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Cover calligraphy Yan Zhenqing 顏真卿, Tang calligrapher and statesman

Cover illustration Members of the Korean History Compilation Association having a picnic on a Chosŏn 朝鮮 royal tomb (Archives National Institute of Korean History)

Errata In the previous issue of *East Asian History* (No.28), the article 'Index of Mongol and Chinese Proper and Geographical Names in the *Sheng-wu Ch'in-Cheng lu* 聖武親征錄' by Paul Pelliot and Louis Hambis, edited by Igor de Rachewiltz, was inadvertently left off the Contents page. The article commenced on p.45.

# CONTESTED OBJECTIVITIES: IKEUCHI HIROSHI, KIM SANGGI AND THE TRADITION OF ORIENTAL HISTORY (*TŌ YŌSHIGAKU*) IN JAPAN AND KOREA

史 Remco E. Breuker

In this article I intend to examine the historiographical schools of textual criticism in Japan and Korea and, more particularly, the relationship between them. In both Japan and Korea, the textual-critical tradition (*kojūng sabak* 考證史學 or *shilchūngsabak* 實證史學) has exercised an enormous influence on the academic field of history. It claimed special access to knowledge through its methodology; rigid textual criticism, strict adherence to the documented facts and an unwavering loyalty to the vaults of historical facts: the archives. In Japan the textual critical historiography, most prominently represented by Oriental History (*tōyōshigaku* 東洋史學), played an important role in establishing history as an independent academic discipline. It also played a key role in the legitimation of Japanese expansion and fulfilled a clearly colonialist function.

The Korean textual critical tradition, represented by the historians of the Chindan Academic Association (*Chindan hakhoe* 震檀學會, hereafter CAA)—one of the most influential Korean academic associations, which was devoted to textual-critical research and produced the most influential Korean academic journal—was highly derivative of Japanese Oriental History, but at the same time managed to fulfill a role in the discourse of national independence that distinctly suited its characteristics. Contrary to the commonly argued passive stance of the CAA historians towards nationalism and anti-Japanese resistance, I will argue that these historians did take an active and positive attitude towards these issues, albeit within the structure of their textual-critical historiography. In the view of many later historians, the obsession of the CAA historians with historical objectivity effectively obscured their loyalties. This ironic twist of fate—that the CAA adopted objective historiography in order to defend their nation—has given rise to the common opinion that although

<sup>1</sup> Condemnation of this textual-critical historiography is virtually unanimous. Prominent historians such as Han Yōngu 韓永愚, Cho Tonggōl 趙東杰 and Hong Sūnggi 洪承基 all criticized the CAA with regard to its nationalist stance. The argument is similar in all three cases; the tendency to pursue “pure science” [*sunsu baksul* 純粹學術] estranged the CAA scholars from the nationalist cause. In other words, methodology is blamed; but Hong Sūnggi is the only one who explores and analyzes the textual-critical methodology in depth and detail. See Cho Tonggōl, Han Yōngu and Pak Ch’angsūng 朴贊勝, *Han’guk-ūi yōksaga-wa yōksabak* [Historians and historiography of Korea], 2 vols. (Seoul: Ch’angjakkwa Pip’yōngsa, 1994); Han Yōngu, *Han’guk minjokchūi yōksabak* [Korean nationalist historiography] (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1993); Hong Sūnggi, “Shilchūngsahak non 實證史學論,” in *Hyōndae Han’guk sabak-kwa sa’guan* [Modern Korean historiography and historical views] (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1991); Cho Tonggōl, *Hyōndae Han’guk sabaksa* [Modern Korean historiography] (Seoul: Na’nam Ch’ulp’ansa, 1998).

<sup>2</sup> Historians of an earlier generation, themselves students of the founders of the CAA, share this critical attitude to the above-mentioned historians, but are much more sympathetic towards the circumstances in which the pioneers of textual critical historiography were working. Ch’ōn Kwanu 千寬宇, for instance, has presented the emphasis of these historians on methodology as positive rather than negative, although his reasoning is identical to that of Han, Cho and Hong. Kim Ch’ōlchun 金哲俊, another eminent student of the founders of the CAA, praised them for distancing themselves from Japanese historians, who relied exclusively on Chinese sources in their research on Korean history, but was himself given to the construction of grand narratives. Finally, Yi Kibaek 李基白 had studied textual-critical history in Japan and after independence in Korea, which uniquely qualified him to understand textual-critical historiography. His position is nuanced, recognizing that the CAA was about more than collecting historical facts; nonetheless, he agrees with the majority opinion. See Ch’ōn Kwanu, *Han’guksa-ūi chae palgyōn* [The rediscovery of Korean history] (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1974), esp. pp.36–7; Kim Ch’ōlchun,

the textual critical tradition may have acquired impressive merits in the field of historical methodology it was severely lacking in national ethos.<sup>1</sup> This condemnation has followed the CAA from colonial times until the present.<sup>2</sup> It has been argued that the textual-critical school focused exclusively on individual historical facts and failed to examine the bigger picture of national history. The prioritizing of the individual historical fact to the disadvantage of a systematic approach towards history effectively meant the loss of any nationalistic significance for textual-critical studies, despite their acknowledged methodological qualities.<sup>3</sup>

I will argue that this understanding of the CAA is in fact a misunderstanding based upon a too-literal reading of its goals and self-definition. I will look into the Japanese textual-critical tradition first in order to determine the nature of the relationship between the Japanese and Korean schools of textual critical historiography. Having determined the nature of this relationship, I will then tackle the problem of the nationalist attitude of the CAA. I will argue, in short, that it was not so much the attraction of the concept of historical objectivity in itself that seduced the CAA historians to commit themselves to the pursuit of an objective historiography, but rather the attraction of historical objectivity as a rhetoric of legitimation that led to the adoption of textual-critical methodology.

I will concentrate on the writings of two famous historians, both well-known for their rigid application of textual-critical methodology. On the Japanese side I will focus on the historian Ikeuchi Hiroshi 池内宏 (1898–1952), a prolific historian of Japan, Korea and Manchuria. He was known for his view that historical facts and objectivity were the core of historiography. For Korea, I will concentrate on Kim Sanggi 金庠基 (1901–77), who was educated in Japan by Tsuda Sōkichi 津田左右吉 (1873–1961)—a fellow-student of Ikeuchi’s and later a fellow-professor—and one of the first consistent textual-critical historians in Korea. Kim was known for the same qualities as Ikeuchi: rigid textual criticism and strict objectivity. Both Ikeuchi and Kim were also known as patriots; Ikeuchi supported Japan’s government and policy all through his life.<sup>4</sup> Kim was an ardent supporter of the moderate nationalist Korean move-

/“Yōn’gu saenghwar-ūi iltanmyōn” [An aspect of my life in research] in *Han’guksa sbimin kangjwa* [Lectures on Korean history for the public], p.5 (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1989), p.171; Yi Kibaek, *Minjok-kwa yōksa* [Nation and history] (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1978), esp. pp.36–43; Yi Kibaek, *Yōnsasurok* [Appendix to my research] (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1994), p.232.

<sup>3</sup> Talking about the characteristics of the textual-critical tradition in Korea, Hong Sūnggi concludes that “first, research methodology was considered extremely important in textual critical historiography; it prioritized the investigation of documents and was very thorough in its textual

/criticism. Second, it is a fact that the (the textual critical tradition) not only lost itself in the establishing of individual historical facts, it also neglected to look for a systematic understanding of history or for historical principles.” See Hong Sūnggi, “Shilchūngsahak non,” p.40.

<sup>4</sup> The only exceptions were two brushes with the Japanese military police (*Kempeitai* 憲兵隊) in 1939 and at the end of the war. See *Tōkyō daigaku byakunenshi, bukuyokushi* [A history of one hundred years of Tokyo University departments], vol.1 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1986), p.631.



<sup>7</sup> See Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago University Press, 1995), Introduction.

<sup>8</sup> For an interesting discussion about the role that speculative—Hegelian—philosophy played in the thought of avowed anti-Hegelian, non-speculative historians such as Ranke, see Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, p.19.

<sup>9</sup> See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991).

It goes without saying that this idealized picture of the historian did not translate easily into reality. The rapidly changing circumstances of nineteenth-century Europe had not only brought about an international environment in which the professionalization of the historical enterprise could take place, but had at the same time led to the politicization and sometimes near-nationalization of history as a discipline. As a result of the ongoing politicization of the historical discipline, history became more and more intertwined with the newly risen nation-state. To borrow the words of Prasenjit Duara, history became History, the history of the nation-state.<sup>7</sup> Not only did the intensified interest of historians in the nation-state mean that the nation-state became the predominant historical object, it also meant that, as the interest of the nation-state in historians was as intense as the historians' interest in the nation-state, the nation-state became a historical subject by actively supporting, guiding, subsidizing or even repressing its historians.

