏngmi, “Koryŏ Yo oegyo kwangye”.


\footnote{124} Twitchett and Tietze, “The Liao,” pp.100-4, 111–12.

\footnote{125} KS 3: 32b–33a.

\footnote{126} Some frontier commanders were overwhelmed by Liao forces and surrendered; this had a devastating effect on morale as well as on Koryŏ’s military strength. See KS 94: 21a–b for a particularly poignant example.

\footnote{127} KS127: 10a; the same story is also recorded in the Essentials of Koryŏ History. See KSC 3: 5b–6a.

\footnote{128} K5 5: 16a–b.

\footnote{129} Kang’s father, who remains unnamed, made great efforts to get the message that Mokchong was in danger delivered to his son, finally hiding it in the hollow walking stick of one of his slaves. Kim Ch’i-yang’s men were everywhere, but the slave passed them safely and delivered the message to Kang. This version of how Kang came to be involved in the messy transfer of power underscores the basic loyalty (and almost stereotypical naïveté) of the faithful warrior. See KS 127: 7a–b.

\footnote{130} There is some doubt whether he pretended to defect, or really did and later changed his mind, a question that cannot be resolved with the available sources. Whichever was the case, the fact that, on the flight south, Hyŏnjong was afraid that Ha was after him reveals the reality of the danger posed by defectors to the Khitan.

\footnote{131} This is probably a late embellishment of the original. Stories about Khitan cannibalism were part of the demonization of their soldiers during their wars against Koryŏ and the Song. Liao sources attest to the fact that cannibalism only occurred in times of extreme famine, as it did in Koryŏ and the Song. See Karl A. Wittfogel and Fenchung Feng, History of Chinese Society (Liao (907–1125)) (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1949), pp.381, 396, 425 and n.560–70.

\footnote{132} KS 94: 28a–30a. The same story is also recorded in the Essentials of Koryŏ History, see KSC 3: 18ab.

\footnote{133} Ha Kongjin was honoured by Hyŏnjong for his loyalty to the country. See KSC 3: 49b. Munjong bestowed a high rank on his son in honour of his father’s exploits and, later, received posthumous promotions. His loyalty and valour at the frontier was even mentioned in a letter to Liao in 1088. In his first year on the throne Sukchong secured protected appointments for a descendant of Ha Kongjin and Yejong promoted Ha’s great-great-grandson See KS 75: 29b–30b; KS 75: 29b–30a; KS 13: 15a–b.

\footnote{134} After glorious careers with numerous honours and accolades, both Sŏ and Kang/own
received many posthumous tributes. They were officially honoured as late as the reign of Ch’ungson-wang (r. 1298 and 1308–1313). See KS84: 23b. Along with these two heroes, Yang Kyu, the fortress commander who had refused to surrender his fortress to the Liao army carrying a forged letter from Kang Cho was also mentioned.

135 This Khitan general is customarily referred to in Koryo sources by his style Xunning, although his proper name was Xiao Hengde.

136 KSC 2: 51a–b; KS 94: 3a–b. Translation with slight adaptations from Peter Lee, Sourcebook, p.430.

137 An Pyongu, “Koryo-wa Song-ui sangho inshik-kwa kyosop”.

138 During the eleventh century, the term was used to designate “barbarians”; see for instance KS9: 23b where Munjong acknowledges Jurchen to be identical to “birds and beasts”, but nonetheless also possessing a sense of filial piety. It is used as a synonym for the expression “wild animals with human faces”.

139 KS95: 19b–20a; KSC4: 20a. Hwang’s comments were in line with the traditional opinions about the legal governing of multi-ethnic states. Both the Liao and the Jin empires applied this principle of ius sanguinis. Hwang’s use of the legal term hwaoein suggests that he was cognizant of Liao legal practices. See Twitchett and Tietze, “The Liao,” pp.93. Hwang held the minority opinion in 1034, but during the reign of Hyönjong, the expression “savage beasts with human faces” was used to refer to Jurchen and other barbarians with some frequency. See for instance KSC3: 54a; and KSC4:30b. In both cases the references are extremely negative; the second one even proposes the extermination of Jurchen who were considered bothersome.

140 Kim Yongmi, “Koryo Yo oegyo kwan’gye”.

141 For Mokchong’s edict, see KS 79: 10a–11a.

142 KS 79: 12a.

Since our august ancestor’s establishment of the dynasty, we have preserved our sovereignty to this day. Now, without a single loyal official voicing objection, we rashly want to surrender land to the enemy. Is this not lamentable indeed? The ancients had a poem:

A vast territory is disposed of in a casual manner,

The civil and military officials of the two courts reproached Jiao Zhou 焦周

Jiao Zhou was a great minister of Shu in China who urged his young ruler to give up land to Wei, thus becoming the joke of eternity. I propose that we bribe Xiao Xunning with gold, silver, and other treasures to discover his real intentions. And rather than rashly cutting off land and handing it over to appease an enemy, is it not better to renew practice of the Lantern Festival, the Assembly of the Eight Prohibitions, and the Immortal Lad to elicit spiritual protection, as was done under our former kings? Is this not a better way to preserve the state and achieve peace than to resort to the strange practices of others? If we are to do this, we ought first to report to our deities. As to whether there is war or peace, Your Majesty alone should decide.

The validity of Yi Chibaek’s recommendations was acknowledged by Sŏnjong, who nonetheless persisted in his Chinese ways. If the injunctions are from Hyönjong’s reign, the ideas expressed in them were not new, but drew upon existing concepts and sentiments among the Koryo literati. During Hyönjong’s reign, pressure from Liao crystallized these beliefs into a more coherent form and gave an impetus to the formation of a distinctive Koryo identity, different from both the Khitan and China. Liao pressure had transformed into destructive invasion, the influence of Khitan practices were noticeable everywhere, and Koryo frontier commanders had defected. In response, it was at this time that anti-Khitanism reached its apogee: the use of insulting terms to describe the Khitan in the fourth injunction also places its composition in Hyönjong’s reign. Interestingly, Hwang Churyang, the historian who had compiled the Veritable Records under the supervision of Ch’oe Hang, used a very similar expression to describe Jurchen who had become embroiled in a legal dispute:

This bunch may have submitted to us and become our vassals, but they are still wild animals with human faces (inmyŏn sushim 人面獸心), unfamiliar with civilized customs and not fit to be tried by civilized law. According to the codex, non-acculturated foreigners (hwaoein 化外人) must be judged according to their own laws if the crime has been committed against a person of the same race.

Hwang made these harsh comments in 1034 at a time when, despite the ever-threatening frontier presence of Liao, anti-Khitan feelings had abated and cultural exchange and trade with Liao was flourishing, and his
counsel was ignored. Hwang served Tökchong and Chǒng-jong, but his political ideas firmly belonged in the period that Hyŏnjong ruled Koryŏ. He had assisted Hyŏnjong from the beginning of his reign, working as a historian, a bureaucrat and a policy maker—and as a forger, as I shall argue later. Like Ch’oe Hang, Hwang had been intimately involved in the battle for Hyŏnjong’s legitimacy. Having endured the calamitous Liao invasions and the destruction of the capital, Hwang loathed Liao, even when generations of younger Koryŏ literati came to appreciate their impressive cultural and religious achievements. The fact that Hwang’s biography in the Standard Koryŏ History largely consists of his vehement attack on the application of the law of the land to the Jurchen, and mentions so little of his other activities, reveals that he was probably identified as a representative of anti-foreign sentiment.

Hwang’s plea to keep non-acculturated foreigners such as Jurchen and Khitan strictly separate from natives of Koryŏ was lost on younger literati, although the rhetoric was still powerful. As late as 1105, in his attempts to prevent the further use of money, Yejong had to battle against officials who appealed to what they believed was T’aeto’s prohibition of reliance on Tang and Liao customs. Mokchong, too, had tried to abolish Koryŏ’s monetary system in 1002 by encouraging the use of barter but, importantly, he did not appeal to T’aeto’s injunctions. Yet, a century later, officials gratefully used the fourth injunction to oppose Yejong’s monetary policies. Yejong’s edict reads as follows:

The monetary law was aimed by former rulers at enriching the country and making the people comfortable. My father did not intend to increase property and capital, especially not now that the Great Liao have started to use money! If a law is proclaimed, slander and abuse of it will follow automatically. That is why it is said that the people cannot understand something that has just been started. However, unexpectedly, many officials are boycotting the use of money, using T’aeto’s injunction not to copy Tang and Khitan customs as a pretext. But [T’aeto’s] proscription actually aimed at nothing but decadent customs. If we were to do away with Chinese civilization and institutions, what then?

The first part of the fourth injunction had prohibited the slavish imitation of Tang customs. Like the first three injunctions, this does not fit easily into the context of T’aeto’s reign when cultural contacts with Chinese dynasties were at a relatively low level. This dramatically changed during the reign of Kwangjong, whose love of Sinitic culture prompted Ch’oe Sŭngno, an admirer of Chinese ways himself, to write the following evaluation in his On Current Affairs:
It is impossible not to adhere to the ways of China, but since the customs of all regions throughout our country follow their own characteristics, it is difficult to change them all. Our vulgar ways must be corrected according to Chinese rules with regard to the teaching of the rites and music, poetry and literature and with regard to the moral principles between ruler and minister, and father and son. However, with regard to such things as transport and clothing, we can adhere to our local customs and reach a balance between luxury and thrift. There is no need to make everything similar to China.\textsuperscript{143}

The same criticism applied to the reign of Sŏngjong whose reverence of China, deemed to be excessive by many, was the primary target of criticism of Yi Chibaek's memorial.\textsuperscript{144} This was in marked contrast with the situation during T'aejo's reign when according to Ch'oe Sŏngno the influence of Sinitic civilization was insufficient: the ancestral shrines and the altar for the gods of the land had not yet been established, while the rites and music, and literature and culture were still underdeveloped.\textsuperscript{145} There was little reason for T'aejo and his immediate successors, then, to react against Sinitic influence.

In summary, it is unlikely that the fourth injunction was composed during T'aejo's reign. It is, however, much more likely that it derives from Hyŏnjong's and was written in response to continuous Liao pressure, the Khitan invasions, the role of the Liao in Hyŏnjong's quest for legitimacy, and the realization that Song China was not a reliable ally. In this context, the development of the formation of a sense of being “of and from Koryŏ” in the fourth injunction (different from both Liao and Song) is entirely understandable. This same idea of a distinct Koryŏ identity can be detected in the biographies of military commanders who distinguished themselves in the wars with Liao. These biographies were compiled during the early years of Hyŏnjong's reign, concerned people intimately connected to his ascension to the throne, and were compiled by his most loyal ministers. All available evidence, therefore, points to Hyŏnjong and his advisers as the persons responsible for the articulation of a distinct Koryŏ identity in the Standard Koryŏ History biographies, in contemporary policies and in the fourth injunction.

\textit{Number Five}

The fifth injunction is often quoted to underline the importance T'aejo attached to P'yŏngyang, the Western Capital (Sŏgyŏng). It reads:

\textit{Fifth injunction:} I relied on the mysterious assistance of the mountains and streams of the Three Han to bring the great enterprise to completion. In the Western Capital the aquatic force is balanced and smoothly flowing and is the root of the terrestrial arteries of our country. It is the place of the great dynastic undertaking for ten thousand generations. Royal visits
Figure 19
The Liao invasion of 1010. The Liao invasion of 1010–1011 left Kaegyŏng in ashes. Map by author

Figure 20
Liao warrior depicted on a wall painting. Photographer unknown

to the Western Capital should be made four times a year in the second, fifth, eighth, and eleventh months and the ruler should reside there for more than one hundred days per year. By this means, peace and prosperity will be secured.\(^{146}\)

T’aejo was known to have expressed interest in the rebuilding of the Western Capital, which had fallen into ruin during the struggle for supremacy over the peninsula.\(^{147}\) He took an active interest in repopulating the desolate city and went there at least ten times.\(^{148}\) During the early years of the dynasty, it was also important as a strategic place from which the northern frontier could be guarded, thus the attention T’aejo bestowed
The Western Capital functioned as the central defensive location in the case of a northern invasion. Liao never managed to capture the city. During the invasion of 992–993, the Western Capital was the rallying point of Koryo’s defence. During the invasions of 1011 and 1018, again P’yon gyang played a crucial role in the defence of Koryo. Although the capital of Kaegyong was captured and sacked, P’yon gyang was not.

Chongjong had been able to ascend the throne with the backing of Wang Shingnyǒm (795–885) and his powerful Sogyong-based faction. Chongjong’s championing of Sogyong was a way of rewarding the people who had supported him. For a good discussion of Sogyong and its powerful lineages, see Kang Ogyop, “Koryo Sogyong kyŏngyong-gwa Sogyong se’ryŏk-ŭi ch’ui” [The Administration of the Western Capital in Early Koryo and Changes in the Power Structure of the Western Capital] Tongdae sahabak [Tongguk University Historical Journal] 1 (1995): 3–27, also see Kang Ogyop, “Koryo Sogyong-ŭi p’ungsuirijok koch’al,” p.95. This last study looks at the history of the Western Capital from a geomantic point of view.

These appointments are the only ones that can be confirmed. See KS 4: 10b; KS 4: 14b; KS 4: 17a; KS 4: 22b; KS 4: 26b; KS 4: 38a; KS 5: 1b; KS 5: 13b; KSC 3: 17a; KSC 3: 17b; KSC 3: 22a; KSC 3: 24a; KSC 3: 29a; KSC 3: 33a; KSC 3: 43b; KSC 3: 55b–56a; KSC 3: 56b.