Historiography in Europe under these conditions began to take on two different—and contradictory—roles. On the one hand, History was the legitimation and explanation of the nation-state in its present expanding form, which was sanctioned by the social Darwinist laws of evolution. On the other hand, this same History represented the desires of nations to become states by way of (re-)unification or secession. The wide acceptance of social Darwinist thought among historians and the deep influence that positivist schemes of development had exercised ultimately gave scientific and thus objective legitimation to both imperialistic and non-imperialistic exponents of the historiography of the nation-state. Contradictory as these two may be, they were only so temporally; it was assumed that a nation would develop through certain stages, including both the imperialist phase and the phase of not yet being independent. A temporal difference between states in different stages of development was certainly recognized, but this difference was not perceived to be ontological, and was therefore considered bridgeable. Even in the case of Ranke and other historians who saw rigid textual criticism as their main tool, teleological development (of nations) lay behind their historical vision, despite their publicly claimed abhorrence of theoretical concepts, let alone of a complete speculative philosophy.<sup>8</sup>

When combined with colonialism, the dual role of History became very pronounced. The tendency of nationalism to develop into a kind of imperialist nationalism was encouraged by the acquisition of new territories that were previously not a part of the national landscape. Even when incorporated into the nation-state, they remained part of the state and not of the nation.<sup>9</sup> Confronted with nations and peoples seemingly 'untouched by the spirit of progress,' European colonizers considered this striking evidence of the veracity of their own historical process as a unique (and ultimately as the only kind of) development. Stagnancy, backwardness and ignorance were the key words for describing peoples supposedly cut off from the flow of civilization.



A sharp demarcation line between civilization and barbarism, knowledge and ignorance, colonizer and colonized was thus drawn. The reaction to European dominance among colonized peoples was not necessarily armed resistance. On the contrary, the sheer weight of the all-too-apparent superior position of the colonizers forced the colonized into a situation in which imitation of the colonizer's model seemed to be the only way out of their predicament.

Both Benedict Anderson and Partha Chatterjee conclude that nationalism in a colonial situation derives its structure from the colonial structure, which the colonized strive to imitate, emulate and finally overthrow. The nationalist discourse derives its structure from the colonial discourse.<sup>10</sup> Chatterjee discerns three separate 'moments' in the response of the colonized towards the colonizer or, in other words, in the formation of nationalism. The beginning of the nationalist discourse is represented by the *moment of departure*, which is characterized by extreme imitation of the colonizer. The *moment of manoeuvre* is the phase in which this attitude is replaced by an attitude that is more suitable for the country in question. And finally comes the *moment of arrival*: the realization of the nation as a state with nationalism adapting to the actual state of affairs (to the concept of *Realpolitik*, as it were).<sup>11</sup> This tripartite division of the response of the colonized offers valuable insights into the abstract mechanisms at the bottom of the development and formulation of the response to the colonizer in general. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the Korean response can be analyzed with this model in mind. It provides a helpful analytical background, but also raises the question as to whether or not it was possible for colonial historiographies to evade a so-called negative historiography in which the structure of the colonialist historiography was kept, but its conclusions were consistently negated.

The case of Japan seems to be something of an exception: it was never colonized, yet it reacted towards the West in a manner reminiscent of the way colonized nations reacted. The burden of the "unequal treaties" it was forced to conclude in the latter part of the nineteenth century was heavy enough for Japan's condition to be called semi-colonial.<sup>12</sup> The unusual thing in the case of Japan was the simultaneous playing of two very different, indeed contradictory, parts. While struggling to free itself from the burden of the unequal treaties and trying to cope with the all-too-rapid introduction of Western culture, technology and intellectual trends, Japan also started devoting its energies to the acquisition of new territories. At first, reactions from Japanese intellectuals tended to develop along imitative lines. Despite the efforts of Japan's intellectual élite, the Enlightenment movement did not succeed in transcending its Western origins. Western intellectual and philosophical theories turned out to be Trojan horses. As Peter Dale has argued:

[He] discovers that his adoption of foreign material culture to defend his own indigenous autonomy subtly alters and subverts the very values he strives to protect. He quickly learns that the imported infrastructure had

<sup>10</sup> See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p.163; Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* (London: Zed Books, 1986); Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).

<sup>11</sup> See Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought*.

<sup>12</sup> See Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910* (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1995), p.426.

<sup>13</sup> See Peter Dale, *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986, p.47); Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought*, p.30.

<sup>14</sup> See Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1993), pp.31–5.

<sup>15</sup> This not only included the proper training of future historians in the use of textual-critical methodology, but also planned the organization of professional platforms for historical discussion (such as the magazine *Shigaku zasshi* 史學雜誌) and the compilation of archival records (such as the ambitious undertaking of compiling all known important historical records in Japan in the *Dai Nippon shiryō* [Compendium of Japanese historical sources] (the postwar pronunciation is *Dai Nihon shiryō*). Both initiatives came from Riess.

<sup>16</sup> For a discussion of Shigeno Yasutsugu and other historians who were trained in the textual critical methodology by Riess, see Numata Jirō, "Shigeno Yasutsugu and the Modern Tokyo Tradition," in *Historians of Japan and China*, ed. W.G. Beasley and E.G. Pulleyblank (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961).

a logic all its own, and that the 'mechanically propelled Trojan horse' of alien civilization drastically disrupts and reorganizes the social fabric upon which the ideology of his traditional outlook rests.

Partha Chatterjee explains this phenomenon in more general terms:

Nationalism sought to demonstrate the falsity of the colonial claim that the backward peoples were culturally incapable of ruling themselves in the conditions of the modern world. Nationalism denied the alleged inferiority of the colonized people; it also asserted that a backward nation could 'modernize' itself while retaining its cultural identity. It thus produced a discourse, which, even as it challenged the colonial claim to political domination, also accepted the very premises of 'modernity' on which colonial domination was based.<sup>13</sup>

Well suited to the needs of Western nations, these theories tended to prove the inherent backwardness and inferior ontological level of the non-West when applied to a non-Western case.<sup>14</sup> The Enlightenment movement thus ran into trouble; the simple adoption of Western knowledge positioned on top of a set of 'uniquely' Japanese values and morals did not prove viable. If Western thought was to be adopted, it had to be adapted in such a way that it would suit Japanese needs.

In terms of historiography, the Oriental History historians undertook this most successfully. This particular form of historiography was largely developed by Shiratori Kurakichi 白鳥庫吉 (1865–1942) in response to the growing influence of Western History (*seiyōshi* 西洋史) in Japan. Shiratori was one of the early students of Ludwig Riess (1861–1928), a German historian who himself had been a student of Leopold von Ranke. Riess had been invited to lecture in Japan at the Imperial University of Tokyo in 1887 and to lay the foundations for a historical discipline which would satisfy the newly formulated Western demands for a scientific and objective approach towards the study of history.<sup>15</sup>

Under the guidance of Riess a new generation of Japanese historians was trained. These historians excelled in the rigid textual criticism that had paved the way to fame for Ranke. Contrary to Japanese History (*kokushi* 國史) historians such as Shigeno Yasutsugu 重野安繹 (1827–1910) (who despite his advanced age was one of Riess' most famous students, and is still an icon of Japanese historiography), Shiratori did not limit himself to the study of Japanese history.<sup>16</sup> Although his historical writings are Japan-centred, Shiratori was certain that Japanese history could not be properly studied by itself. Japan's history had to be embedded in the history of the Asian continent, for the study of the continent would yield much information about Japan's past. Also, keeping the contemporary international situation in mind, it was necessary to give Japan a usable past.

From the start it was clear to him that a modern historiography of Japan would need to be based upon Western—or rather German—ideas about history as a scientific discipline. At the same time this particular historiography

would need to be especially well suited to the needs of Japan. In other words, Shiratori strove to incorporate both universal and particular aspects in his historiography.<sup>17</sup> In order to avoid repeating the mistakes of Enlightenment thinkers, speculative Hegelian philosophies of history and the creation of some kind of metaphysical superstructure for history had to be avoided. The historian had to remain true to the documented facts. Following in the footsteps of Ranke, Shiratori envisioned a historical narrative that would explain Japan's past in relation to its present. This narrative would have to serve the legitimatization of Japan as a modern nation *vis-à-vis* the West; at the same time it would need to explain Japan's dominant position in Asia.

Oriental History as Shiratori had envisioned it proved to be eminently well-suited to post-1868 Japan. In response to the changing needs of Japan, the emphasis within this newly established academic discipline shifted from an inward-looking nationalism to a perceptibly outward-looking, imperialistic nationalism. These imperialistic tendencies found their most obvious expression in the activities of the Research Bureau of the South Manchurian Railway (*Mantetsu rekishi chiri chōsabu* 滿鐵歷史地理調查部).

This research institute played a significant role in the institutional formation of the field of Oriental History. The bureau was established in 1907 through the cooperation of Shiratori and the then president of the South Manchurian Railway Company (*Minami-Manshū Tetsudō Kabushiki Kaisha* 南滿州鐵道株式會社) Gōtō Shimpei 後藤新平 (1857–1929) with the aim of providing the government and government-affiliated bodies active on the mainland with objective and scientific knowledge about the newly annexed territories.<sup>18</sup> The bureau represented the academic expression of the expansionist foreign policy of late Meiji Japan, resulting in an officially sanctioned view of history whose main characteristics were an emphasis on the (historically inevitable) superior role of Japan, the absence of sovereignty in both Korea and Manchuria (hence the so-called 'Manchu-Korean History' *Man-Senshi* 滿鮮史), the stagnation in the development of China as a leading regional power and finally the assumption that there was a cultural and historical sphere called 'the Orient' *tōyō* 東洋. By most accounts, *tōyō* included East Asia, Central Asia, and the Altai. It was further assumed and sanctioned by the contemporary international situation that the Japanese played the leading role as a virtual chosen people in this cultural sphere which antedated the Indo-European cultural sphere.<sup>19</sup> A set of interlinked theories on Japan in relation to 'the Orient' developed out of the research of historians affiliated with the Research Bureau of the South Manchurian Railway. Some of these theories were in effect updated, sophisticated versions of theories already propagated by earlier historians of Japan ('nativists' or *kokugakusha* 國學者). Other theories were essentially 'Japanized' versions of European diffusionist theories or academized versions of then current political issues. Though Oriental History claimed to rest upon a solid scientific basis, its resemblance to the 'discourse on Japaneseness' (*nibonjinron* 日本人論), the origins of which date from the same period, is striking.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup> See Tanaka, *Japan's Orient*, pp.86–93; Goi Naohiro 五井直弘, *Kindai Nihon to tōyōshigaku* [Contemporary Japan and 'Oriental History'] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1976).

<sup>18</sup> See Hatada Takashi 旗田巍, *Nibonjin no Chōsenkan* [The Japanese and their view on Koreans] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1967), p.188; Goi, *Kindai Nihon*, p.57, pp.67–8.

<sup>19</sup> See Hatada, *Nibonjin*, p.188; Goi, *Kindai Nihon*, pp.42, 72–4; Yi Man-yōl 李萬烈, "Ilche kwanhakcha-dūl ūi Han'guk yōksa sōsul" [The writings on Korean history of Japanese colonial historians in government employ], in *Han'guk saron* [Studies on Korean History] 6 (Seoul: Kuksa P'ōnch'an Wiwōnhoe, 1981).

<sup>20</sup> The basic assumptions underlying *nibonjinron* 日本人論 and Oriental History are very similar. See Dale, *Myth*, Introduction.



Figure 2

Part of the foreword by Shiratori Ikeuchi Hiroshi, *A Study of Manchu-Korean History* (Mansenshikenkyū-chūseihen 滿鮮史研究-中世篇). (Tokyo: Zaiubō Kankōkai, 1937, vol.2, p.3)

The founding of the Research Bureau not only offered a chance to bring academics like Shiratori into close contact with their objects of study; it also enabled Shiratori to form his own clique of students. The Bureau was the employer of virtually all the well-known Japanese historians of the Orient. The most famous include Tsuda Sōkichi, Ikeuchi Hiroshi and Inaba Iwakichi 稻葉岩吉 (1876–1940).<sup>21</sup> The influence exercised in Japanese intellectual circles through the institutionalization of Oriental History in the Research Bureau of the South Manchurian Railway Company can hardly be overestimated. The Bureau also played an instrumental role in the formation of Manchu-Korean History, the politically oriented manifestation of Oriental History (and a partial narrative of the general narrative of Oriental History).<sup>22</sup> As the name suggests, *Man-Senshi* occupied itself with the writing of the history of the Manchu-Korean region, Korea and Manchuria, neither of which was thought of as an independent area. The most ardent academic advocates of Japanese expansion in Asia were usually affiliated with this historiography; its overt political commitment made it possible for it to be recognized as the official view on Korean and Manchurian history through its institutionalization in the Korean History Compilation Committee (*Chōsenshi hensan inkai* 朝鮮史編纂委員會) in 1922.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>21</sup> These students of Shiratori would go on to become acknowledged experts in their field. Tsuda would become one of the most influential sinologists in Japan and Ikeuchi Hiroshi would succeed Shiratori in the chair of the Oriental History Department at Tokyo University. For a complete and rather impressive list of Shiratori's students who worked under him at the Research Bureau and their subsequent careers, see Tanaka, *Japan's Orient*, p.235.

<sup>22</sup> Shiratori had assigned to each of his students

different parts of 'the Orient' in order to get a complete narrative of this geographically immensely stretched cultural sphere. Tsuda and Ikeuchi, for example, were 'given' Korea and Manchuria as research objects. The results of their studies were published under the auspices of the Research Bureau in *Manshū rekishi chiri* [Historical geography of Manchuria] and *Chōsen rekishi chiri* [Historical geography of Korea] in 1913 and 1914 respectively.

<sup>23</sup> The Korean History Compilation Committee changed its name to Korean History Compilation Society [*Chōsenshi henshūkai*] in 1925. This influential organization was responsible for the publication of the enormous Korean History [*Chōsenshi*] in 37 volumes, published from 1932 onwards. Members of this committee were usually drawn from the reservoir of Shiratori's students who had positions at the Research Bureau or affiliated institutions.

**Figure 3**

Members of the Korean History Compilation Association having a picnic on a Chosŏn 朝鮮 royal tomb (Archives National Institute of Korean History. From the Photographic Materials, the National Institute of Korean History Archives CD-ROM, Kwa'chŏn, 2001)



Institutionalization was of the utmost importance for the development of the authority of Oriental History. Institutionalization meant authority in itself; it also meant a permanent foundation for the research, a permanent group of researchers, the regular publishing of books and articles, and the establishment of archives—those endless vaults of objective facts, the key to scientific authority.<sup>24</sup> Nuances still perceptible in the studies of historians of Oriental History tended to be obscured by the openly political historical writings of Manchu-Korean History historians. As the colonial exponent of the intrinsically imperialistic Oriental History, Manchu-Korean History brought into full bloom the political consequences of Oriental History concepts such as the divinity and essentially changeless nature of the Imperial House, which intrinsically imperialistic Oriental History, Manchu-Korean History brought into full bloom the political consequences of Oriental History concepts such as the divinity and essentially changeless nature of the Imperial House, which was cleverly used to deny the influence that Chinese culture, now perceived as

<sup>24</sup> The role of archives in the production of history cannot be underestimated. Michel-Rolph Trouillot described archival power as follows: “[Archives] convey authority and set the rules for credibility and interdependence; they help select the stories that matter.” Institutionalization and archival power automatically bring with them “technical power [which] determines the difference between a historian, amateur or professional, and a charlatan.” Institutionalization thus brings scientific authority. See Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1995), p. 53.

<sup>25</sup> See Tsuda Sōkichi, *Chūkokunobunkaron* [A discourse on Chinese civilization] in *Tsuda Sōkichi zenshū* [The collected writings of Tsuda Sōkichi] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1963–66), cited in Goi, *Kindai Nihon*, pp. 59–61, 138, 143. For a discussion of Tsuda's vision on the stagnancy of Chinese culture, see Joel Joos, "A Stinking Tradition: Tsuda Sōkichi's View of China," in *East Asian History* 29 (2004): 1–27; see Ōkubo Toshiaki 大久保利謙, *Nihon kindai shigaku no seiritsu* [The establishment of modern Japanese historiography] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1988), p. 189.

stagnant, had exercised upon Japanese culture. Tsuda Sōkichi, for instance, denied the impact of Chinese culture upon Japan. He also made a significant distinction between the merits of 'indigenous culture' (*bonrai bunka* 本來文化) and 'imported culture' (*gairai bunka* 外來文化). Shiratori maintained that the Chinese were "conservative and a kind of people that are restricted to the phenomenal world," adding that "Chinese culture is still in its first phase of development" and "the period for which Chinese culture has been stagnant in this first phase is exceptionally long." He concluded that as far as Japan was concerned, "the political form may change, but Japan will never change." That this line of reasoning is somewhat at odds with the supposed stagnancy of Chinese culture and the supposed progress of Japan he seems to have overlooked, be it purposefully or not.<sup>25</sup> The victories in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–95 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–05 and the subsequent gearing up of Japanese expansionist policies not only sanctioned the imperialistic tendencies in both Oriental and Manchu-Korean History, but also made it possible for these narratives to find a firm institutional base from which they could develop further.

### *Ranke, Unparteilichkeit and Korea*

<sup>26</sup> A discussion of Practical Learning (*shirhak* 實學) does not fall within the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that modern historiography in Korea owes much to the Practical Learning movement and their historical writings, especially with regard to the textual-critical research many scholars engaged in. The Practical Learning movement formed a bridge between the textual critical historiography of the Ch'ing dynasty and late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Korean historiography. Despite the avid interest displayed by Enlightenment thinkers in the histories of other nations, they seemed to have been rather less than enthusiastic about Korea's history. Until the establishment of the Bureau for the Compilation of Korean History [*p'yōnsaguk*] in 1894 no heirs to Practical Learning historiography claimed the throne, which was consequently left empty. See Hwang Wōngu 黃元九, "Shirhakp'a ūi sahak iron" [The historiographical theories of the Practical Learning School], in *Han'guk ūi yōksa insbik* [The perception of history in Korea], vol. II (Seoul: Changjak-kwa Pip'yōngsa, 1976), pp. 116–29; Cho Kwang 趙珪, "Chosōn hugi ūi yōksa insbik" [The perception of history during the late /OVER

These developments also influenced Korea. Chosōn Korea actively sought a way in which to deal with Japan's ascendancy and the encroachments of Western powers. As one result, Neo-Confucian historiography came under fire. Reform-minded intellectuals found its traditional moralizing contents (*chōngt'ongnon* 正統論) wanting. Dissatisfaction with mainstream Neo-Confucianism had existed since the eighteenth century and had given birth to the Practical Learning (*shirhak* 實學) movement. Historical works written by participants in this movement had employed thorough textual criticism and documentary research (*kojūngbak* 考證學).<sup>26</sup> The tremendously classical training of the historians of the *Chindan hakboe* which they had received as young students before embarking upon academic research in Japan suggests that the discontinuity between classical textual-criticism (both Chinese and Korean) and later historians is less acute than has often been suggested (though little research has been done on the subject). It should be mentioned, however, that the Rankean methodology of textual criticism had long been known and practised in Korea (as in China and Japan) and that in this respect, Korean historians had little to learn. As early as the second half of the sixteenth century, Han Paekkyōm 韓百謙 (1552–1615) had published his pioneering historical and geographical study of Korea, *The Geography of the Eastern Kingdom* (*Tonguk chiriji* 東國地理志), in which he displayed impressive textual-critical skills.<sup>27</sup> Rankean methodology was not unknown, then, but the claims that were associated with it were.