Ch’oe Pyonghǒn, “Hyŏnhwa-sa,” p.239; Yi Hyeok, “Koryo ch’ori Sogyong seryŏ-g-e taehan il koch’al” [Some Thoughts on the Powerful Factions in the Western Capital in Early Koryo] Han gukbakpo 26 (1982): 105–32, at p.106; No Myŏngho, “Ch’oe Chagyŏm ilp’a-wa Han Anilp’a-ŭi chok seryŏk. Koryo chunggi ch’innok-t’ur-ŭi chŏngch’i seryŏkhwǎ /over on P’yon gyang was based on more than geomancy. However, despite considering declaring it his new capital, Taejo never did as, apparently, he did not want it to compete with Kaesŏng. An entry in the Standard Koryo History from 932 shows his ambiguous feelings in this regard:

I have recently restored the Western Capital and moved people there to fill its streets. I relied on its terrestrial force to pacify the Three Han, so I wanted to establish my capital there. But now, hens have transformed into roosters in the houses of the people and a strong wind has made government buildings collapse. I wonder what kind of calamities can be more serious than this.

The same characteristics that had given the Western Capital its privileged position, now worked against it. The extraordinary events that took place there made a convenient excuse for abandoning the proposed move of the capital. There are several reasons why Taejo decided that a move to the Western Capital would not be advantageous. At this stage, he was still little more than a primus inter pares and a move north would mean that he was further away from the majority of powerful families, most of whom resided south of Kaesŏng. In addition, his ministers had also expressed concern about the increased burden of corvée labour the people would be forced to bear. Accordingly, neither Taejo nor his successors Hyejong and Chongjong moved the capital to Sŏgyŏng. Chŏngjong seems to have tried but he came up against the resistance of the Kaegyong population who refused to be moved. It was only during the reign of Sŏngjong that P’yon gyang’s role started to become more pronounced. In an edict issued in 990, Sŏngjong publicly acknowledged the importance of the Western Capital for the longevity and the success of the dynasty. Mokchong, too, valued the Western Capital renaming it Hogyŏng 鎮京 in a conscious attempt to borrow the splendour and brilliance of the classical Zhou 周 capital of the same name.

The military importance of the Western Capital also indicates that even if this injunction does date from Taejo’s reign, it was consciously upheld during later reigns and in particular under Hyŏnjong. The Western Capital never lost its strategic importance and Koryo’s most capable and trustworthy military commanders customarily served there. As a consequence, the military commander of P’yon gyang wielded considerable domestic influence. Kang Cho was Chief Military Inspector of the Western Capital 西京都巡檢使 when Mokchong’s ministers called on his aid to oppose the schemes of Kim Chi’yang and the Dowager Hŏnae. That he was immediately able to raise five thousand armoured soldiers and march upon the capital indicates the military strength and readiness of its garrison. It is understandable, then, that during Hyŏnjong’s reign only his most trustworthy ministers were put in charge of the Western Capital: Ch’oe Sawi 崔士威 in 1011, Yu Bang 庚方 in the same year, Chang Yŏng 張榮 in 1013,
Kim Shimôn 金審言 in 1014, Yi Chuhôn 李周憲 in 1016, Kang Kamch'an in 1018, Ch'ae Ch'ungsun in 1022, Yi Kong 李幡 in 1023 and Yi Tan 李端 in 1029. Ch'ae Ch'ungsun was appointed again in 1030, only to be replaced by Han Cho 韓祚 in the same year.156 Besides the importance of the garrison of the Western Capital, some of Hyŏnjong's closest advisers came from the area around P'yŏngyang, as did some of his wives.157 His reign also recorded the greatest number of newly created administrative offices in the Western Capital,158 and extensive construction activities were undertaken, both to strengthen the city fortifications and to enhance its prestige for the state.159 There are also indications that Hyŏnjong was strenuous in his support of the veneration of T'aejo in the Western Capital in order to identify it with his grandfather.160

The strategic value of the Western Capital can hardly be overestimated considering the ever present danger of a Liao invasion. The cavalry often deployed from it and more than once, battles fought nearby turned out to be decisive.161 However, it was not just for the quelling of external threats that the Western Capital was important; the possibility of rebellion emanating from there was always present. Thus, its inclusion and participation in Koryŏ politics was absolutely necessary.162 A strong, and strictly controlled, Western Capital was a prerequisite for the safety of the state; securing peace and prosperity by sojourning there, referred to in the fifth injunction, is, therefore, completely understandable.

The Western Capital functioned as a counterbalance for Koryŏ's supreme capital of Kaegyŏng. It not only did so militarily and politically, but also geomantically. Although Tosŏn's association with the Koryŏ royal family may only date from Hyŏnjong's reign, the importance attached to geomancy dates from much earlier.163 With Wang Kŏn's rise as the most powerful warlord on the peninsula, it was acknowledged that Kaegyŏng was weak geomantically.164 This weakness needed to be "remedied" by installing P'yŏngyang as the country's Western Capital in order to gain the power of its water virtue (sudŏk 水德) to replenish that of Kaegyŏng. Later in the dynasty, the Southern Capital 南京 (present-day Seoul) was also established to make use of its wood virtue (moktŏk 木德).165 The Western Capital was almost perfect geomantically. Behind it, and to the sides, it was protected by high mountain ranges that joined the Paektu 白頭 mountain range. In front, the Taedong River 大同江 flowed, embracing a wide plain. P'yŏngyang was, then, almost impregnable and its history in ancient and medieval times shows that successive rulers and dynasties recognized the virtues of its location.

Geomancy went through a revival during the reigns of Mokchong and Hyŏnjong, after losing much of its influence under Sŏngjong. However, while Hyŏnjong in particular paid great attention to the art of reading the landscape, it is impossible to conclude decisively that the fifth injunction was written during his reign. Its concerns fit comfortably with the political
circumstances and the ideological currents of the early eleventh century, and the Western Capital was of great importance for Hyŏnjong, but the same may be said for T'aejo. Thus, while the possibility that this injunction derives from T'aejo cannot be excluded, plausible arguments can be adduced that the fifth injunction was of even more significance for Hyŏnjong's reign.

**Number Six**

The sixth injunction can be dated with some precision. It refers to T'aejo's vow to uphold Buddhist and native religious customs:

**Sixth injunction:** My most intense wish concerns the Lantern Festival and the Assembly of the Eight Prohibitions. The Lantern Festival is to worship Buddha. The Assembly of the Eight Prohibitions is to worship the spirits of heaven, the five sacred peaks, the major mountains and streams, and the dragon god. If, at some future time, villainous courtiers propose adding to or abolishing these festivals, it should be absolutely prohibited. At the beginning of my reign I also made an earnest oath that the days of the festival should not coincide with days of mourning and that the ruler and his ministers should celebrate together. This should be carried out with reverend respect.  

The villainous courtiers from the first injunction reappear in the sixth, here attempting to abolish the Lantern Festival and the Assembly of the Eight Prohibitions. Buddhist rituals were extremely important in Koryŏ, although relatively little information about their purpose and significance has been transmitted. The Lantern Festival was celebrated on the birthday of the historical Buddha and seems to have been a truly Buddhist festival, although the fact that it was often celebrated in the P'yŏngyang Temple suggests that it was also connected to royal ancestor worship. Despite its Buddhist name, the Assembly of the Eight Prohibitions had emerged from several native, especially Shilla, traditions and was dedicated to the worship of the spirits of the land, the mountains and the rivers of Koryŏ. The Assembly had been performed since the sixth century in various forms and in the Koryŏ period, it was intimately connected with the flower youth tradition (bugŏng 花郞). T'aejo re-established the Assembly, perhaps with the example of Kung Ye 弓裔 in mind. Under T'aejo, it "thus subsumed various traditions under a very loose Buddhist framework: the Shilla bugŏng tradition, spirit worship, the tongmaeng 東盟 festival of Koguryŏ, and the worship of merit subjects." The Assembly was abolished in 987 by Sŏngjong, who had experienced misgivings since witnessing it in the first year of his reign in 981, but many officials were unhappy with this decision and his Confucian policies in general. The memorial of Yi Chibaek quoted above clearly demonstrates the importance the Assembly and Koryŏ's
native traditions had for them. The description in the Essentials of Koryo History of the Assembly reveals that by Sŏnjong’s time it had become one of Koryŏ’s most important state festivals and, moreover, one with deep roots in the peninsula:

Eleventh month (918). The Assembly of the Eight Prohibitions was instituted. An official said, “Every year, in the second month of winter, the former kings organized a grand fast of the eight commandments to pray for blessings. I beg you to honour this institution.” The king said: “Lacking in virtue, I protect the great enterprise. Relying on Buddhism, the realm can be pacified.” In the ball court a circle of lamps was made, flanked by rows of incense burners, so that it was brightly lit at night. Two coloured tents were erected, more than 50 feet high, and a platform constructed in the shape of a lotus was made. It was dazzling. In front, a hundred plays, songs and dances were performed, including the music troupe of the four immortals, cart-ships of dragons, phoenixes, elephants and horses, and all old stories of Shilla. All the officials paraded in full dress, carrying their insignia. The whole capital came to look, and feasted day and night. The king watched from the Wibongnu Pavilion 威鳳樓. It was nominally a gathering to make offerings to the Buddha and enjoy the spirits. After this it became an annual event.

T’aejo clearly attached importance to this grand festival that celebrated the peninsula’s traditions under the guise of Buddhism; great effort and expense was involved with celebrating it both in Kaegyŏng, and also in the Western Capital.

Since there is little doubt that T’aejo considered the Lantern Festival and the Assembly of the Eight Prohibitions to be of great significance for Koryŏ we can conclude that he would have agreed with the contents of the sixth injunction, however whether he wrote it is a different question. The re-appearance of the unnamed villainous courtiers is suspect, representing an obvious attempt to increase this injunction’s applicability to the time in which it was “rediscovered”. More importantly, however, T’aejo had no reason to doubt the continuation of his two favourite festivals which were widely supported by his officials and by his successors. When Sŏnjong decided on abolition, though, he was in the minority, obstinately implementing the policy in a drive to complete the sinification policies of Kwangjong. Sŏnjong may have had the support of Ch’oe Sŏngno, who in his writings criticized the court’s lavish spending on Buddhism and the costs incurred manufacturing statues and effigies for Buddhist festivals, but no other hint of agreement was recorded in the sources. When Hyŏnjong subsequently reinstated the festivals, no disagreement was voiced. Thus, the most plausible reason why the Lantern Festival and the Assembly were singled out in the sixth injunction was that they had already been abolished in Sŏnjong’s time against the wishes of a majority, or at least a significant portion, of officials. Sŏnjong /at overthrowing Koryŏ’s ruling stratum by using the Western Capital’s rich historical, religious and symbolical heritage. See Yi Hyeok, “Koryŏ ch’ogi Sŏgyŏng seryŏg-e taehan il koch’al;” Kang Ogyŏp, “Yo’ch’o Sŏgyŏngkyŏngyŏng;” Kang Ogyŏp, “Koryŏ shidae-ŭi Sŏgyŏng chedo;” Breuker, “When Truth Is Everywhere,” ch.14; Breuker, “Landscape Out of Time,” pp.69–106.


165 Kang Ogyŏp, “Koryŏ Sŏgyŏng-ŭi p’ungsuijŏk koch’al’ p.94.

166 K.2: 16a. 其六日, 聶所至顧, 在於懷憶八閹, 供燈, 所以事佛, 八閹所以事天靈, 及五嶽名山大川燭神也, 後世臣民, 建白加減者, 切宜禁止, 吾亦當初誓心, 會日, 不犯國忌, 君臣同樂, 宜當敬依行之。


168 Vermeersch, “Power of the Buddha,” p.83; Hô Hûngshik, “Koryŏ sahoe-ŭi pulgyo’ok kihan” [The Buddhist Foundation of Koryo Society], in Hô Hûngshik, Koryŏ pulgyosa jŏn ‘gm [A Study of the History of Koryo Buddhism](Seoul: Iljogak, 1986), pp.47–102. The portrait of T’aejo was kept in the Pongan-sa, which suggests that the celebration of the Lantern festival there may have encouraged the identification of T’aejo with the historical Buddha.


170 Extant congratulatory texts explicitly mention the connection with the hwarang. See Ha Padgweon p’yo in TMS 31: 15b–16a; P’algwansŏn bap in TMS 531: 21b–23a. This last text is quoted by Yi Illo in his description of the hwarangorigns of the Assembly in the P’aban chip [hereafter PHC]. See PHC 3.

According to the Koryo-sa, this pavilion was called Ubongnu 儀紋楼. See KS 1: 14b.


Songjong abolished the Assembly simultaneously in both capitals. The annals do not mention it, but it seems probable that the Lantern Festival was also abolished at this time. The section of rituals in the Standard Koryo History mentions that both festivals had been abolished by Songjong and had been re-established simultaneously by Hyonjong. See KS 3: 13a; KS S: 40b-41a. See KS 69: 11b.