In a way, then, the later textual critical historiography in Korea succeeded

the Practical Learning movement and its historical writings. Another movement, though, filled the gap between the period in which Practical Learning historical works had been written and the ascendancy of modern textual criticism. A movement similar to the Enlightenment movement in Japan came into being, a movement that after the forced opening of Korean harbors by Japan in 1876 received support from the Enlightenment faction in Japan. Notwithstanding this support, the Korean Enlightenment movement soon faced problems similar to those of the Japanese movement.

The choice for Westernization (which was thought of as equal to modernization) was complicated by the additional difficulty that choosing Westernization (that is, Westernization through Japanization) almost automatically seemed to imply an endorsement of imperialism. Having been confronted with the very physical consequences of imperialism during armed struggles with the French and Americans in 1866, and having experienced Japan's successful duplication of Commander Perry's gunboat diplomacy in 1875, the Korean intellectual élite was understandably reluctant to endorse imperialism if that might mean a *de facto* endorsement of Korea's subjection to Japanese power politics. Through the political upheavals of the late nineteenth century, the need for a proper understanding of Korea's history was a constant factor that prompted both private individuals and government bodies to publish historical works. The newly established Bureau for the Compilation of History (*p'yönsagak* 編史局) issued a series of historical publications in the years between the opening of Korea and the conclusion of the Ŭlsa Treaty 乙巳條約 in 1905.<sup>28</sup> As textbooks for educational use, they had undergone little foreign influence, the only novelty being the use in some of these books of the distinct, newly acquired reign names of the Great Korean Empire (*Taeban cheguk* 大韓帝國), instead of those of Ch'ing China.<sup>29</sup>

A place of special importance in the rapidly changing historiography of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Korea is occupied by social Darwinist thought. Introduced into Korea through Chinese and Japanese translations, this doctrine of evolution and progress exercised great influence on the Korean intelligentsia. The Enlightenment thinkers were the first to learn about social Darwinism through Japanese mediation, but they were not able to overcome its inherent imperialistic tendencies. The Chinese interpretation turned out to be of greater importance to the formulation of a Korean response towards the increasing pressure from Japan. Through the innovative readings of the Chinese philosopher, historian and activist Liang Ch'i-chao 梁啟超 (1873–1929), the imperialistic tenets of social Darwinism were turned upside down. Stressing the importance of weeding out the weak in oneself, as opposed to weeding out the weak in the international world, Liang managed to transform social Darwinism into a philosophy of action that was eminently suited to so-called weak countries. Liang undermined the potentially imperialistic qualities of social Darwinism by shifting the struggle for existence from an external environment to the internal environment: "Selection by man means carefully seeking

[Chosön period], in *Han'guk sabaksa üi yön'gu* [Studies on Korean historiography] (Seoul: Han'guksa Yö'n'guhoe, 1985), pp.400–05.

<sup>27</sup> For a discussion of Han Paekkyö'm, see Ko Yöngjin 高榮鎭, "Han Paekkyö'm" [Han Paekkyö'm] in Cho, Han and Pak, *Han'guk üi yöksaga*, vol.1, pp.175–87.

<sup>28</sup> The Bureau for the Compilation of History was established in 1894 and published its first history book two years later. During its existence it published 13 textbooks, which were milestones in Korean historiography. See, amongst others, Kim Hüngsu 金興洙, "Hanmal yöksa kyoyuk üi shilt'ae-wa kü söngkyök—1906–1910 nyön üi yöksa kyoyuk-kwa yöksa kyogwasö-rül chungshim-üro" [Circumstances and characteristics of historical education towards the end of the Great Korean Empire: focusing on education and textbooks from 1906 to 1910] in *Samun sabak* [Samun History] 汕臺史學 1, 1985.

<sup>29</sup> The acute awareness of crisis which the Koreans experienced can be seen from textbooks of this period. In a history textbook from 1907 Koreans are encouraged to strengthen the nation by drawing dramatic parallels with the fates of Poles and Jews in Europe. They had not been able to unite themselves into strong nations and had subsequently suffered a pitiable fate. With dramatic exhortations and even more dramatic pictures of pogroms, Koreans were encouraged to resist and actively cooperate to strengthen the nation, and thus avert this horrible fate. See Han'gukhak munhön yö'n'guso [Research Institute for Korean documents] (ed.), *Han'guk kaebwagi kyogwasö ch'ongsö II* [Collection of Korean enlightenment textbooks] (Seoul: Asea Munhwasa, 1977).

<sup>30</sup> See James Reeve Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin* (Harvard, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), cited in Bok-hee Chun, *Die Funktion des Sozialdarwinismus in Korea in der Zeit vom Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts bis Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Marburg: Philips Universität, 1992), pp.82, 84, 197. For a concise and insightful treatment of the introduction of social Darwinism in Korea, see Yi Kwangnin 李光麟, *Han'guk kaehwa sasang yŏngu* [A study of the thought of the Korean enlightenment] (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1979).

<sup>31</sup> The similarity with Shin Ch'aeho's opinion on the use of the teaching of history to the nation is clear. For further details, see Michael E. Robinson, "National Identity and the Thought of Sin Ch'ae-ho: *Sadaejuii* and *Chuch'e* in History and Politics," in *The Journal of Korean Studies* 5 (1984): 121-42; also see the articles on different aspects of Shin Ch'aeho's thought in *Tanjae Shin Ch'aeho sŏnsaeng t'anshin 100 chunyon kinyŏm nonjip* [Essays in honor of the 100th birthday of T'anjae Shin Ch'aeho] (Seoul: Tanje Shin Ch'aeho sŏnsaeng t'anjin 100 chunyon kinyŏm saŏphoe, 1982).

<sup>32</sup> The young Shin Ch'aeho was among the advocates for the recovery of the lost territories in Manchuria [*Manju subok*].

<sup>33</sup> See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

<sup>34</sup> Michael Robinson relates the influence of the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi, which stressed non-violent resistance and cultural autonomy, upon the cultural nationalists. See Michael E. Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea 1920-1925* (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1988).

<sup>35</sup> In the words of Yi Kwangsu: "[...] I was convinced that the independence of our nation could not be attained through a radical movement, but only through cultivating the strength of our nation. The only way to cultivate the strength of our nation was through strengthening individuals and organizing them. Without this kind of collective strength, it would not be possible to realize independence. Even if independence were attained through the assistance of other nations, this could not be sustained for long." See Yi Kwangsu 李光洙, *Na ūi kobaek* [My confession], cited in Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism*, p.66.

out the unfit in himself and changing it, to make oneself fit to survive." He further connected evolution with revolution: "Revolution is an inescapable law of the world of evolution." Finally he stressed the importance of proper education in one's own history:

"If we want to advocate nationalism [...] then every man [...] must study our nation's history. [...] The study of history is the broadest and most important field of study. It is a mirror for the people. It is the wellspring of nationalism."<sup>30</sup>

Its influence upon historiography was all-pervasive, mainly owing to Shin Ch'aeho 申采浩 (1880-1936), who was an ardent reader of Liang's works. This new interpretation of social Darwinism emphasized the need for the strengthening of the country together with the education of the people in the proper history of their nation, so as to create a sense of nationhood, the fundamental condition for the survival of a nation.<sup>31</sup> This ultimately resulted not only in a historiography that stressed the need for "carefully selecting the unfit in oneself," but also in a nationalist imperialist view of Korean history.<sup>32</sup> Proponents of this view advocated the expansion of Korea towards its former territories in Manchuria, which proved the point that nationalism has inherent imperialistic qualities, whether actualized or not.<sup>33</sup> The loss of progress in Korean history was usually seen as a consequence of the loss of Manchuria.

The radical nationalism at the beginning of the twentieth century laid the groundwork for the nationalism of the 1920s. In those years, as the left-wing nationalists stepped up their attempts to mobilize the people towards a revolution and Shin Ch'aeho entered a phase of radical anarchist thought, an important role in the nationalist debate was reserved for cultural nationalists. These cultural nationalists were far more moderate than their predecessors had been and they owed their name to their insistence that the protection and development of Korean culture was of primary importance. They believed that independence depended upon achieving this. Resistance against the Japanese would be more effective if undertaken within the boundaries of the law.<sup>34</sup> Important figures of cultural nationalism include Korean cultural icons such as Yi Kwangsu 李光洙 (1892-?) and Ch'oe Namsŏn 崔南善 (1890-1957).