Songjong appears to have been a lover of Buddhist temples. He performed commemorative rites in the temple and when he died, his portrait was enshrined there together with one of his costumes and a jade girdle. Yet despite the obviously great importance of the Kaet’ae-sa Temple to T’aejo and the state, it is not mentioned in the Ten Injunctions. Similar examples are easily found. Why, for instance, do the important Buddhist ritual categories of baengbyang 行香 and toryang 道場 go unmentioned? The reason the Lantern Festival and the Assembly of the Eight Prohibitions were mentioned in the sixth injunction was that they had only just been reinstated by Hyonjong at the time of its composition—the injunction was actually warning against the repetition of past mistakes and not “future dangers”. The Lantern Festival and the Assembly were again held in Hyonjong’s first year of rule. Earlier, when Songjong had discontinued the performance of the two festivals, Ch’oe Hang, who was instrumental in Hyonjong’s subsequent accession to the throne, immediately protested in a memorial. This turned out to be in vain, but as soon as his young protégé became Koryo’s ruler, both the Lantern Festival and the Assembly were reinstated. Given Hyonjong’s weak position during the early years of his reign and his indebtedness to the experienced officials who had helped him, it is conceivable that

Figure 22
The Western Capital 西京 or P’yongyang on the nineteenth-century map Yojido 契地圖. Source unknown
the reinstatement of the two festivals was not so much an act of the king (despite his own Buddhist proclivities), but was pushed through by the likes of Ch’oe Hang and Yi Chibaek.

The latter part of the sixth injunction refers to the necessity of avoiding celebrating the festivals on royal days of mourning, and of having the ruler joined by his ministers in the celebration. These further instructions also reveal inconsistencies with T’aejo’s reign. The avoidance of overlap between the festivals and memorial days for deceased royalty has been interpreted as evidence that these festivals were not meant to commemorate the royal kin group. This analysis is valid, as long as it is restricted to the period after the two festivals were reinstated. Before Sŏngjong abolished them, it would appear that deceased members of the royal family were honoured at both festivals. In *On Current Affairs* Ch’oe Sŏngno warned Sŏngjong that the state spent too much time and money on apparently random commemorations.

It has been long established at our court that commemorative rites are performed at the prayer meetings in summer and winter and at the memorial days for deceased kings and queens. This cannot be done away with, however I beseech Your Majesty to reduce everything that can be reduced and if reduction is impossible to make sure that [the commemorative rites] are performed according to the proper season as in the *Book of Rites*.185

Ch’oe further explained that performing excessive commemorative rites and for the wrong spirits only did damage to their religious and ritual value. He also objected to the “worship of the spirits of the mountains and peaks and sacrifices to the constellations”, maintaining that they injured the integrity of proper ancestral sacrifice. While for T’aejo the indiscriminate celebration of royal memorial days may only have been a minor problem since the royal kin group was still of limited size, by Sŏngjong’s reign it had expanded greatly, creating the necessity for regulation. This situation still pertained when Hyŏnjong became Koryŏ’s ruler and it is at least plausible that he felt the same need to keep a check on royal memorial days. Later rulers observed this injunction: Sŏnjong is on record as postponing a festival because of a conflicting royal memorial day and Munjong repeatedly postponed the celebration of a festival to prevent it overlapping with royal memorial days. The significance of the command not to hold commemorative rites during the two festivals was to economize on expenses: Ch’oe Sŏngno vividly described the lengths to which rulers would go to honour deceased persons, having valuable effigies made which afterwards were carelessly destroyed. It was probably also meant to differentiate the functions of the Lantern Festival and the Assembly of the Eight Prohibitions: from Hyŏnjong’s reign on, the Assembly started to incorporate clear references to Koryŏ’s international position. At the Lantern Festival, while foreign guests were entertained, the
emphasis was much more on the domestic situation and the Koryo royal family. Finally, it should not be forgotten that Hyonjong considered these festivals to be of vital importance to the dynasty. While his personal commitment to the memory of his parents (who had never been on the throne) was great, he kept the commemorative rites in the Hyonhwa-sa Temple separate from the rituals of the state. The injunction that “the days of the festival should not coincide with days of mourning” might thus be explained by Hyonjong wanting to keep the memory of his parents unsullied by worries of the state.

The festivals were originally celebrated in both Kaegyong and P’yongyang, and when Songjong abolished them, he did so in both capitals at once. A memorial from Myongjong’s reign (1131–1170–1197–1202) reveals why the festivals were celebrated in both capitals and why ruler and ministers should be together. According to this memorial, T’aejo had customarily sent his ministers to the Western Capital to represent him and perform the rituals belonging to the festivals in his place. This explains why the section on rituals in the Standard Koryo History details what should happen if the ruler himself does not perform the ceremony, when according to the Standard Koryo History’s introductory remarks (pomnye), the ruler should always perform the ritual himself. By deputising his ministers to perform the ritual while he celebrated it in parallel in the capital, T’aejo at once emphasized the importance of both Kaegyong and of P’yongyang. Given his continuing interest in the Western Capital, it is therefore unlikely that T’aejo would have left instructions to discontinue this practice. However if, as I concluded earlier, the Western Capital was also of great importance to Hyonjong, how can this injunction be explained as a product of the latter reign? Hyonjong needed to be seen in the Western Capital, to keep a weather eye on it, and to be able to control it, to bolster his fragile legitimacy. Koryo’s most powerful military commanders came from the Western Capital and, as I discuss below, Hyonjong neglected the Koryo military at his cost. As a part of his policy to maintain intimate ties with P’yongyang, he went there himself to celebrate the rituals associated with these important festivals and did not delegate as T’aejo had done. His successors, who were not plagued by issues of doubtful legitimacy, seem to have alternated between celebrating these rituals themselves in the Western Capital and sending their ministers to do so on their behalf. Both festivals were extremely important for the legitimacy of the ruler and the ruling house. Hyonjong’s hold on the throne was weaker than T’aejo’s had been and sharing the prestige and significance of the Lantern Festival and the Assembly of the Eight Prohibitions with his ministers was not something he could afford to do.

Thus, while the sixth injunction might at first sight make sense in the context of T’aejo’s policies, (even if the reappearance of the villainous courtiers raises suspicions), further consideration reveals that it cannot
have derived from T’aejo’s reign. The first part appears to warn against future abuses but actually deals with the past, and the second—forbidding the overlapping of the two festivals with royal memorial days and ordering the collective celebration by ruler and minister—explicitly refers to circumstances under Hyŏnjong.

**Number Seven**

Number seven is a very general Injunction, counselling the ruler to govern wisely and justly, by referring to classical Chinese ideas and examples. It reads as follows:

Seventh injunction: It is very difficult for the king to win over the hearts of his officials and the people. If you want to win over their hearts, the essence simply lies in heeding sincere remonstrance and keeping a distance from slanderous gossip. If you accept sincere remonstrance, you will be like a sagacious ruler. Slanderous gossip is sweet as honey, but if you do not believe it, it will cease of its own accord. If you use the people’s labour at appropriate times, lighten the corvée duty, lower the taxes and know the difficulties of agricultural production, you will naturally win over the people’s hearts, the state will become prosperous and the people will be comfortable. The ancients said that a fish will certainly hang under a tempting bait; an able general will certainly be found under a generous reward; a bird will certainly not dare to fly under a drawn bow; and there will certainly be good subjects under a virtuous and benevolent ruler. If you administer rewards and punishments moderately, the interplay of yin and yang will certainly be harmonious. 197

In contrast to the first six injunctions, the seventh seems completely general. It does not refer to Koryŏ or the Three Han and it does not men-

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197 KS2: 16a–b. The original text is as follows:

其七曰：人君，得民心之心，為甚難，欲得其心，要在從謹遠讒而已，從謹則聖，讒言如蜜，不信，則讒自止，又使民以時，輕徭薄賦，知稼穡之艱難，則自得民心，國富民安，古人云，芳餉之下，必有懸魚，重賞之下，必有良將，張弓之外，必有鶴鵠，垂仁之下，必有良民，賞罰中，則陰陽順矣。
Three Koryŏ period Buddhist statues at the Kaet'ae-sa 開泰寺 temple complex. Photograph by author

Figure 25

The particular instructions in this injunction may perhaps be linked to particular occurrences in Koryŏ. The warning against believing slander brings Kwangjong to mind, who was said to have believed slanderous rumours and consequently killed countless people in his purges. The reference to corvée duty might also suggest Kwangjong, who was warned by Ch'oe Sŭngno against exhausting the people by having them build temples and monasteries. The same criticism, however, was also made with regard to Sŏngjong. In an edict of 1002 Mokchong actually apologizes for the suffering he caused the people by imposing strenuous corvée duties. To complicate matters further, the injunction also has several points in common with the experiences of Hyŏnjong when in 1011 he fled south.

201 This was the customary explanation of Kwangjong's terrible purges, originating with Ch'oe Sŭngno. See KS 93: 15b–19b. For a translation, see Peter Lee, Sourcebook, p.239.
and had to deal with distrusting and unruly soldiers and officials, as noted above. In addition, in an edict in honour of the soldiers who had died defending Koryo against the Khitan, Hyonjong guiltily admits to having listened to flattery and slander, instead of to the remonstrance of upright officials.\footnote{KS 4: Sa-b.}

Thus, far from dating this injunction, these possible connections serve to underline two points: the first is the injunction’s general nature, the second the continued presence and currency of these ideas and of the metaphors in which they were cloaked. This injunction, then, may date from T’aejo’s time. In that case, however, Ch’oe Sungs, Kim Shimŏn and Mokchong referred to it silently or else simply tapped into the same set of ideas and metaphors T’aejo had used when writing his testament. On the other hand, it may have been written later, with the examples of Kwangjong and Songjong in mind, incorporating metaphors originally used by Ch’oe and Kim. The fact that Kim Shimŏn was assistant supervising state historian under Ch’oe Hang when Koryo’s historical annals were recompiled lends credence to this assumption but is insufficient to settle the question.\footnote{KS 4: 15a.} It may be noted in passing that Kim Shimŏn also encouraged the reading of Against Luxurious Ease (Muil p’yŏn/Chin. wuyi bian 無逸編), which is also advocated in the tenth injunction. Kim wrote his proposals to Songjong in a conscious attempt to emulate the Duke of Zhou, who submitted Against Luxurious Ease to his nephew, King Cheng. It is also noteworthy that Songjong praised Kim Shimŏn’s suggestions and promised to adhere to them, but did not refer to the injunctions or to T’aejo.\footnote{KS 96: 26b-29b.} Yet another hint that this injunction dates from Hyŏnjong’s reign is connected to Hyŏnjong’s ignominious flight south in 1010. When faced with treason and unrest the royal party fled, and his trusted minister Chi Ch’aemun advised him to act like T’aejo when he had unified the Three Han, holding out the prospect of rewards to everyone who helped the king.\footnote{KS 94: 25b-26a.} If the injunction dates from Hyŏnjong’s reign, it was probably written with the trauma of his flight in mind: it certainly provided a fine lesson in how to reward and punish people as he immediately felt the consequences of his actions.

Any definitive conclusion concerning the dating of the seventh injunction is impossible due to its generality. It may date from the beginning of the Koryo dynasty, but it may also come from the early eleventh century, and indeed this latter date is perhaps the more likely. The most important characteristic of the seventh injunction is that it represents an ideal of clas-
This type of analysis was prevalent in the works of historians belonging to the Committee for the Compilation of Korean History (Chosenshi henshukai), a Japanese academic association sponsored by the Government General (Chōngdokp'ok; Jap.: Sotokufu 總督部) in colonial Korea. Its members consisted of mainly Japanese academicians and some Korean scholars.