The cultural nationalists, divided as they were, agreed on a number of things. They agreed that their identity as Koreans might be jeopardized if the cultural iconoclasm of the preceding decades were allowed to continue. They also agreed that the time had not yet come to rise in rebellion against the Japanese because Korea still had to prove it was worthy of the prize of independence. This was to be achieved through the reconstruction of the nation, a theme that enjoyed considerable popularity among the intellectual elite.<sup>35</sup> Culture played an all-important role in the theory of reconstruction (*kaejoron* 改造論) propounded by Yi Kwangsu and others of that ilk. Koreans had to lay claim to Korean culture before it was too late. Spiritual domination came before actual political domination and was a prerequisite for it. Partha



Chatterjee puts it thus:

The bilingual intelligentsia came to think of its own language as belonging to that inner domain of cultural identity, from which the colonial intruder had to be kept out; language therefore became a zone over which the nation had to declare its sovereignty and then had to transform in order to make it adequate for the modern world.<sup>36</sup>

This view is corroborated by the inaugural article in *Han'gŭl* 한글 (The Korean script), the magazine of the Association for Research in the Korean Language (*Chosŏn'ŏ yŏn'guhoe* 朝鮮語研究會), an organization founded in 1921 in order to protect and spread the use of the Korean vernacular:

These days everything is influenced by language and script: from the rapidly changing natural sciences, humanities and culture to daily life itself. It needs no further argument that language and script are so important in our daily lives that we could not do without them, not even for a single day. All peoples possess their own language and their own script and they all love their language and script dearly.<sup>37</sup>

The above quotation indicates that the cultural nationalists were convinced that Korean culture should occupy a central place in the reconstruction of the Korean nation. Yet they did not have a very positive view of much of Korean history and Korean culture.

Ch'oe Namsŏn, one of the most active intellectuals throughout the Japanese occupation of Korea and the writer of the Declaration of Independence of the March First Movement, was a pivotal figure in the cultural nationalist movement. He not only published many magazines focusing on issues of Korean culture and reconstruction of the nation, but was also active as a historian. Influenced by Japanese scholarship, he represents the beginning of Rankean textual critical historiography in Korea.<sup>38</sup>

Ch'oe tried to counter the arguments of Japanese historical writings on Korea, all of which described Korea in the by now familiar terminology of the Manchu-Korean History historians. In doing so, he adopted the same stratagems as the historians of Oriental History had done before him. Methodologically, Ch'oe took the road that Shiratori had taken; he made extensive use of Chinese sources and tried to establish links by means of a philological approach.<sup>39</sup> This resulted in a virtual Koreanization of the contents of Oriental History. The *Purham* 不咸 cultural sphere took over the role of 'the Orient'; Tan'gun 檀君, Korea's mythical founding father, took over the supra-historical role of the Japanese Imperial House; and Korea took over the central position of Japan.<sup>40</sup>

In taking over these Japanese concepts and applying them to Korea, Ch'oe faced a huge problem. Unlike Japan, Korea seemed to lack the sanction of the present. Notwithstanding its history, Korea had not managed to maintain its leading position in Asia. In line with the main cultural nationalist view as represented by Yi Kwangsu, Ch'oe argued that centuries of sinocentrism

<sup>36</sup> See Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*, p.7.

<sup>37</sup> See Yi Yunjae 李允宰, "Han'gŭl ch'ŏm nae'myŏnsŏ" [On the occasion of the first publication of *The Korean Script*], in *Han'gŭl* 1:1 (Seoul: Chosŏn'ŏ Yŏn'guhoe, 1932), p.3.

<sup>38</sup> Ch'oe Namsŏn is not usually regarded in Rankean terms, and the enormous influence that Shiratori Kurakichi exercised upon him is not generally discussed. In view of the development of textual-critical historiography in Korea, Shiratori's influence should be seen apart from the general Japanese influence that Ch'oe received. Neither Cho Tonggŏl, Han Yŏngu nor Hong Sŭnggi sees Ch'oe as connected to the CAA, despite his obvious aspiration towards a history based upon the same principles as Japanese Oriental History. See Cho, Han and Pak, *Han'guk ūi yŏksaga*; Han, *Han'gukminjokchu'ui yŏksabak*; Hong Sŭnggi, "Shilchŏngsahak non"; Cho, *Hyŏndae Han'guk sabaksa*.

<sup>39</sup> It is remarkable to see the many similarities between Shiratori and Ch'oe when one compares their historical writings; the important difference is that Shiratori was by far Ch'oe's superior when it came to textual criticism and philological issues.

<sup>40</sup> The supra-historical role Shiratori had assigned to the Imperial family (which he regarded as both cause and result of the historical development of the Japanese nation) bears a strong resemblance to the role Ranke assigned to his Protestant God, whose divine thoughts had animated the concept of the nation. Whereas Ranke saw the will of God behind the nation as a concept (that is, no particular nation, but any nation), Shiratori quite naturally restricted this divine animation to Japan. Ch'oe did exactly the same when he adopted this idea and applied it to Tan'gun and the shamanistic religion associated with him. It hardly needs to be said that according to him Japanese *Shintō* 神道 was but a version of this Korean *religio religionis*. See Hayden White, *Metahistory* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p.172; Tanaka, *Japan's Orient*, pp.66–7; Goi, *Kindai Nihon*, p.80; Takeuchi Chizuko, "Ch'oe Nam-sŏn: History and Nationalism in Modern Korea" (PhD diss., University of Michigan Dissertation Information Service, 1988).

<sup>41</sup> See Ch'oe Namsŏn, *Chosŏn yŏksa kanghwa* [Lectures on Korean history] in *Yuktang Ch'oe Namsŏn chŏnjip* [Collected works of Yuktang Ch'oe Namsŏn] 13 vols. (Seoul: Hyŏnamsa, 1973), vol. I, p. 89.

<sup>42</sup> Takeuchi Chizuko concludes that Ch'oe thought he would be most useful to the Korean nationalist cause in the service of the *Chŏsensbi benshūkai*, which would place him in a position from which he would be able to counter the Japanese historians directly and legitimately. Although this may have played a part in his decision, it seems rather unlikely that Ch'oe was that naïve. One would assume that someone with his extensive knowledge would have known that he would be used as a mere figurehead. It seems more convincing, then, to suppose that the perceived helplessness of the Koreans led Ch'oe to cooperate with the Japanese. See Takeuchi, *Ch'oe Nam-sŏn*, pp. 202–28.

<sup>43</sup> Robinson counts an increase in such organizations from 985 to 5728 between 1920 and 1922. Under the influence of the somewhat less restrictive policies of the Government-General after the First March Movement, these organizations had become legal and were officially tolerated by the Japanese colonial government. This did not mean, however, that their existence and their activities were not considered suspicious by the authorities. See Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism*, pp. 49–50.

<sup>44</sup> Despite the overwhelming majority of Waseda alumni in the CAA, an important minority was made up of alumni from the Imperial University of Keijō (nowadays Seoul, (Jap.) Keijō teikoku daigakkō 京城帝國大學校). The most prominent representatives of this minority were Yu Hongnyŏl 柳洪烈 and Shin Sŏkho 申奭鎬. See Cho, *Han'guk ūi yŏksaga*, vol. II, pp. 254–5.

<sup>45</sup> This is opinion of most Korean historians. See Cho, *Han'guk ūi yŏksaga*, vol. II, p. 259. Han, *Han'guk minjokchui yŏksabak*; Hong Sŭnggi, “Shilchŭngsahak non.”

<sup>46</sup> See Yi Pyŏngdo's inaugural article in *Chindan hakpo*, 1 (Seoul: Chindan Hakhoe, 1934), p. 223.

had brought out the bad qualities in the Korean national character. Vehemently attacking everything he thought despicable in Koreans, he displayed an ambiguous view of Korean history. He extolled the virtues of the ancient Koreans and severely condemned contemporary ones. His indignation and frustration were mainly directed against the tribute system, which had been an important feature of Korean history for so many centuries.<sup>41</sup>

Ch'oe's aggressive criticism of the tribute system exemplifies his negative view of Korean history. He found it impossible to disagree with the arguments put forward by Japanese Oriental History historians. This was reinforced by his adoption of the same methodology and historical subject. His belief that Koreans were to blame for their own predicament eventually led him into the arms of the Japanese Korean History Compilation Society (*Chŏsensbi benshūkai* 朝鮮史編輯會).<sup>42</sup> He did not think he had an alternative to cooperation with a people that had successfully turned itself into a legitimate subject of history. Ch'oe Namsŏn enjoyed considerable influence, both before and after his decision to cooperate with the Japanese. His example was immensely important to other, younger historians and nationalists.

The spirit of the cultural nationalists continued well into the 1930s. The enormous increase in the number of societies that aimed to promote and preserve Korean language, history, and culture continued after the turn of the decade.<sup>43</sup> One of the most influential academic societies set up during the colonial period was the CAA (1934), which was mainly founded by alumni of the history department of Waseda University 早稲田大學. Among its members and founders it counted influential historians such as Yi Pyŏngdo 李丙燾, Son Chint'ae 孫晉泰, Kim Sanggi 金岸基 and the sociologist Yi Sangbaek 李相伯.<sup>44</sup> Tsuda Sōkichi trained these historians in textual-critical methodology, and from the outset it was clear that they intended the CAA to be an association that would concentrate on “pure science” (*sunsu baksul* 純粹學術).