I argue that while his conclusion that this injunction was not written by T'aejo was correct, Imanishi's argumentation was biased and lacked conviction. Pointing out that many of T'aejo's closest comrades as well as one of his favourite wives came from this region, Imanishi concluded that Ch'oe Hang and Ch'oe Chean, (whom he held responsible for forging the injunctions) were descendants of old Shilla nobility from Kyōngju and thus ipso facto detested anyone from the former territories of Later Paekche. Apart from its relevance to political agendas of his own times, this kind of reasoning is also ahistorical, clearly involving a retroprojection of contemporary issues onto the past (see Fig. 28). Imanishi's analysis aimed at establishing a fundamental lack of unity and continuity in Korean history, emphasizing that people from Kyōngju necessarily must detest those from Later Paekche. This implicitly confirmed the popular Japanese notion that Korea had never been truly unified, lacking the "national essence" (kokutai 国體) that supposedly made Japan unique, Indeed, one of the reasons why the debate on the authenticity of the injunctions has focused so much on the eighth injunction is precisely because of the possibilities it offers for interpretation in the context of twentieth- and twenty-first century Korea and, as a result, it has been consistently overemphasized. If, however, one examines this injunction in the context of early Koryŏ, it loses the ambiguity that made it such an attractive target for Imanishi. The injunction reads as follows:

Number Eight

The eighth injunction is concerned with the territory south of the Kongju River 公州江外 and the "treacherous and disharmonious" nature of both the terrain and its inhabitants. It has been the most debated injunction and it was the focus of Imanishi Ryū's argument that the injunctions as a whole were a forgery. I argue that while his conclusion that this injunction was not written by T'aejo was correct, Imanishi's argumentation was biased and lacked conviction. Pointing out that many of T'aejo's closest comrades as well as one of his favourite wives came from this region, Imanishi concluded that Ch'oe Hang and Ch'oe Chean, (whom he held responsible for forging the injunctions) were descendants of old Shilla nobility from Kyōngju and thus ipso facto detested anyone from the former territories of Later Paekche. Apart from its relevance to political agendas of his own times, this kind of reasoning is also ahistorical, clearly involving a retroprojection of contemporary issues onto the past (see Fig. 28). Imanishi's analysis aimed at establishing a fundamental lack of unity and continuity in Korean history, emphasizing that people from Kyōngju necessarily must detest those from Later Paekche. This implicitly confirmed the popular Japanese notion that Korea had never been truly unified, lacking the "national essence" (kokutai 国體) that supposedly made Japan unique, Indeed, one of the reasons why the debate on the authenticity of the injunctions has focused so much on the eighth injunction is precisely because of the possibilities it offers for interpretation in the context of twentieth- and twenty-first century Korea and, as a result, it has been consistently overemphasized. If, however, one examines this injunction in the context of early Koryŏ, it loses the ambiguity that made it such an attractive target for Imanishi. The injunction reads as follows:

Eighth injunction: The shape of the mountains and the propensity of the earth of the territory south of the Ch'ahyon Ridge 車峴以南 and beyond the Kongju River all tend to be treacherous; the hearts of its inhabitants follow these properties. Thus, if people from those towns and counties are allowed to participate in the affairs of state, to intermarry with the royal family, aristocracy and royal relatives, and to take the power of the state, they will either throw it into disorder or transgress against the royal carriage and instigate a rebellion since they resent the unification. Furthermore, those who have been government slaves, worked at forts, postal stations, and other dishonourable trades often surrender to the powerful in order to change their social class and evade prescribed duties. There will also surely be others who will attach themselves to the royal family, the aristocracy, to palaces or to the monasteries. It will certainly be the case that, speaking treacherously and craftily, they will
then abuse their authority and create disorder in government, going so far as to bring about political disaster. Even if they have the status of free commoners, they must not be admitted into government service or put to work.\footnote{209}

At first sight the contents of this injunction confirm Imanishi’s conclusion that Koryo was plagued by severe regional schism (see Fig. 29). Many interpretations of the eighth injunction have regarded it as referring to the southern part of the peninsula: the “territory south of the Ch’ahyon Ridge and beyond the Kongju River” has been identified with present Cholla Province in the south-west of Korea, even extending to the south of Ch’ungch’ŏng Province.\footnote{210} Recent research, however, has convincingly shown that this identification is wrong because it does not adequately take into account contemporary geographical names and administrative units. Whether or not the injunction is authentic, it certainly does not refer to the entire south-western region of the peninsula, but to the immediate area south of the Kongju River: Kongju, Chŏnju 全州 and Nonsan 諏山.\footnote{211} The area under consideration, then, is much more limited than Imanishi argued and, accordingly, most of his arguments lose their validity. Taejo had a power base in Naju 還州, a large and important city to the south of Chŏnju: he had enjoyed popular support there,\footnote{212} he had married a Naju woman who became the mother of his successor,\footnote{213} many of his closest comrades—as well as Tosŏn himself—were from the south-west, and later rulers continuously employed ministers from the south-west. These points all evaporate as objections to the genuineness of the eighth injunction. This is corroborated by the fact that Pak Sŏn 朴堯 who warned Hyŏnjong not to stay in Chŏnju during his flight south and who was later generously rewarded by him was a native from Naju, suggesting that the distrust of Hyŏnjong and his party was aimed specifically at Chŏnju and not at the south-west in general.

The situation was similar for Hyŏnjong, among whose high officials were natives from the south-west (there is no evidence that institutional measures were in place to obstruct the careers of bureaucrats from this region).\footnote{214} One of his wives also came from the south-west.\footnote{215} In short, there is nothing to indicate that people from the south-west were targets of discrimination during the early Koryo period. Later writings by officials stationed in Kongju or Chŏnju confirm this. Despite the fact that it was well known that Chŏnju was the former capital of Later Paekche and that its inhabitants were apt to persist in their old ways, the region is never described as treacherous. Writing in the early thirteenth century, Im Ch’un 林椿 (dates unkown) described Kongju in some detail, paying due attention to its geomantic characteristics and is positive about the land and its

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure27.png}
\caption{The eighth injunction.}
\end{figure}

From: Standard Koryo History

\footnote{214} Kang Ogyŏp, “Koryo shidae-ui Sŏgyŏng chedo,” p.112.
\footnote{215} KS’88: 16a.
people, not once referring to its supposed treacherous and disharmonious nature.  

216 Yi Kyubo 李奎報 (1168–1241) was posted in Chŏnju as its magistrate, and although he admitted that its people were hard to govern properly, he recognized its historical importance as the old capital of Later Paekche.  

217 It was also where the monk Podok 首德 had magically flown to when he left behind the doomed Koguryŏ, as well as being the home of the famous Shilla priest Wŏnhyo 元曉 (617–686). The independent nature of its people, which made them on the one hand impervious to the whip and on the other hand lazy when indulged, was not much of a problem for an able magistrate who alternated between strictness and indulgence.  

218 The idea that this region was of historical significance to Koryŏ, rather than being a danger, was also expressed by the late Koryŏ scholar Yi Kok 李懿 (1298–1351), who devoted two different essays to it. One concerned the reconstruction of a Later Paekche temple complex, arguing that it should be rebuilt because it was a part of the Three Han and because it had been a place where the dharma had been preached. In the other he recounted how, as a Koryŏ official, he had to tell the people of Chŏnju of their glorious past as capital of Later Paekche. Thus, there is no indication that this region was thought of as dangerous or treacherous and, in fact, not once during the whole of the Koryŏ dynasty was the eighth injunction ever invoked. In a sense, it was Imanishi Ryū who rescued the eighth injunction from obscurity. Before him, only Yi Ik seems to have been interested enough to pay attention to it, and then only to decisively refute its contents.  

219 Yi Ik’s interest in the eighth injunction, furthermore, was simply based on the coincidence that the Chosŏn royal family originally came from Chŏnju and had nothing to do with Koryŏ.  

220 Imanishi’s arguments may be invalid and beside the point, but this does not mean that T’aejo actually wrote the eighth injunction. T’aejo fought many battles with Later Paekche in and around the area encompassing the “territory south of the Ch’’ahyon Ridge and beyond the Kongju River”. He was severely defeated twice, only escaping with his life because his trusted comrade-in-arms Shin Sunggyŏm 申崇謙 (?–927) sacrificed himself. The defection to Later Paekche of fortress commanders in the region only strengthened his distrust. According to the argument of those opposing Imanishi, these experiences made T’aejo detest the region with such vehemence that he singled it out in his injunctions.  

221 A number of counterarguments to this position have been raised: it has been suggested that the eighth injunction can safely be ignored, because of its divergence from contemporary policies. It has also been suggested that T’aejo did not necessarily do what he said. These points are unconvincing and too general to carry the weight of the argument. On the other hand, it is true that T’aejo could not afford to discriminate against this region, especially not at the beginning of his reign when the power of local families was still something to be reckoned with.
not afford to estrange the notable families in Chônju, Kongsan and Nonsan and neither he nor his successors did so. The influential statesman Yu Panghôn 柳邦憲 (944–1009) served with distinction and reached the apex of Koryô bureaucracy; the fact that he was a Chônju native never worked against him.\(^{229}\) His father, too, was apparently not obstructed in his career; he passed the local state examinations, served as a censor during T’aejo’s lifetime and became famous as a scholar.\(^{230}\) Importantly, Yu’s ancestors had been loyal to Later Paekche before surrendering to T’aejo but despite this family history, he became one of the great officials of early Koryô. Perhaps Yu Panghôn was so immensely talented that he was forgiven for coming from Chônju, however the evidence is against this. In 990 Song-jong issued an edict on the need to practice filial piety, citing a number of families who had excelled in showing this cardinal virtue. The top two families came from Chônju and paragons of filial piety were certainly not accused of treacherous and disharmonious behaviour.\(^{231}\) The contents of the eighth injunction, then, even if limited to the area of Kongju, Chônju and Nonsan, do not correspond to T’aejo’s policies or beliefs and, indeed, contradict them. Accordingly, it is highly implausible to suppose that it was written by him.\(^{232}\)

This incompatibility of the eighth injunction with tenth- (and, indeed) eleventh-century policies establishes that it was not a product of T’aejo’s time. To understand it, we must, again, shift our attention to Hyônjong’s reign, whose personal experiences it reflects. When a Liao army invaded Koryô in 1010 on the pretence of avenging the murder of Mokchong, Hyônjong had to flee the capital, which was subsequently pillaged and burnt to the ground by the Liao army. Hyônjong, on the throne for less than a year, fled southwards but his flight seemed doomed from the start: angry soldiers attacked the royal carriage, one of Hyônjong’s wives was pregnant, his retinue was too small to afford him real protection and most of his officials had abandoned him. There was a constant—and plausible—fear of being betrayed and when the royal party arrived in Ch’anghya-hyon 昌化縣 on the way south, local officials attacked them for reasons that are obscure, although it is clear that Hyônjong had been recognized. A rumour that Koryô general Ha Kongjin had defected to the Liao and was now in pursuit of the Koryô king caused the majority of officials and servants to abandon the royal retinue. At night, there were more attacks, with the party, led by Chi Ch’aemun 智蔡文, a loyal military commander who had proved himself in the battle with the Liao in the north, now seriously weakened. Chi managed to lead the king and his two wives away from danger and into relative safety at the Tobong-sa Temple 道峯寺 and to reinforce the party with twenty more soldiers. They then set out for Chônju. On the way there, they lost track of Hyônjong’s queens, but managed to relocate them. Finding it difficult to fend off attacks with the two queens present, Hyônjong wanted to send them home to their respective families but...
of the injunctions, this argument holds that it does not actually refer to persons who might become a danger to the dynasty by participating in the affairs of state, intermarrying with the royal family, aristocracy and royal relatives, and taking the power of the state", but on the contrary to the many refugees the war had left behind in the area mentioned in the injunction. By interpreting it in this manner, the problem of the absence of significant discrimination of the region in question is not only circumvented, but also made completely insignificant to the issue at hand. According to the argument, the injunction is in fact a warning for the future against these people taking power, not particularly aimed at one region, but merely taking the many refugees in the area as one example. This reinterpretation is so "free", that it virtually loses any connection with the original text: the same argument could be applied to any number of historical texts, without obtaining significantly different results. Apart from the fact that it takes the warning in the injunction seriously, instead of distrusting it, the argument is not based on sound interpretation. Rather, it is an attempt to find a way of preserving the authenticity of the injunctions and simultaneously getting rid of the potentially divisive message of the eighth injunction. In this, it is certainly not alone. An earlier study (Yi Chaebom, "Koryo T'aejo-ui hunyo shipcho-e taehan chaegom't'o") also tried to circumvent this problem by suggesting, on the basis of rather dubious philology, that the area under consideration should be drastically limited and that, when certain specific conditions concerning the locality and the eligibility of historical figures to be included in the survey were met, T'aejo had actually discriminated against a very small area. In any case, the area was much smaller than the entire south-west of the peninsula and did not, as such, exercise much influence upon the fundamental unity of the historic Korean state. A much earlier historian (Kim Sanggi, "Koryo T'aejo kön'guk-kwa kyöngnyun") was more rigorous in his conclusions, concluding that the eighth injunction did not correspond to contemporary policies and circumstances, stating that the injunctions left by T'aejo bore little relation to contemporary reality and thus were of little historical significance. Another study (Yi Pyöngdo, Koryo shidae-ui yón'gū) was similar in approach, also attempting/over Chi prevented him from doing so, arguing that the king must be seen as steadfast and loyal at all times and especially in such a desperate situation. Hyŏnjong then decided to send only his pregnant wife home to her family. They encountered continuous difficulties in securing fresh horses and food since all the postal station employees had fled from their posts.

Just before reaching Chŏn'ju, only lavishly distributed rewards and promotions kept a band of disgruntled soldiers from attacking the royal party at another postal station. Real trouble, however, only started at Chŏn'ju. At the advice of Pak Sŏm, Hyŏnjong declined an invitation by the military governor of Chŏn'ju, Cho Yonggyŏm 趙容謙, to spend the night in the city. Ostensibly, Hyŏnjong listened to Pak's counsel that since T'aejo had not liked Chŏn'ju, Hyŏnjong also should keep his distance, but it seems much more likely that Cho Yonggyŏm's welcome of the young and insecure monarch had been an act of intimidation. Cho had not even taken the trouble to dress up properly, but was wearing his daily attire when he welcomed the king. The party decided to spend the night at a postal station near Chŏn'ju. That night they were attacked by Cho Yonggyŏm and his followers. Chi Ch'aemun once more saved the day by barricading the doors and causing confusion among the attackers. Leaving the next morning, the royal party managed to reach Naju, which was safe territory. Hyŏnjong was so jittery by then that when he heard that a Liao army was on its way, he wanted to leave in the middle of the night. Again, Chi strongly advised his monarch not to panic, while he investigated the rumour. As it turned out, Liao had retreated and Chi had saved Hyŏnjong from yet another ignominious nocturnal flight.233

The only bright spot in Hyŏnjong's flight south was that he managed to gain three more wives. The only time on his journey that he had been received cordially had been when he was received by Kim Ên'bu 金殷溥, a centrally appointed official stationed in Kongju at the time. Hyŏnjong was so impressed by Kim's warm welcome both times the royal party passed through Kongju that he married his eldest daughter. Later he would marry two other daughters of Kim, making Kim Ên'bu the maternal grandfather of three future monarchs: Tŏkch'ong, Chŏngjong and Munjong.234

On the flight south, Hyŏnjong panicked when his inexperience was exposed and when he met real hostility from his subjects, often subordinate officials, postal station workers and foot soldiers; in other words, the hoi polloi mentioned in the eighth injunction. Local officials attacked him in Chŏn'ju: Military Governor Cho Yonggyŏm, Deputy Director of the Royal Domestic Service 殿中少監 ユ ソングォン柳僧虔, Transport Commissioner 轉運使 ヨー 錢, Military Inspector 巡檢使 チョ イュップ崔楫, as well as Ch'oe Sŏngŭi 崔成義 and Im T'ak 林卓, whose offices have not been recorded. It is no coincidence that the eighth injunction specifically mentions attacks on the royal carriage, a symbol for the ruler.
Historians who try to preserve the authenticity of T’aejo’s injunctions find the eighth injunction problematic. To date, only one Korean historian has concluded that some of the injunctions could not have been written by T’aejo (Mun Kyonghyon, see above note 18). See Yi Chae-bôm, “Koryô T’aejo-ui hunyô shipcho-e taehan chaegôm’t’o,” pp.83–108; Kim Sanggi, “Koryô T’aejo-kön’gyûk-kwa kyŏngnyun,” pp.60–83; Yi Pyŏngdo, Koryôsbidae-uiyŏnggu, pp.64–6; Hŏ Chunggwôn, “Koryô ch’ogiyugyojokch’ôngch’i sasang-ui hyŏngsŏng kwajŏng,” pp.137–38; Mun Kyonghyon, Koryô T’aejo-ui Hu Samguk tongil yŏn’gu, pp.310–20.

233 The biography of Chi Ch’aemun recounts the story of the flight in detail. The entries in the annals for the reign of Hyŏnjong are limited to matter-of-fact statements regarding the places the king passed through. See KS 94: 21–28a; KS 94: 6b–7b.

234 KS 94:30a–31a; KS 88: 13b–14b; KS 88: 15h.
It also refers to the ruler’s need for physical safety away from his court on tour and the requirement to suppress elements that might regard royal authority too lightly and take advantage of its weaknesses. The flight south was a defining moment in Hyŏnjong’s career, showing emphatically that loyalty must be rewarded and treason punished. The incident with the disgruntled soldiers showed this, but it is more clearly reflected in the way Hyŏnjong rewarded those few officials who had stayed with him through thick and thin. Chi Ch’aemun was rewarded and received a promotion; his loyalty and steadfastness were remembered when Tŏkchŏng, Hyŏnjong’s son and successor, ascended the throne and had him recorded in the register of meritorious subjects for his actions during the flight south.\textsuperscript{235} Pak Sŏm was also handsomely rewarded. The biography of his great-grandson Pak Sŏngjung still mentions his ancestor’s merits on the flight south, for which the slightly euphemistic term \textit{namhaeng} (literally “a southern progress”, sometimes more specifically a “royal tour of the south”) was used.\textsuperscript{236} Pak, like Chi, received the title of “meritorious subject who accompanied the king on his southern travels” (\textit{Namhaeng bojong kongshin}). Others who were rewarded included Chu Chŏ, Pak Ch’ungsuk, Chang Yŏnu, Ch’ae Ch’ungsun, Yu Chong, and Kim Üngin. The most lavish reward, perhaps, went to Kim Æng, who became royal father-in-law and later maternal grandfather when Hyŏnjong married his three daughters, the first out of gratitude. Apparently, Hyŏnjong was deeply touched by the cordiality Kim had awarded him in an otherwise hostile environment.

These rewards were matched with punishments. Cho Yonggyŏm and his accomplices were banished to remote places for their failed attack attempt on the king’s life after the Liao armies had retreated and Hyŏnjong once again had the reigns of the government firmly in his hands. In addition, in his third year on the throne, Hyŏnjong abolished the post of military governor in Chŏnju and Kongju—he had, after all, been confronted with Military Governor Cho Yonggyŏm’s actions directly—replacing it with the much lower and less powerful rank of prefecture supervisor.\textsuperscript{237} Demoting the administrative status of a region was a time-honoured way of punishing it for disloyalty or treason.

The first part of the injunction warns of accepting traitors at the court and even in the royal family. People like Cho Yonggyŏm, whose precise background is unknown, would have been included in this as they held central appointments (military governors were appointed from the capital). Why the injunction should also warn of intermarriage with the royal family is not as clear; it may be connected to one of Hyŏnjong’s secondary wives, who came from Chŏnju, about whom the sources remain completely silent.\textsuperscript{238} However, the reference to Later Paekche shows that in Hyŏnjong’s time there was still some fear at the Koryŏ court that the integration of Chŏnju and Kongju had not been completely successful:
until the end of the Koryŏ dynasty, they would be identified with Later Paekche, although in a slightly nostalgic manner from the twelfth century on. The last part of the injunction warning against the low-born, incited by slander, joining up with the more powerful, directly reflects Hyŏnjong’s own experiences. The slander may have referred to Hyŏnjong’s tarnished descent or the way he became Koryŏ ruler, but he was certainly pursued, harassed and attacked by common soldiers and postal station workers, led by officials such as Cho Yonggyŏm.

The nightmare of his flight south stayed with Hyŏnjong for the rest of his life and convinced him of the need to encourage loyalty and discourage treason with rewards and punishments. The fact that he created a new class of meritorious subjects for those officials who had not abandoned him, married the daughter of the one man who had treated him well and demoted Chŏnju and Kongju after his return to the capital clearly indicate how strongly he felt. The lessons derived from these experiences were passed on to his successors: one of Tŏkchong’s first acts was to confirm Chi Ch’aemun’s status as meritorious subject on the strength of his actions during the nam-baeng, and the exploits of Pak Sŏm were still beneficial to his great-grandson. This suggests the legendary status the flight south came to acquire, probably in tandem with the heroic resistance seen against Liao during Hyŏnjong’s reign. Despite the fact that officials from Kongju and Chŏnju did not lose their appointments at court (provided that they had been loyal), Hyŏnjong came to distrust the region deeply, as it was where the worst moments of his reign took place.

We should note that the eighth injunction does not, in fact, refer to national dangers; instead its viewpoint is local and it displays a keen fear of disturbances, incited by slander, at that level. While, on a national level, a slave or a postal worker would not pose any danger, even when a mob was involved, for a young ruler who inherited the throne in suspicious circumstances, on the run from a powerful enemy, suspicious of the loyalty of his men and accompanied only by a small group of soldiers and officials, they could be very dangerous indeed. This fear of local violence also points at somebody other than T’aejo who had, after all, spent most
of his life putting down local resistance in some form or other, as author of this injunction. The nineteen-year-old ruler Hyŏnjong, who had been on the throne for just one year and had previously only experienced life as a monk, was not, however, adept at handling such situations.

The only question remaining, then, is why the eighth injunction’s condemnation of the territory south of the Kongju River was clothed in geomantic terms since there was general agreement amongst the commentators that the geomantic qualities of this area were not advantageous. According to Yi Pyŏng-do, T’aejo did not mean to suppress the people of the area, but rather its disharmonious geomantic features. This argument is not sustainable on two grounds. First, it is implausible that T’aejo would have used an injunction to remedy or remove the area’s disharmonious features as he had access to far more sophisticated means of adjusting geomantic imbalance. Kaegyŏng, after all, was hardly a place with outstanding geomantic features, yet it was able to remain Koryŏ’s capital by having its deficiencies remedied by the Western Capital and later the Southern Capital, as well as by the sophisticated construction of temples and monasteries at places that could harm the dynasty’s geomantic health. Secondly, apart from this single injunction, the territory south of the Kongju River was not associated with geomantic disharmony for the rest of the Koryŏ dynasty. Later administrators may have complained about the stubborn nature of the people, but not of their innate treachery or disharmony, nor that of the terrain. This leads to the conclusion that while the territory may have lent itself to unfavourable geomantic interpretation, it was not necessarily the case. The use of a geomantic argument in this injunction, then, was less occasioned by real geomantic deficiencies than by the cogency of geomantic rhetoric in general, especially with regard to an area that may have been suspect or not clearly positive in geomantic terms.

A recent analysis of the eighth injunction concluded that the principles used to establish that Chŏnju and its surroundings were treacherous and disharmonious would have yielded similar results if applied to Kaegyŏng. This study concluded that Koryŏ geomancy relied on various contradictory principles, making a logical consideration of Koryŏ geomancy next to impossible. However, Koryŏ geomancy had clearly established its viability in that society and despite the fact that it may have relied on contradictory principles, this meant that in general the relation between input and output, between terrain and geomantic suitability, was not arbitrary. In the case of the eighth injunction, though, this does, in fact, appear to be the case and thus, it has been proposed that T’aejo simply used geomancy
here as a convenient mode of argument, his real reasons for ostracizing Chŏnju and surroundings being political. However, having established that T'aejo did not compose this injunction, the argument can be transferred to Hyŏnjong without difficulty. The geomantic reasoning is purely for legitimation; its internal logic does not withstand scrutiny and, perhaps more importantly, contemporaries clearly did not attach any significance to it. To put it briefly, the geomantic argument was little more than rhetoric, widely understood and accordingly very persuasive, to give the contents of the eighth injunction legitimacy and urgency.

In general, the eighth injunction only became important after the Koryŏ period. Koryŏ documents show that it was never referred to or implemented. What this injunction actually shows is Hyŏnjong's anger at his ignominious flight south. Only when it became a useful tool to reinforce the idea that Korea had historically always been a fundamentally divided country (a state, perhaps, but not a nation), did the eighth injunction gain in significance and prominence. Only in the context of regional tensions in twentieth-century Korea and of Japanese academic efforts to utilize these tensions to strengthen the legitimacy of the annexation does the study of the eighth injunction make sense. In the context of Koryŏ, other than as the distillate of one ruler's traumatic experiences, it does not.

**Number Nine**

The ninth injunction is very general, like the seventh. It reads as follows:

Ninth injunction: The salaries and allowances for the aristocracy and the bureaucracy have been set according to the size of the state. They should not be increased or diminished. Furthermore, the classics say that salaries and allowances should be determined by the merits of those who receive them and government appointments should not be made on the basis of personal preferences. If those without merit or one's relatives or friends are undeservedly given salaries, not only will the people come to resent and criticize such abuses, but those who enjoy salaries undeservedly will also not be able to enjoy them for long. You should strictly forbid this. Since our country shares borders with strong and evil states, you should never forget the danger they pose, even in peaceful times. Treat the soldiers kindly and take good care of them; relieve them of their burden of forced labour; inspect them every autumn; give honours and promotions to the brave who stand out from the mass.

The advice contained in this injunction is general and sound, but it was occasioned by a very particular situation. Before investigating the immediate reasons why the ninth injunction was rendered as it was, however, the reasons why it does not date from T'aejo's reign must be adduced.

First, the prohibition to increase or diminish salaries and allowances is suspect. In organizing the Koryŏ state, T'aejo devised a provisional system...
245 Yi Chehyön added a commentary to the introduction of the *chönshigwa*, in which he commended Kyôngjong for establishing the new system, mentioning that T'aejo's provisional system was not good enough. It was, however, as good as could be expected from a young dynasty that was still developing effective ways of administering the country. See KS 2: 33b, KS 78: 6b. There has been extensive research on T'aejo's allocation and distribution of salaries and allowances. A good discussion is provided by Kim Yongdu. He concludes that despite T'aejo's prolonged efforts to introduce an efficient system, the *yokpunjon* system never functioned properly. T'aejo's successors made great efforts to create new and more effective measures. This resulted in considerable political unrest during the reigns of Hyejong and Kyôngjong. See Kim Yongdu, “Koryö T'aejodae-ü yokpunjon” [Meritorial Service] (Seoul: Iljogak, 1996), which has been revised numerous times, this being the most recent version. For a useful overview of different opinions, see Yu Hant’aek, “Chonshigwa ch'ae-eso sajon-üi songkyok” [The Character of Private Land under the Field and Woodland Rank System] in Han'guk chon'gundaesa-üi chuyo chaengchōm [Important Debates in Korean Pre-Modern History], ed. Yôksa pip'yông p'yônjip wiwonhoe (Seoul: Yôksa pip'yôngsa, 2002), pp.151–66.

246 KS 2: 33b, KSC 2: 14a–b. The classic study on the Koryö land system is still Kang Chinch'ol, *Koryö t'oj j cheodo yŏnggu* [Revised Study of the Koryö Land System] (Seoul: Iljogak, 1996), which has been revised numerous times, this being the most recent version. For a useful overview of different opinions, see Yu Hant’aek, “Chönshigwa ch’ae-eso sajon-üi songkyok” [The Character of Private Land under the Field and Woodland Rank System], in *Haguk ch’ongja gundesa-üi chuyo chaengchōm* [Important Debates in Korean Pre-Modern History], ed. Yôksa pip’yông p’yônjip wiwonhoe (Seoul: Yôksa pip’yôngsa, 2002), pp.151–66.