The CAA published a journal which was to be the platform of academic discussion on Korean history and culture, the *Chindan hakpo* 震檀學報 (The Chindan journal). Later historians have equated the CAA with a disinterested stance towards nationalism in favor of the pursuit of “pure science,”<sup>45</sup> but the inaugural issue of the journal clearly states its ends:

Perhaps our research is mediocre due to insufficient financial resources, but even so we certainly have the duty and the task to advance the investigation of Korean culture by supporting one another and proceeding through processes of trial and error. This is because no matter what culture of what society is concerned, the people who should study a particular country are the ones who were born there, grew up amid its habits and customs and speak its language. Truthful and accurate research and proper awareness elevating the standards of our culture are more likely to be expected from the commitment and sincerity of such people.<sup>46</sup>

The statement of purpose of the *Chindan hakhoe* leaves little ambi-

guity with regard to its most important message. Korea should be studied by Koreans; it should not be studied by Japanese, who were incapable of properly understanding Korea and biased owing to different national affiliations. Moreover, they did not speak Korean. The *Chindan hakhoe* had based its claims to historical truth firmly on its research methodology. Nevertheless, face to face with the Japanese scholars who employed those same methods, the *Chindan hakhoe* defined its suitability to undertake research in Korean history in purely nationalist terms. The legitimation of its own tasks and the suitability of those tasks were Janus-faced; legitimation towards the Japanese and legitimation towards their fellow Koreans were based on different premises, which were ultimately irreconcilable. The above statement of purpose is exactly what Chatterjee has called “the appropriation of the inner domain of cultural identity.” The founding of the Korean Academic Association (*Seikyū gakkai* 靑丘學會) in 1930 by Japanese scholars and professors at Keijō Imperial University with the goal of “doing research on the Far East focusing on Korea and Manchuria and making the results known to the public”<sup>47</sup> had created an even more urgent need to found a similar Korean academic society.

The CAA was also heir to Ch’oe Namsŏn’s historiography. Despite the fact that the CAA historians were thoroughly trained textual-critical scholars, as Ch’oe was obviously not, they stand next in line in the genealogy Ranke-Shiratori-Ch’oe (/Tsuda). This becomes clear when one looks at the CAA historians’ perception of Korean history. Yi Pyŏngdo, while explaining the provenance of the word *chindan* 震檀, arrives at the conclusion that it is an ancient word, originally derived from the Sanskrit, and that it was initially used to designate a region in East Asia that can be equated with Greater Korea (*Haedong taeguk* 海東大國).<sup>48</sup> This region, with Korea at its center, is more or less identical to the Japanese ‘Orient’ region. The resemblance is not coincidental, as Yi was trying to define a distinct cultural sphere, conceptually linked to Shiratori’s ‘Orient’ and Ch’oe’s *Purham*. The historians of the CAA further attempted to establish an academic discipline that would study Korea scientifically;<sup>49</sup> they published an academic magazine and made exclusive use of—and were sometimes even defined by—textual-critical methodology and Ranke’s concept of *Unparteilichkeit*.<sup>50</sup> And finally, the CAA historians published in Korean—despite the fact that the direct dialogue with the Japanese would thus be lost—as if to underscore the re-appropriation of their own language.<sup>51</sup>

The CAA historians were not a mere mirror-image of the Japanese. As much as the CAA was directed against Japanese Oriental History and Manchu-Korean History, it was also directed against left-wing historiography in Korea itself. The 1930s saw the emergence of left-wing historiography. Led by prominent Marxist nationalists such as Paek Namun 白南雲 and Yi Ch’ŏngwŏn 李清源, left-wing historiography developed rapidly with the publication of such books as *Economic History of Korea* (*Cbosŏn sabŏe kyŏngjesa* 朝鮮社會

<sup>47</sup> See *Seikyūgakusō* [Korean studies] I (Keijō: Seikyū Gakkai, 1930): 157–8.

<sup>48</sup> See Yi Pyŏngdo, “Chindan pyŏn” [An exposition on ‘Chindan’], in *Chindan hakpo* 1, pp.167–74. The Sanskrit original is Cinasthāna, “the Land of China.”

<sup>49</sup> Ch’oe Namsŏn had also tried to establish an academic discipline called Korean Studies (*Cbosŏnbak* 朝鮮學, but had not succeeded. The CAA historians did more or less succeed where Ch’oe had failed. However, they were not the only ones who had tried to establish a general discipline for the study of Korea. An Chae Hong 安在鴻 also advocated the need to establish Korean Studies but his attempts met with criticism from the CAA historians: “The Korean Studies movement of An Chae Hong did not receive sympathy from all historians. Especially Marxist historians like Paek Namun were against it. And it was not just Marxist historians like Paek Namun who opposed it. The historians from the 1934 CAA did not show any particularly positive reactions either. This was caused by the fact that there was a gap between Korean Studies and the scientific approach of the CAA historians who venerated textual criticism more than a particular view of history.” See Han, *Han’guk minjokchu’i yŏksabak*, pp.207–8.

<sup>50</sup> Yi Sangbaek neatly summarizes the methodology of the CAA historians: “I. The determination of historical facts that appear in the historical sources by using these sources and giving them a critical evaluation as to their value as sources. II. The elucidation of the causal relations of all facts following a chronological systematization, as far as possible. III. Truly getting to know everything about the subject.” See Yi Sangbaek, *Yi Sangbaek chojakjip* [The writings of Yi Sangbaek] 3 vols. (Seoul: Ŭryu Munhwasa), Introduction.

<sup>51</sup> After the liberation in 1946, Yi Kibaek enrolled at the newly established Department of Korean History at Seoul National University. Attending for the first time a class given by Yi Pyŏngdo, he was utterly shocked “to hear a Korean historian lecture about Korean history in the Korean language.” The significance of the language shift of the CAA must accordingly not be underestimated. See Yi Kibaek, *Yŏnsa surok*, p.237.

<sup>52</sup> See Yi Kijun 李基俊, *Han'guk kyōngjehak paltalsa* [The development of the study of economics in Korea] (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1980); Yun Kijung 尹起重, "Kyōngje kyōngyōnghak ūi hangmunjōk chōnt'ong" [The academic tradition of economics and business and public administration], in *Chilli chayū* [Truth and freedom] 3, 1989; Kang Chinch'ōl 姜哲哲, "Sahoe kyōngje sahak ūi to'ip-gwa paljōn" [Introduction and development of socio-economic history], in *Kuksagwan nonch'ong* [Essays on Korean history] 2, 1989; Cho, *Han'guk ūi yōksaga*, vol.II, p.255.

<sup>53</sup> See, among others, Cho, *Han'guk ūi yōksaga*, vol.II; Han, *Han'guk minjokchui'i yōksahak*; Hong Sūnggi, "Shilchungsahak non."

<sup>54</sup> In 1942, the Association for Research in the Korean Language was prohibited and its members were arrested following the tightening of Japanese colonial rule. Publication and education in the Korean language had been prohibited since 1939 when the outbreak of the war in the Pacific had brought with it more repressive rule in Korea. Owing to the *Chindan hakboe's* connections with the Association for Research in the Korean Language (the two associations shared founding members) the *Chindan hakboe* was declared an illegal organization as well. See *Han'guk chōngshin munhwa yōn'giso* [Academy of Korean Studies] ed. *Han'guk minjokmunhwa taebaekkwajōn* [Encyclopedia of Korean culture] under the entry "Chosōn'ohak yōn'guhoe sakōn" [The incident of the association for research in the Korean language] (Songnam: Han'guk chōngshin munhwa yōn'guwōn, 1994); Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism*, pp.78, 88, 90–1.

經濟史, 1933) and the establishment of the new academic field of economic history. Within moderate and right-wing nationalist circles the need was felt to counter this trend in national historiography. The founding of the CAA was a direct response to this perceived need.<sup>52</sup>

The CAA was on the one hand a direct heir to the Rankean tradition of textual criticism, and on the other a continuation of the ideals of the cultural nationalists of the 1920s. Although it had a distinct nationalist coloring, it was an organization made up of temperate nationalists whose moderate stance has often evoked criticism from later generations of historians.

Whether or not the cultural nationalists—and the CAA by extension—were too moderate is a question open only to ethical debate. The choices these historians made undeniably influenced their effectiveness in proposing alternatives to Japanese historiography. They were certainly constrained with regard to the ways in which Japanese narratives could be questioned. However, it has become clear that, when necessary, the CAA historians resorted to nationalist arguments. The charges of comfortable collaboration with the Japanese which have been leveled against them are not justified. The argument against the nationalist commitment of the historians of the CAA mainly consists of the accusation that their obsession with the science of history obscured the duties the study of history was thought to have;<sup>53</sup> the study of history was supposed to support a strong nationalist ethos, which was lacking in the historical studies of the CAA. The sources, however, do not support this view. I will not try to argue that the nationalist stance of the CAA historians was as strong as that of other anti-Japanese figures. Nor will I try to argue that their approach to the struggle of Korea as a nation was more effective than other approaches. What I wish to point out is merely that the criticism directed at the CAA is not consistent with what can be found when analyzing their goals and historiographical activities. The CAA did have clear nationalist goals and, as I will argue later, their allegiance to an objective historiography was in fact subordinated to their two-pronged objective, namely the emancipation of Korean history and culture and of the study of Korean history and culture.