247 KS 78: 6a–13; KSC 2: 60a.

248 Yi Kihaek, *Ch’oe Sŏngno*, p.76.

249 In these two years a long wall was completed which stretched from the north-west to the north-east. See KSC 4: 5a.

250 KS 82: 30a–32a; KSC 4: 5a.

according to which officials and soldiers were rewarded in proportion to their loyalty to T’aegyo. The salaries and allowances distributed according to this system were not fixed, but dependent of the recipient's standing with the ruler. As T’aegyo himself probably knew, this ad hoc system was not adequate to administer all salaries and allowances distributed by the state. A major revision came in 976, when Kyôngjong established the Field and Woodland Rank System, that for the first time officially fixed the salaries of officials by granting them the prebendal rights to plots of cultivated land. The system initiated by Kyôngjong went through a number of far-reaching changes during the reigns of Sŏngjong and Mokchong. After these changes, although the system was adapted in minor ways numerous times, its fundamentals were in place. The history of the salary system of early Koryo, then, makes it implausible that T’aegyo could have written this part of the injunction. There was no fixed system for salary distribution during his reign. The earliest date for such a system is 976.

A second indication is furnished by the warning not to neglect the borders and the border garrison soldiers. During the reign of T’aegyo, border defences were not static. The first point of Ch’oe Sŏngno’s *On Current Affairs* deals with this problem: according to him it was advisable to use indigenous frontier people to man the future garrisons that would guard the border. In his advice to Sŏngjong, Ch’oe explicitly referred to Koryo guarding the borders by rotating the standing armies, alternating frontier duty between them. Despite the continuous harassments of Jurchen bands, there was no savage country bordering Koryo—Liao did not constitute a dangerous presence at Koryo’s borders in this period. Koryo did not face any immediate threats to its security and no static frontier defence had been established. The second part of the injunction refers to garrison soldiers who bore the brunt of frontier defences. Garrisons and a static border defence were finally completed only during the first two years of the reign of Tŏkchong, Hyŏnjong’s successor, after decades of frontier fortification. Expenditure on wages for frontier soldiers increased enormously during the reigns of Sŏngjong, Hyŏnjong and Tŏkchong due to the destructive Liao invasions and continuing tension at the frontier. It was only during the eleventh century that it became necessary to maintain permanent garrisons.

Thus, the circumstances of T’aegyo’s reign make it unlikely he wrote the ninth injunction. It begins as a general warning against the abuse of state resources and nepotism, but ends with a warning to guard the frontiers and treat the frontier soldiers well. The reign of Hyŏnjong provides an incident that explains why these quite different topics have been addressed in the one injunction.

Hyŏnjong’s reign was a period of invasions, repulsion of those invasions and of the consolidation of the Koryo state after domestic upheavals that could have ended the dynasty. In 1014, three years after the Liao inva-
sions and Hyŏnjong’s flight south, a military rebellion broke out, decribed in the biography of Hwangbo Yuŭi, one of the senior statesmen who had helped Hyŏnjong ascend the throne:\footnote{KS 4: 17a–b, KSC 3: 24a–b.}

After the war of 1010, military expenses were increased, which caused shortages in the salaries for the officials. Consequently, Hwangbo Yuŭi conferred with Security Council member Chang Yŏnu. They decided to repossess the lands awarded to soldiers now serving in the capital [because of their merits at guarding the frontier] and use the revenue from those lands to pay the officials. The military officials were disgruntled and annoyed with this. Supreme General Ch’oe Chil had given meritorious service at the border and performed in several military posts, but he failed to become a civil official. As a result, he was always dissatisfied. Finally he conspired with Supreme Generals Kim Hun, Pak Sŏng, Yi Hyŏp, Yi Sŏm, Sŏk Panghyŏn, Ch’ae Kajŏng, Kon Mun and Im Maeng. Stirring up the anger of the soldiers by using the theft of their lands as an excuse, they led several armies into rebellion. Clamouring, the soldiers entered the royal palace. They tied up Hwangbo Yuŭi and Chang Yŏnu and gave them a whipping that nearly killed them. They then went to the ruler’s quarters and said to him: “That Hwangbo and others have stolen our lands was not for the benefit of the state but for private gain. It is like cutting off a toe, so the shoe will fit, but what about the body? Now your soldiers are enraged and can no longer bear the abuse. The situation is critical, so we beg you to get rid of those who harm the country and put our minds at ease.” The king could hardly ignore the wishes of the crowd and removed Hwangbo and Chang from the list of officials and banished them.\footnote{KS 94: 14b–15b. Also see KSC 3: 24ab.}

Kim Hun and the other military officials had fought at the northern frontier, where they had distinguished themselves.\footnote{KS 94: 16a.} It was customary for soldiers who had excelled on garrison duty in the north to be transferred to the capital guards after a number of years.\footnote{Most biographies and appointments of generals of one of the capital guards confirm this. See for example, Ch’oe Hongŭi yang Kŭmowi sangjanggun sŏp hyŏngbu sangso pur’yun [Refusal of the Request of Ch’oe Hongŭi to become Supreme General of the Golden Bird Division of the Capital Garrison and Temporary Minister of the Ministry of Punishments], in TMS 30: 13a; Yu Sŏngdan, Cho In’gol yang chŏb’ŏng taejuŭ Kŭmowi daejanggun pur’yun pidap [Refusal of the Request of Cho In’gol to Receive a Civilian Prestige Title and Become Grand General of the Golden Bird Division of the Capital Garrison], in TMS 25: 15b–16b.} In this case, however, their sacrifices at the border had not been properly rewarded, the most important reason being the inherent imbalance in the stipend system, which made sure that civil officials were considerably better paid than military officials.\footnote{The preferential treatment of civil officials over military officials was one of the salient characteristics of the Field and Woodland Rank System.} Even generals, grand generals and supreme generals like Ch’oe Chil were structurally underpaid and his ambition to become a civil official had gone unfulfilled. Hwangbo Yuŭi’s act of dishonesty was the proverbial last straw. The military took over and one of the first acts of Kim Hun, who quickly emerged as the new leader, was to abolish the censorate and replace it with a new bureau which included a stipend commissioner (noksŏ).\footnote{KS 76: 21a–b; KSC 4: 24b.} The military coup lasted less than a year. In the following year Wang Kado led a party of advocates of civil rule and murdered Kim Hun and nineteen others at a banquet in the Western Capital—the forces from the Western Capital once more coming to Hyŏnjong’s rescue.\footnote{KS 4: 18a. This time it was completely planned. According to his biography, Wang Kado had spent significant time in the Western Capital when he was younger and had managed to gain the trust of the people. After the military coup, Hyŏnjong appointed him in the Western Capital, giving him the necessary time to prepare everything to eliminate the military leaders as easily as possible. Wang Kado’s original family name was Yi, but Hyŏnjong expressed his gratitude at Wang’s exploit by bestowing the royal surname on him. See KS 94: 34a–b, KSC 3: 56a.} Hwangbo and Chang were subsequently recalled from exile and reinstated in the bureaucracy (see Fig. 33).
The episode shows how vital it was for the state to keep the military satisfied. After the Liao invasions, military expenses had risen steeply, but apparently little of those funds ended up with the soldiers who actually stood guard in the garrisons and who fought the battles. One of the things they could expect was to be awarded a plot of land for services rendered after their return from the frontier. When this was taken away from them, revolt broke out. The Koryo state needed a strong military to guard against Liao invasions—and when one came in 1018 the army was ready because Hyŏnjong had taken care to build up the army's strength by rewarding it appropriately. Secondly, a strong army was required as the state and its ruler were personally vulnerable if the capital guards rebelled. Kim Hun met an untimely death, but the lessons of the coup were not forgotten by Hyŏnjong. After things had returned to normal, Hyŏnjong visited his armies on a regular basis and held frequent inspections during which he rewarded brave soldiers, gave gifts to parents, wives and children of soldiers and showed his concern. Welfare policies such as releasing soldiers with parents over eighty from active duty were implemented. Hyŏnjong's active and visible involvement with the military was continued by Tŏkch'ong, Chŏnjong and Munjong. Hyŏnjong also invested heavily in the construction of fortresses and garrison towns, having several defensive fortifications and strongholds built during each year of his reign.

Thus the ninth injunction could not have been written by T'aejo as it does not correspond to the circumstances in the first half of the tenth century. Rather, it was occasioned by the military revolt of Kim Hun, who was supported by aggrieved soldiers who had fought on Koryo's northern frontiers for years on end. In the tenth century T'aejo had kept the borders safe with ad hoc rotation of his armies, but from the reign of Hyŏnjong on, a static border defence was implemented, at much greater expense. After the military coup of 1014, however, this was not paid for by the soldiers themselves. Hyŏnjong became a monarch who actively and visibly invested in the military, and the success of his policies after 1014 was reflected in Kang Kamch'an's resounding defeat of the invading Liao armies in 1018. It was further confirmed by the completion of static border defences in 1032, the second year of Tŏkch'ong's reign. The ninth injunction, then, is a reflection of the situation and needs of Hyŏnjong's reign, stressing the importance of a strong and motivated military and a warning against the consequences of mistreating soldiers.

**Number Ten**

The tenth injunction is probably the least debated of the *Ten Injunctions* and like the seventh and the ninth, it also is of a general nature. It reads as follows:

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258 *KS* 81: 4a–11a. A decree from 1016 reads as follows: “If a soldier should die while on active duty guarding the frontiers, the state will provide the necessary items to wash and clothe the body and send the remains to the soldier's home. If he has died in strange territory and his name and place of origin is not known, he will be buried temporarily by the local government office concerned. His age and his physical appearance must be recorded, so that there need not be any worry lest he be mistaken for someone else.” See *KS* 3: 16a–b.

259 *KS* 82: 30b–31b.
Tenth injunction: In preserving a household or a state, one should always be on one’s guard, even if one has no immediate worries. Read widely in the classics and in history; take the past as a warning for the present. The Duke of Zhou 周公 was a great sage, yet he sought to admonish his nephew King Cheng 成王, with *Against Luxurious Ease*. Draw a diagram of *Against Luxurious Ease*, post it on the wall and reflect upon it when entering and leaving the room.260

The contents of this injunction amounted to common sense in medieval East Asia but there is one vital clue that allows some confidence concerning its dating. *Against Luxurious Ease* is a concise exposition on the proper Confucian way of governing a country and is included in the *Book of Documents*. It had long been known in Koryŏ, and was used as a text to instruct the ruler early in the dynasty: Kim Shimón had urged Sŏngjong to read it in the policy proposals he submitted and Sŏngjong was glad to take note of it.261 However, the practice of explaining *Against Luxurious Ease* in the form of a diagram, seems to have become popular only during the reign of Song emperor Renzong (r. 1022–63).262 The Song scholar Sun Shi 蘇昞 is usually credited with inventing the diagram of *Against Luxurious Ease* but according to the *Old History of the Tang*, Tang emperor Xuanzong 玄宗 (r. 712–56) was given a diagram of it some three hundred years earlier.263 If this record is reliable T’aejo could have known of the diagram but the *Old History of the Tang* was only compiled in 945, two years after his death. Given that the Tang had fallen early in the tenth century, and that Koryŏ was relatively isolated with regard to non-mainstream Chinese culture during T’aejo’s reign, it is highly improbable that Xuanzong’s alleged diagram somehow found its way to T’aejo. The *Old History of the Tang* was widely read in Koryŏ but only from the reign of Hyŏnjong or Tŏkchong. It was first printed during the reign of Chŏngjong in 1042 and started being referred to during Munjong’s reign.264 It is more plausible, then, to accept the Song example as the decisive influence, especially if the way the diagram was used in that dynasty is taken into the account. Song emperor Renzong had two screens adorned with it made and placed in new audience halls. According to the *Standard Jin History*, the Jin dynasty also knew the diagram of *Against Luxurious Ease* through Song envoys, suggesting that such diagrammatic explanation was a well-known device in Song China and easily exported—the diagram was customarily calligraphed on folding screens and they made excellent, as well as easily portable, gifts.265 The diagram also became known in Koryŏ on folding screens. In 1103, academician and noted calligrapher Hong Kwan 洪灌 (?–1126) wrote it on one to be placed behind the throne of the ruler in the main audience hall.266 Not long after, the ruler commanded Yun Kwan 尹瓘 (?–1111) to give a lecture on it in the palace, which was followed by a discussion of its contents.267 Early thirteenth-century poet Kim Yanggyŏng also wrote a poem about calligraphing *Against Luxurious Ease* on a folding screen.268

260 KS 2: 17a. This is the original text: 其十曰，有國有家，儆戒無虛，博觀經史，鑑古戒今，周公大聖，無幾一篇，進戒成王，宜當細讀，出入觀省。Strangely, all translators of the tenth injunction, irrespective of the language into which they translate it, seem to have missed the fact that it refers to a diagram and not a written or printed full text.
263 Jiǔ Tángshū [Old History of the Tang] 119: 9a. The diagram is not mentioned again in Chinese dynastic histories until 1035. Given the fact that Chinese historians also credited the Song scholar with inventing the diagram, the gift of diagram to the Tang emperor appears to have been an isolated episode.
265 Jinshí 89: 3a.
266 KS 12: 2a.
267 KS12: 26b–27a. During the reign of Injong, Yun Kwan’s son Yun Oni was ordered by the monarch to participate in a discussion on *Against Luxurious Ease*. See KS 16: 2a–b.
268 TMS 19: 4b.
It is reasonable to assume that Koryŏ came to know *Against Luxurious Ease* in diagram form through Song envoys sometime during the reign of Renzong. Even if the *Old History of the Tang* introduced the diagram into Koryŏ, this would have happened after the death of T'aejo and, in any case, the Tang history does not indicate what the diagram looked like. Given the similarity between the ways Koryŏ and Song used the diagram, the many, though unofficial, contacts between them in the early eleventh century, the popularity of the diagram in the Song, and the prestige of Song learning, it is safe to assume that the diagram of *Against Luxurious Ease* came to Koryŏ through the Song. This makes it possible to date the tenth injunction to the reign of Hyŏnjong or perhaps to that of Tŏkchong.

### Notable Absences in the Ten Injunctions

This analysis of the *Ten Injunctions* makes it clear that they are a forgery from the reign of Hyŏnjong. However, one possibility that cannot be excluded is that they were based on original but no longer extant instructions from T'aejo. The *Standard Koryŏ History* mentions two writings by T'aejo: one containing instructions for his officials, the other probably an outline on proper government. At least one of these was said to have survived the burning of the capital and may very well have been used as a starting point to write the *Ten Injunctions*. Even if the *Ten Injunctions* was based upon now lost instructions by T'aejo, this does not constitute evidence that they are not products of Hyŏnjong's reign. They fit the circumstances of the first half of the eleventh century and provide solutions for eleventh century problems.

In this monograph, the injunctions have been consistently analysed for what they contain but a brief consideration of what does not appear, and what might reasonably have been expected to be present had T'aejo been the author, is instructive. Why, for instance, is Tosôn prominently mentioned, when there is no contemporary evidence to connect Tosôn and T'aejo? This is particularly puzzling given the number of monks who did play active roles as advisers to T'aejo and who go completely unmentioned, despite the presence of a considerable amount of contemporary evidence as to their influence. In addition, as mentioned above, the absence of references to important temple complexes such as the Kaetaesa is also perplexing. And if the injunctions were in fact warnings against what might happen in the distant future, why did T'aejo neglect to point out the dangers that the powerful merit subjects posed? Although history has enshrined T'aejo as the man who established Koryŏ, he certainly did not do this on his own, and his reign was characterized by struggles with his old comrades-in-arms. For several decades the power of the Koryŏ ruler was to a large extent shared with men who had helped found the state and defeat its enemies. At best he was the first among equals and at worst a plaything of the new aristocracy formed by the old generals.
and their families. As such, although officially held in high esteem as so-called merit subjects, the very people who had helped T’aejo unify the peninsula posed the gravest dangers to his immediate successors—not the savage countries in the north or disgruntled south-westerners. It took Kwangjong’s ruthless purges of the aristocracy to break their influence. It is hardly conceivable that T’aejo would not have warned against the danger the merit subjects posed, since he had been exposed to it on a daily basis. On the other hand, why do the merit subjects receive no positive mention in the injunctions since without them T’aejo would not have succeeded in unifying the peninsula? Ch’oe Sŭngno, after all, singled out the very costly practice of making effigies of merit subjects during festivities in his criticism of Koryŏ’s festivals, indicating that their worship was an important and expensive element of Koryŏ’s ritual calendar. These are glaring absences in a document that purports to be the testament of T’aejo Wang Kŏn.

The Men Behind the Myth

Two questions remain that may best be answered together: what was the motive for the forgery of the Ten Injunctions as a coherent text (rather than each individual injunction) and who were the forgers? Although it is not possible to offer a definitive answer to these questions, the circumstantial evidence in one direction is strong.

Let us first try to determine the identity of the forger or forgers. The provenance of the text offers a good clue. Ch’oe Chean, grandson of Ch’oe Sŭngno, discovered the injunctions in the house of Ch’oe Hang, famous statesman, scholar, historian and Buddhist believer. As has been demonstrated above, Ch’oe Hang’s ideas on the importance of Buddhist festivals are reflected in the injunctions, as are his ideas about Confucian kingship, legitimate succession to the throne and ruling a country in general. The ideas of Kim Shimŏn, a contemporary of Ch’oe Hang and assistant supervising state historian for the compilation of Koryŏ’s historical annals, are also clearly reflected in the Ten Injunctions. Kim Shimŏn submitted several proposals to Sŏngjong, the contents of which are reminiscent of some of the injunctions. He used the same metaphors, expressed the same ideas and consciously followed the example of Against Luxurious Ease. The same can be said of Hwang Churyang; his outburst against the legal emancipation of Jurchen tribesmen closely corresponds to the vehement description of the Khitan in the fourth injunction.

The composition of the Ten Injunctions is inextricably tied up with the recompilation of Koryŏ’s historical annals after the burning of the capital in 1011. The scholars and officials responsible for interviewing old people, collecting everything that had survived the burning of the
capital and compiling the annals are the prime suspects for the forgery of T'aejo’s last instructions. The analysis of the injunctions has shown the involvement of the same loyal and trustworthy ministers that Hyŏnjong had gathered around him time and again. Ch’oe Hang and Kim Shimŏn belonged to the older generation and were seasoned statesmen who had served during several reigns. Ch’oe Hang’s disciples also belonged to this inner circle of confidants: Hwang Churyang and Ch’oe Chean had passed the state examinations under Ch’oe Hang and the bond between examiner and examinees was traditionally strong. Yun Chinggo and Chu Chŏ should perhaps also be added to the inner circle as they undoubtedly belonged to the same group, but the sources contain too little data to make it possible to determine to what extent they were involved with the others. Ch’oe Ch’ung is another dubious case: he was clearly associated with those mentioned above, although he seems to have had a lesser involvement. These are the
people to whom we should direct our attention. They compiled the historical annals, were involved in events connected to the injunctions and were confidants of Hyŏnjong. Ch’oe Hang and Yun Chinggo had been trusted, for instance, with the excavation and transfer of the coffin of Hyŏnjong’s father Wang Uk (later styled Anjong). The same people also had the means to forge the Ten Injunctions. They were among the most gifted scholars of their day and had access to all historical materials; materials to which even the ruler himself had limited access. Arguably, these scholars “knew” T’aeko better than his own grandson did or could as they had compiled his now no longer extant Veritable Records. They even had access to the printing facilities and scriptorium in Ch’oe Hang’s residence. And they were staunch supporters of Hyŏnjong, waging battles for his legitimacy on his behalf.

Given their advanced age at the time of the forgery, it could be that neither Ch’oe Hang nor Kim Shimon was involved in the physical forging of the Ten Injunctions, although the intimate connections between them and Ch’oe Chean and the others, as well as the clear presence of their ideas in the injunctions, suggest that they acted as mentors to the younger scholar-officials. There is another reason why the presence of both Ch’oe Hang and Kim Shimon would have been of great importance. Peddling a forgery is at best a risky affair and if the last will of a dynasty’s founder is involved it becomes quite literally a matter of life and death. To have the Ten Injunctions accepted as authentic, some kind of authentication from scholars of high repute would have been necessary. Even in death, Ch’oe Hang’s reputation was judged to be of sufficient grandeur to remove the injunctions from suspicion. Including the record of their rediscovery in an appendix to Ch’oe Sungno’s biography was probably motivated by similar concerns. In Ch’oe Sungno, Ch’oe Chean had the most authoritative grandfather a Koryŏ scholar could possibly have; the choice for him to be the discoverer of the injunctions was probably determined by his distinguished descent.

The rest was simple. Giving the text the linguistic and physical appearance of a document from the previous century cannot have been difficult. The forgers were historians, after all, charged, among other things, with compiling the history of the reign of T’aeko. The language of the injunctions is simple, terse, and unambiguous—very different from the flowery style in which many royal testaments were written in Koryŏ. This is also an indication that they were not written with an eye to posterity but to obtain practical results in their own time. The provision of a convincing pedigree was a more difficult task, but the same opportunity that made it possible to forge the injunctions also made it possible to stage their rediscovery. The Liao sacking of the capital provided both the reason and the opportunity to forge the injunctions; it also made it plausible for the injunctions to be rediscovered among documents in Ch’oe Hang’s house.

272 It is not recorded whether the injunctions were handwritten or printed. Given the sophistication of early Koryŏ printing techniques, printing would have been a viable option. On the other hand, the forgers may have tried to enhance the authenticity of their product by writing it in a scribe’s hand.
The most important way to assert the significance of the text was, evidently, to appeal to T'aejo's authority. As the dynasty's sacred founder, his authority was unchallenged and was customarily invoked when his successors issued important edicts. His portraits in the Kaet'ae-sa Temple and in the Pongun-sa Temple, built especially for him, were the focal points of a continuous cult of royal ancestor worship in Koryo. As noted above, until the end of the Koryo dynasty, important decisions were often taken only after consulting auguries in the Kaet'ae-sa Temple. Especially during Hyonjong's reign, care was taken to honour T'aejo's memory. During the Liao invasions, his coffin was excavated and temporarily buried at a safe place, so as to prevent desecration of his remains.\textsuperscript{273} Hyonjong's problem-

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Figure 35
Facsimile of a Song edition of Against Luxurious Ease and commentary.
From: Songben Shisanjing zhushu fujiao kanji (Mowangxian guan: Guangxu dinghai [1887])
atic legitimacy made it necessary to make an appeal to the highest political authority possible: by passing off the injunctions as T'aejo's last will, Hyŏnjong could bypass the murder of his predecessor, and the faking of his own death to avoid further trouble with Liao. As an able monarch supported by extremely capable ministers, Hyŏnjong possessed the worldly power to issue edicts and to command their execution, however he did not have the generation-transcending charisma needed to proclaim his ideas about the dynasty well into the future. In other words, Hyŏnjong needed the Ten Injunctions to gain nation-wide legitimacy. An incident from the early twelfth century reveals that Hyŏnjong's plan succeeded: by that time, all officials, including petty and minor ones, knew the injunctions and, if applicable, relied on T'aejo's alleged authority to argue their case, in this instance, to resist Yejong's monetary reforms.²⁷⁴

To summarize, the Ten Injunctions was most likely forged by Ch'oe Chean and Hwang Churyang under the supervision and authority of Ch'oe Hang and probably Kim Shimŏn. Hyŏnjong must have known about the forgery, and may have instigated it, but it is equally possible that one of his most trusted ministers came up with the plan. The injunctions were forged to give credence and authority to the course Hyŏnjong and his ministers intended for Koryŏ and were probably "rediscovered" towards the end of Hyŏnjong's reign. In a sense, then, the injunctions are Hyŏnjong's testament under T'aejo's name, as they contain his ideas for the country, his practical guide for government. Rather than a malicious forgery, the injunctions can be seen as an attempt to use the past creatively and to arm Koryŏ against the threats that surrounded it, both domestic and international. That T'aejo's instructions are a forgery is not their most important characteristic. On the contrary, the injunctions played a crucial role in the crystallization of a distinct Koryŏ identity. It is now necessary to look at them as an artefact of the eleventh century.

Forging New Truths

"If any law holds for all forgery, it is quite simply that any forger, however deft, imprints the pattern and texture of his own period's life, thought, and language on the past he hopes to make seem real and vivid."²⁷⁵ Grafton's law certainly holds for the Ten Injunctions, which is imprinted with the concerns, worries, ideas and hopes of the first half of the eleventh century. This does not mean, however, that it only reflects the circumstances during Hyŏnjong's reign, as a strong continuity underlies it, a necessary prerequisite for it to be accepted as authentic. The reliance on Buddhism and on the spirits of the mountains and rivers, for instance, was a tenet to which all Koryŏ rulers subscribed. Many of the injunctions clearly refer to earlier edicts, proposals, and memorials and use the same language, rely on the same metaphors and express the same ideas. In this

²⁷³ This happened several times. See KS 4: 20a-b; KS 4: 29a; 31b.
²⁷⁴ KS 79: 12a.
²⁷⁵ Grafton, Forgers and Critics, p 67.
context, the injunctions functioned as T’aejo’s instructions, but also as Hyönjong’s vision for the dynasty.

To situate the Ten Injunctions in its proper context, it should be remembered that the reign of Hyönjong was a period of instability, of domestic division and foreign threat when the Wang lineage could very well have lost the throne. An epitaph from 1117 in honour of Ch’oe Kyebang, great-grandson of Ch’oe Sawi who was a minister close to Hyönjong, describes Hyönjong’s reign as the period in which “the altars of the land and grain gods almost went over into the hands of another family”. 276 The epitaph predictably credits Ch’oe Sawi with single-handedly saving the dynasty and making sure that it was returned to its legitimate monarch Hyönjong: “Our holy ancestor Hyönjong was able to succeed T’aejo and to transmit his legitimate heritage to myriad generations”. 277 Hyönjong’s reign was seen as an opportunity for the revitalisation of the dynasty, after Mokchong’s disruptive reign and the Liao invasions. 278 With the grandson of T’aejo on the throne, the dynasty consciously tried to return to its roots. The composition of the injunctions was more than a political expedient. They forged—in both of the meanings of the word—a truth that was desperately needed during precarious times. They should, therefore, be understood as a creative and efficient use of Koryo’s history and traditions to convey a contemporary message, a set of practical guidelines. Put briefly, while the text was a forgery, the contents were not.

As noted above, the injunctions contain a pluralist message with Buddhist and nativist beliefs, Confucian principles, instances of astute Realpolitik, administrative guidelines, as well as examples of intellectual and cultural independence. 279 Typically, modern historians have singled out those injunctions closest to their own field of specialization: Buddhologists analyse injunctions one, two and six; scholars of nativism and shamanism (often conflated) choose injunctions five and six; scholars concerned with regional schism concentrate on injunction eight; specialists on Confucianism focus on numbers three, seven, nine and ten. 280 This is understandable as the injunctions often contradict themselves on fundamental points if taken to their logical extremes (which is to say, the extremes to which the internal logic and the historical baggage of each injunction lead), and any analysis that might attempt an internally coherent interpretation will encounter many difficulties. It is, however, precisely in the nature of the injunctions to allow different interpretations, depending on the standpoint of the interpreter, so long as they do not necessarily deny each other.