The adoption of textual-critical methodology reflects not only methodological concerns, but also concerns of an obvious nationalistic nature. A major reason for the adoption of the tools of Oriental History was, as shown above, the fact that Rankean historiography was a proven model of legitimation. In the form of Japanese Oriental History—and Manchu-Korean History—it had shown itself to be an excellent discourse of legitimation and justification. But it is also clear that the path the CAA historians had chosen forced them to manoeuvre very delicately. In the end these manoeuvres turned out to be in vain. After having been active for eight years, the CAA was declared an illegal organization in 1942 following the proscription of the Association for Research in the Korean Language.<sup>54</sup> In order to

attain its goal, namely moderate nationalistic resistance against the Japanese within the borders of the law, the CAA had to be very careful not to suffer the fate of Ch'oe Namsŏn. Although it successfully managed to steer clear of collaboration, Japanese rule proved fatal in the end.

I have gone into some detail in describing the respective historiographical environments in Japan and Korea. This was necessary in order to be able to situate the historical visions of both Ikeuchi Hiroshi and Kim Sanggi within the intellectual and political environment to which they belonged. Neither Ikeuchi nor Kim can be appreciated fully without knowing where they came from and how they were active. I will now turn my attention to the historical thought of Ikeuchi.

### *Ikeuchi Hiroshi*

Ikeuchi was a graduate of Tokyo's Imperial University, where he had specialized in Korean and Manchurian history at the request of Shiratori. From 1908 until 1913, he worked at the Research Bureau of the South Manchurian Railway Company under Shiratori's guidance. During that time he published his first studies on Korea and Manchuria together with Tsuda Sōkichi. These studies were exemplary of the textual criticism and factual research Shiratori had envisioned.<sup>55</sup> Ikeuchi was to become renowned for his strict textual criticism up to the point that his disciple Hatada Takashi 旗田巍 said of him that he was a scholar "who had let go of ideology."<sup>56</sup> After the Research Bureau was closed in 1913—ironically due to the perceived lack of practical knowledge it produced—Ikeuchi went back to his Alma Mater and started to teach Korean history. In 1916 this became an independent subject and Ikeuchi was promoted to assistant professor.<sup>57</sup> After earning his doctorate with a dissertation on the early relations of the Jurchen 女眞 and Chosŏn in 1922, Ikeuchi succeeded Shiratori as full professor in 1928.

The study looks characteristically thoroughly researched, with facsimile reproductions of sources attached. Ikeuchi's oeuvre is voluminous, but despite the enormous range covered by his research, it is possible to detect a certain number of themes. It is important to realize that Ikeuchi did not study the Man-Sen region for its own sake; his goal was to uncover Japan's continental history. In the introduction to *A Study of Japanese Antiquity* (Nihon jōdaishi no ichi kenkyū 日本上代史の一研究), he states:

Seen in the light of Korean and world history, the relations between Japan and this peninsula are part of the history of that particular period in Korean history, but are also an aspect of Japanese history. As such it is an important problem that requires special examination. [...] It is solely for this reason that I, a student of Korean history, teach this subject.<sup>58</sup>

This was not, however, his sole reason for studying Korean history. The

<sup>55</sup> As noted in note 23, these studies appeared in 1913 and 1914 respectively under Shiratori's name as *Manshū rekishi chiri* and *Chōsen rekishi chiri*. For a complete list of the studies that were published under the auspices of the South Manchurian Railway Company, see John Young, *The Research Activities of the South Manchurian Railway Company, 1907–1945: A History and Bibliography* (New York: East Asia Institute, Columbia University Press, 1969), pp.558–64.


<sup>56</sup> See Goi, *Kindai Nihon*, pp.79–80.

<sup>57</sup> See Tōkyō daigaku hyakunenshi henshū iinkai [Committee for the compilation of *A History of One Hundred Years Tokyo University*], *Tōkyō daigaku hyakunenshi: bukuyokushi*, vol.I (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1986), p.626.

<sup>58</sup> See Ikeuchi, *Nihon jōdaishi no ichi kenkyū* (original edition, 1946, this edition Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Bijutsu Shuppan, 1970), pp.2–4.

Figure 4

A page of one of Ikeuchi's studies in *A Study of Manchu-Korean History, vol.2, pp.642-3*



<sup>59</sup> See Ikeuchi Hiroshi, *Bunroku keichō no eki* [The Hideyoshi invasions of Korea] (Tokyo: Tōyō Bunkō, 1936), Introduction. This is a revised edition of the 1914 original. Shiratori's original introduction can be found in this 1914 edition, and was partly copied by Ikeuchi in the revised edition. In the introduction to *Mansen rekishi chiri kenkyū* [Studies on the historical geography of Korea] by Tsuda, Shiratori says exactly the same thing; only the phrasing is different. The emphasis is again on the acquiring of knowledge about Korea and Manchuria by way of purely scientific methods, after which this knowledge can be used for practical purposes. See Tsuda Sōkichi, *Mansen rekishi chiri kenkyū* in *Tsuda Sōkichi zenshū*, vols. XI and XII (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1964, original edition 1913).

other reason lies in the colonial character of Manchu-Korean History, as clearly stated by Shiratori in his preface to one of Ikeuchi's studies:

[The true story of the Japanese invasions in Korea] is not only an interesting historiographical problem concerning the reasons of the failure [of the invasions], but it is also an excellent source of [historical] materials to find out more about the international relations in East Asia and about the Korean national character. Now that Korea has been absorbed into our Imperial territory, it is imperative that we learn from the vestiges of the past [how to conduct] a conciliatory policy towards the recently annexed peoples, [how to conduct] a realistic government and [how to develop] complete contact with the mainland.<sup>59</sup>

The study of Korea and Manchuria is sacrificed to the historically superior role of Japan, and some practical information is extracted in passing. Ikeuchi was clearly a Manchu-Korean History historian in both his goals and his methodology.

In the choice of his subjects he was unmistakably a student of Ranke. He shared Ranke's preoccupation with the *Primat der Außenpolitik*, the study of a nation's foreign relations. The majority of his studies are studies in the history of conflicts; conflicts are the axis around which his historical vision

was formulated. Despite his avowed abhorrence of theoretical constructions he combines this with a Comtian scheme of development, which is apparent in his study on Shilla warriors, *On the Warrior Spirit of Shilla* (Shiragi no bushiteki seishin ni tsuite 新羅の武士的精神に就いて):

It could be said that one of the special qualities of the spiritual life of the people of Shilla expressed itself in embracing death as it came. This was because it was considered a praiseworthy thing to regard one's own life lightly. But this special quality can absolutely not be discovered any more among later generations of Koreans.<sup>60</sup>

The loss of this warrior spirit—the ability to resist foreign aggression—would ultimately result in the loss of Korea's sovereignty. Ikeuchi does not state this explicitly, but he does imply it: once Shilla's most outstanding quality had been lost, the Koreans as a race degenerated.<sup>61</sup>

Ikeuchi's abhorrence of theoretical constructions motivated him to limit himself to merely implying developmental models for nations through his history of conflicts. At the same time his focus on conflicts enabled him to look at history from a broader perspective. Conflicts, in Ikeuchi's view, also functioned as excellent sources of historical information. This approach is most conspicuous in his study of the Mongol invasions of Japan, *A New Study of the Mongol Invasions* (Genkō no shinkenkyū 元寇の新研究). The study not only covers the actual invasions of Japan, but also deals with the international situation on the continent prior to, during and after the invasions. One of the merits of a general narrative like that of *Oriental History* is that it allowed for a broader view of history. Ikeuchi took full advantage of this characteristic.<sup>62</sup>

One disadvantage of this approach is that it tends to devote a disproportionate amount of attention to conflicts. In the case of Ikeuchi—and of many other Manchu-Korean History historians—this resulted in a kind of abstraction of Korea and Manchuria. The emphasis on the *Primat der Außenpolitik* as the primary concern of historians caused them to lose sight of issues that were only indirectly related to conflict.<sup>63</sup> The existence of Korea and Manchuria as historical 'objects' of Japan hinders the existence of the two regions as independent historical subjects. The result is that the historian who adopts a purely conflict-historical approach works with a depersonalized history. The existence of independent histories and cultures of peoples is subordinated or even obliterated for the sake of 'naked facts.'<sup>64</sup> A telling example of this approach is Ikeuchi's *The Attitude of the Japanese Army After the Defeat of Ming General Tsu Ch'eng-hsün* (Minshō Sho Shōkun no haito igo waga gun no taido 明將祖承訓の敗走以後我軍の態度). In this article on a confrontation between Chinese and Japanese troops during the Japanese invasions of Korea, Korea is conveniently left out of the picture, since it was not considered a proper historical subject. It only figures as a geographical location.<sup>65</sup>

Depersonalization of a people—however paradoxical this may sound—

<sup>60</sup> See Ikeuchi, "Shiragi no bushiteki seishin ni tsuite," *Shigaku zasshi* [The Journal of History] 40:8 (1929): 35. See also p.37 of the same article.