As Michael Oakeshott has argued:

My Venice is not your Venice, and this grove of trees, which to me now is a shelter from the rains or a place to play hide-and-seek, to another (or to me in different circumstances) may be a defence against soil erosion. But there is nothing subjective or esoteric about these various understandings. They may exclude one another but they do not deny one another,
and they may be recognized by those who do not share them. Every such object is the perception of a subject, but none is "subjective" in the sense of being outside discourse or impervious to error. "Subjectivity" is not an ontological category.

The injunctions offer a multitude of possible interpretations; depending on the circumstances, or on the viewpoint of the interpreter, one or more injunctions can be given precedence over the others.

It would be possible to offer an internally coherent and complete interpretation of the injunctions taking, for instance, the state, or Buddhism, or some other significant feature in the landscape of eleventh century Koryŏ as the absolute principle that underlies each and every one of them. A more popular course has been to emphasise the importance of some injunctions and relegate the rest to the category of "skilful means"; in this manner the injunctions can be interpreted as Buddhist, nativist, or Confucian or as expedient and practical. However, the most popular way to use the injunctions has been to rely on a single one, without mentioning the others at all. Thus, for Koryŏ Buddhists the second injunction meant that there were clear restrictions on the construction of temples, but for Chosŏn literati this injunction meant something entirely different.

The most important characteristic of early to middle Koryŏ ideology was a tolerance of ambiguity and sufferance of contradiction, observable in the Ten Injunctions as much as anywhere else. Ambiguity was preserved, not eradicated, producing a state in which various latent potentials co-existed. This inherent ambiguity made it possible to deal with radical changes in the environment without having to resort to corresponding changes in worldview. The injunctions laid down possible paths to travel, but stopped short of giving directions. It was up to the interpreter to choose which path to take and how to travel it. The pluralist worldview enshrined in them offered the possibility of developing new interpretations to deal with new situations, while not necessarily demanding that old ideas were discarded. If each injunction is taken in isolation there is relatively little ambiguity (although still sufficient to divide generations of scholars), but if they are taken together, as they were presumably meant to be, an entirely different picture emerges. It is no longer clear which injunction should be awarded priority. Equally, it is impossible to establish whether the injunctions are Buddhist, Confucian, nativist, geomantic or merely practical. Given the proper context, a case could be made for each of these and many more. Thus, if the injunctions are anything, they are pluralist, tolerant of inconsistency and contradiction and open to a multitude of interpretations. This is not to say, however, that any interpretation was permissible; the fourth injunction, for instance, did not allow indiscriminate adoption of Khitan practices, but an influx of Liao achievements, which were considered valuable, was still permitted. By the same token, the

/reforming nature both policies shared. See KS129: 4b. Citing T'aejo's statement that he merely used Buddhism to gain the people's favour (when he replied to Ch'oe Úng's remonstrance that he relied on Buddhism), Pak Ch'o classified the injunctions as Confucian, stressing the second injunction that prohibited the random construction of temples. Needless to say, he did not quote the first injunction that stressed the importance of Buddhism for Koryŏ. See KS120: 34b-39a (a translation of this memorial is in Peter Lee, Sourcebook, pp.373-77). Thus, in practice, only the injunctions considered important were stressed. For Ch'oe Úng's remonstrance, see Pohan chip 1: 1a-b. A translation can be found in Peter Lee, Sourcebook, pp.433-34. Another instance of the reinterpretation of the injunctions is provided by the 1129 edict from Injong, cited above. In it, the fourth injunction is reinterpreted as prohibiting the adoption of barbaric Khitan customs and as encouraging the adoption of Sinitic culture. See KS16: 2b-3a.

Breuker, "When Truth Is Everywhere".

Two examples elucidate this. Yejong tried to promote the use of coinage and was rebuked by his officials who argued that Koryŏ should follow T'aejo's proscription on Liao influence, in this case their use of coin. According to Yejong, however, T'aejo had only meant to proscribe those Tang and Liao influences that were decadent, not Tang and Liao customs in general. See KS79: 12a. Injong, Yejong's son, proscribed what he called Khitan influences referring to the fourth injunction (see note 103). He also maintained that T'aejo had promoted the acceptance of Chinese culture in his injunctions. See KS16: 2b-3a. These examples show the interpretative flexibility the injunctions allowed and how they stayed current, despite changing political and social circumstances.
The fifth injunction grants the Western Capital an important role in Koryō. It does not, however, claim that the Western Capital should be made the Supreme Capital. The injunctions, in short, provided its interpreters with both guidance and leeway.

The history of divided scholarship on the Ten Injunctions in a sense makes clear the ambiguous nature of the injunctions. In general, ambiguity can be diminished by abstraction, but in doing so, ambiguity tends to be replaced with crude dichotomies. Typically, scholarship on the Ten Injunctions has followed this course, and the task of explanation has suffered as a consequence. The injunctions may be incongruent and contradictory yet, for practical purposes, they functioned well enough. A pluralist worldview negotiates and maintains the hodgepodge of its constituent elements by constantly defining and redefining elements that can be maintained and those that must be discarded. Thus, as soon as it became clear that the eighth injunction was of little practical use, it was removed as a precedent. However, we should note that the neo-Confucian Chosŏn intellectual Yi Ik felt obliged to comment on this injunction when he discussed Koryŏ history. The implication that the Chosŏn royal family came from a treacherous and disharmonious territory and was itself accordingly treacherous and disharmonious had to be refuted.286 The leeway that a Koryŏ scholar had with regard to the eighth injunction was not available to a Chosŏn scholar. Whereas high Koryŏ officials from Chŏnju functioned very well at court with the injunction against their employment in place, a Chosŏn official could not let the contents of the infamous number eight go unchallenged, given that Chŏnju was the clan seat of the royal Yi family.

A pluralist worldview allows a range of potentially conflicting and contradictory elements to co-exist, if the urge to abstract is suppressed. Potentially conflicting elements then become an aggregate of competing ideas, instead of radically abstracted principles in opposition to each other.287 Systems of thought and belief possess a minimum of shared elements that ensure mutual commensurability, which amounts to a permitted ambiguity at conceptual borders.288 Only when the boundaries that guard group identity are forced to change, when pressure is brought to bear on them, do these boundaries harden. At this time, one potentiality within the structural ambiguity that characterizes pluralist ideologies is then realized at the expense of other potentialities. This boundary mechanism guards the identity of the group.289 Thus, the core of an identity, that which makes something itself and not something else, is located not at the centre, but at the boundaries. The porosity of the boundaries at any given time decides how change is accommodated. Permeable boundaries ensure adjustment through acceptance of foreign elements; impermeable ones reject them when the change required is too great, too radical or too sudden.290

This boundary mechanism is visible in the Ten Injunctions: for example, the fourth injunction warning against the undue acceptance of both
Chinese and Liao influence represents a hardening of boundaries. During T’aejo’s reign, there was little need for such a warning. Under Hyŏnjong, however, Koryŏ appeared to be about to perish under the Liao onslaught and officials were worried about the loss of their native traditions. Thus, this injunction warned against both dangers. The biographies of Kang Cho and Ha Kongjin and the preferential treatment of those who had fought against the northern enemy reveal the same dynamic that positioned the Khitan as the hostile other. Under pressure from Liao and Song, a new identity emerged in Koryŏ. Everything was mobilized to protect a way of life and thinking: in this context the injunctions are revealed as an instance of “ideology under pressure”. Thus, the injunctions did not so much prohibit or prescribe certain courses of action as codify the situation as it was. The injunctions specify what was unique to Koryŏ, what has to be done in order to protect it, and what was required to guard the boundaries. The Ten Injunctions shows the formation of a distinct sense of being a native of Koryŏ, different from both Liao and Song. It does so in a setting that is imbued with tradition—the injunctions borrow T’aejo’s authority—and that also was eminently suited to be used in the present—they were forged during Hyŏnjong’s reign. They cemented the position of the Wang lineage (in whom the state and the country were inextricably bound and so recently shaken by Kim Ch’i’yang’s attempt at usurping the throne) as the guardians of Koryŏ. The injunctions set the parameters within which Hyŏnjong and his ministers envisioned Koryŏ; they set both the outer boundaries beyond which Koryŏ identity would dissolve, and created room for manoeuvre. In other words, they display the flexibility that characterized eleventh- and twelfth-century Koryŏ.

It has often been argued that Iryŏn’s Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms (Samguk yusa 三國遺事) was responsible for the crystallization of a Koryŏ identity under the pressure of defeat by the Mongol armies, but the Ten Injunctions provides a much earlier and more convincing candidate for this role. Like the Memorabilia, the injunctions were written in a time of crisis but unlike it, they were a joint undertaking of several men and reflect much more widely held ideas about Koryŏ. Iryŏn chose a history that he found useful and meaningful, imagining Koryŏ as a Buddhist realm. While it is not difficult to detect common ground between Iryŏn’s account and contemporary ideas in late Koryŏ, Iryŏn was selective rather than
Yi Kyoto's writings are representative for this period. Apart from being a liberator whose writings have been preserved in large number, Yi was also an eyewitness to the Mongol invasions and responsible for the drafting of diplomatic documents. For several instances of the use of "Khitan" for "Mongol", see Mun kwangun yŏ nojongjop [On Hearing that the Government Army Fought with and Defeated the Barbarians] in Tongguk Yi sangguk chip [Collected Works of Minister Yi of Korea] [hereafter TYSQ: 14: 13a-b; Myohyangsan Pohyon-sa tangju Piroch'ana yǒnae changnyuk sosang ki [On the Six Foot Long Statue of Vairocana, the Main Statue in the Pohyon-sa Temple on Mount Myohyang-san] in TYSQ 24: 16b; Monggo pyǒngma susa maksong chugwachō in TYSQ 28: 1b; Kukhambaeng tap Monggosǒ imjin iwol in TYSQ 28: 5b; Munsǒnsa aesa [Eulogy for Munjong] in TYSQ 37: 5b-6b.


The ideas expressed in the injunctions, on the other hand, were directly derived from current circumstances and contemporary ideas and experiences. The fact that during the invasions of the late thirteenth century, Mongols were often dubbed Khitan is also telling, revealing the role the Khitan had come to play in Koryŏ's imagination as aggressors, as the alien power that threatened Koryŏ's way of life. At the same time, however, Liao also dazzled and tempted Koryŏ with their Buddhist civilization, in which Koryŏ eagerly partook. At such times, a pluralist outlook on the world, the ability to tolerate contradictions, is expedient, perhaps even essential. While it is no exaggeration to state that the Khitan became Koryŏ's archetype for the barbarian other, Liao was an example to be emulated. This contradiction was gladly accommodated in Koryŏ even if, for most of the time, it was ignored. However, if circumstances demanded it, either the barbarism of the Khitan was emphasized, or the achievements of Liao praised.

**Conclusion**

The Ten Injunctions is a forgery; indeed it is probably the most successful Korean forgery ever. However, its significance lies not so much in the fact that it was forged but in its exemplary status as an instance of the creative use—or perhaps, abuse—of history. The injunctions "forged" truths, in both senses of the word by extending and exaggerating what was considered to be true. This codification of differing, incongruent and even contradictory ideas should not obscure the fact that the injunctions consist of "expressions of deeply held beliefs and ideas, derived from a strong sense of the importance of justice and tradition", Their status as forgery is inextricably tied up with the domestic and international circumstances of the early eleventh century, when Hyŏnjong was fighting for his own survival, and that of the dynasty and the state. Of illegitimate birth and unorthodox ascension, nineteen years old and without the benefit of the rigorous education Koryŏ crown princes customarily received, Hyŏnjong had to save himself as well as Koryŏ from the invading Liao. The way in which he succeeded in this, aided by an impressive number of capable and loyal ministers, merited emulation. By the time Hyŏnjong died, the country had been stabilized but dangers, both domestic and foreign, had not disappeared. The Ten Injunctions was probably conceived as Hyŏnjong's testament, the distillate of his experience on the throne, but lacking transgenerational legitimacy, it was decided that it should be passed off as the injunctions of T'aejo. Hyŏnjong's most trustworthy and loyal ministers are all implicated in some way in the forgery, but it was probably executed by Hwang Churyang and Ch'oe Chean, while Ch'oe Hang's role in the background was probably also crucial. When the injunctions were
"rediscovered", they came to occupy a place of distinction in Koryŏ's history, becoming the ultimate point of reference for the dynasty.

Revealed as a product of the eleventh century, the injunctions reflect the particular circumstances of their own time, recording a most significant development in Koryŏ history: the emergence of the idea that Koryŏ was different from any other state, that it meant something to be a Koryŏin, to be a native of Koryŏ. They also recorded Koryŏ's peculiar way of looking at the world, tolerating inconsistencies, allowing contradictions and preserving ambiguity. To draw strict dichotomies to characterize and explain such subtleties is to hide the nature of the injunctions from view, to obscure or even obliterate the subtle patternings of history in which the injunctions have served many different causes, all the while remaining firmly wedded to the Koryŏ dynasty and its ruling Wang house.

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