<sup>61</sup> See Ikeuchi, "Shiragi no bushiteki seishin ni tsuite," pp.35–7. It is interesting to note that many Korean historians shared his opinion. It was widely held that with Shilla's unification of the peninsula, Korean history had reached a turning point. A change in mentality was not the reason for this, however; it was the loss of Koguryō territory that caused Korea's future loss of independence. See Cho, Han and Pak, *Han'guk ūi yōksaga-wa yōksabak*, vol.II.

<sup>62</sup> See Ikeuchi, *Genkō no shinkenkyū*, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Tōyō Bunkō, 1931). It is telling in this respect that the first six chapters are devoted to a very detailed and well-researched analysis of political circumstances in Mongolia, China and Korea. Even when Ikeuchi reconstructs and analyzes the actual invasions, he does not lose sight of the link with continental history.

<sup>63</sup> Ranke's *Primat der Außenpolitik* was eminently suited, though unintentionally, for colonial historiography. The emphasis on foreign relations, in which the colonizer obviously had the upper hand, obscured other subjects. Once again the primacy of certain subjects over other subjects is intimately connected with institutionalization and archival power: "What we are observing here is archival power at its strongest, the power to define what is and what is not a serious subject of research, and therefore, of mention." See Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, p.99.

<sup>64</sup> See Hatada, *Nihonjin*, p.39.

<sup>65</sup> See Ikeuchi, "Minshō Sho Shōkun no haito igo waga gun no taido," in *Shigaku zasshi* 29:7 (1918): 647–65.

<sup>66</sup> See Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*, p.20.

<sup>67</sup> See, for example, Ikeuchi, *Nihon jōdai-shi*, pp.9–11; Ikeuchi, *Chōsen no bunka in Iwanami kōza tōyōshisō* [Iwanami lectures on Oriental thought] 15:2 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1935): 70–1. The introduction of Koguryō on the one side and Paekche and Shilla on the other side as ethnic antagonists is the most important part of his argument.

<sup>68</sup> See Ikeuchi, *Nihon jōdai-shi*, pp.9–11.

does not necessarily express itself in literal obliteration or omission. It also expresses itself in the subtle shift from the role of historical subject to the role of historical object assigned to the people in question. This is a necessary aspect of colonial historiography. It is not only the denial of sovereignty that is the crux of this strategy; it is also an excellent way of signaling an important ontological difference between the colonizer and the colonized. It is, in short, the difference between the subject and the object of history. This strategy has important consequences for the concept of objectivity, and its central place in colonial historiography cannot obscure the unequal implementation of supposedly objective standards on different objects. It also informs us that this may very well be the often-observed reason behind the need for colonial historians to create a historiography that is both universalistic and particularistic. This is what the Oriental History historians eventually came to be. When applied to the colonial situation, the universal aspects of that historiography conveniently turn particularistic in order to legitimize colonization. It is a paradox, but a very necessary one:

There is, however, no paradox in this development if we remember that to the extent this complex of power and knowledge was colonial, the forms of objectivization and normalization of the colonized had to reproduce, within the framework of a universal knowledge, the truth of the colonial difference.<sup>66</sup>

Enter *the rule of colonial difference*. The logical inconsistency of this rule, which ceases to be a paradox only in the context of colonial *Realpolitik*, is inevitable and necessary. It led Ikeuchi to a reformulation of the ancient history of Korea in which he tried to establish the unity of Korea and Manchuria (*Man-Sen ichinyō* 滿鮮一如) by changing the accepted provenance of the Korean people.<sup>67</sup> This concept, the rule of colonial difference, is closely linked to another Manchu-Korean History concept that was central to Ikeuchi's formulation of Korean history. This is the so-called 'history formed under foreign pressure' (*gai'atsu no rekishi* 外壓の歴史) that Korea was believed to have. It basically meant that owing to its geopolitical situation, Korea had a history that was formed under constant foreign pressure, and because of this constant pressure Korea had never been able to decide its own fate.

Korea's 'history formed under foreign pressure' had started in antiquity. In Ikeuchi's studies, the isolation of Koguryō 高句麗 from the mainstream of Korean history formed by Shilla 新羅 and Paekche 百濟 and the introduction of the ethnic antagonism between these states are important issues in the 'history formed under foreign pressure.'<sup>68</sup> This concept is found in almost all of Ikeuchi's studies, and figures most prominently in his studies of the Japanese invasions of Korea and the Mongol invasions of Korea and Japan. In *A New Study of the Mongol Invasions*, Korea is depicted as a country without its own historical destiny; its destiny is subordinate to the powers that at that particular time constitute the foreign pressure. Koreans are depicted as helpless victims of the Mongol invaders, unable to come up



with any resistance worth mentioning. They lacked “loyalty and courage as well as true strength.”<sup>69</sup> The resistance the government tried to organize is defined as originating in the relative safety of Kanghwa-do 江華島, where it had fled, and not as stemming from a capacity or will to resist. The resistance mounted by non-government groups is not mentioned at all, although there is ample evidence that it did exist.<sup>70</sup> It is, in short, Ikeuchi’s conception of Korea as the true object of the histories of other countries and powers that largely shaped his historical vision.

These themes resurface in Ikeuchi’s analysis of the rebellion of the Three Special Patrols (*Sambyōlch’o* 三別抄). This elite unit rebelled against King Wōnjong 元宗 in 1270 when Wōnjong concluded a much-opposed peace treaty with the Mongols. The *Sambyōlch’o* was a crack unit composed of different Special Patrols (*pyōlch’o* 別抄). Its history goes back to the twelfth century when these Special Patrols were mainly used as frontal assault groups, doing the dirtier jobs for the regular army. As their importance increased because of their prowess in battle, their numbers also rose and they became differentiated according to their specific tasks. The Three Special Patrols came into being during the Mongol invasions, and they were in fact the only governmental army unit that managed to mount successful opposition against the Mongols. The ruling Ch’oe 崔氏 regime was inextricably connected to the *pyōlch’o* and its later incarnations such as the Special Night Patrol (*Yabyōlch’o* 夜別抄), the Special Mounted Patrol (*Mabyōlch’o* 馬別抄) and the Three Special Patrols. This connection was forged when Ch’oe Ch’unghōn 崔忠憲 (1149–1219) made a name for himself as a young and courageous officer in one of the army’s Special Patrols. The Ch’oe clan continued to depend on the Three Special Patrols during their reign, to such an extent that the Patrols have been described as the “claws and teeth” (*cho-a* 爪牙) of the Ch’oe.<sup>71</sup>

Although it was nominally a governmental unit, opinion still differs as to what extent the Three Special Patrols constituted a private army of the Ch’oe.<sup>72</sup> Be that as it may, the relationship between the Ch’oe and the Three Special Patrols was so intimate that the final coup against the fourth ruler of the Ch’oe house only succeeded because of the support the Three Special Patrols gave to the lower-ranking officers who executed the coup.<sup>73</sup> When the demise of the anti-Mongol Ch’oe gave room to manoeuvre to pro-Mongol factions who concluded a peace treaty with the invaders, the Three Special Patrols rose in revolt. They occupied the capital at Kanghwa-do and installed their own king. They then evacuated Kanghwa-do to establish a more easily defensible base at Chindo 珍島, from where they began coordinating their activities. The Three Special Patrols managed to build an island kingdom of some thirty islands that controlled large parts of Chōllanam-do 全羅南道.<sup>74</sup> Surprisingly, Chindo fell under the attack of a combined Korean-Mongolian army in 1271. The Three Special Patrols were devastated and their leader, Pae Chungson 裴仲孫 (?–1271), was killed. The army consequently went to Cheju-do (T’amna 耽羅) where they were able to withstand the Mongols for another two years until, in 1273, Cheju-do also fell.

<sup>69</sup> See Ikeuchi, *Genkō*, p.7. In his impressive study of the Japanese invasions of Korea Ikeuchi exhibits a similar attitude. The feats of Admiral Yi Sunshin are dealt with in a few sentences, although it was his victories that had won the war for Korea. See Ikeuchi, *Bunroku keichō no eki*, p.124.

<sup>70</sup> It is therefore no coincidence that one of the major focal points for Korean historians of the Mongol invasions is often the resistance of non-government groups. The omission by Japanese scholars of this aspect of resistance against the Mongols gave Korean historians an easy target. The *Koryōsa* contains numerous examples of peasant resistance. See Yi Ikchu, “Koryō hugi Monggo ch’imip-kwa minjung hangjaeng ūi sōngkyōk” [The Mongol invasions and the characteristics of popular resistance during the late Koryō period], in *Yōksapip’yōng* [Critical History] 24 (1994). Any claims towards nationalist aims expressed in the resistance of farmers and slaves, however, must be regarded with caution.

<sup>71</sup> See *Koryōsa* 81: 15b.


<sup>72</sup> See the following articles and books for descriptions and analyses of the Three Special Patrols and their activities: Min Hyōn’gu 閔賢九, “Monggo gun Kim Panggyōng Sambyōlch’o” [The Mongol army, Kim Panggyōng and the Three Special Patrols], in *Han’guksa shimin kangjwa*, 8 (1991); ● Yōngsōn 吳英善, “Mushin chōnggwōn sabyōng” [Private armies during the military period], in *Yōksa pip’yōng*, 29 (1995); O Yōngsōn, “Koryō mushin chipgwōngi sabyōng ūi sōngkyōk” [The character of private armies during the military period], in *Kunsa* (Military History) 33 (1996); Yun Yonghyōk, *Koryō Sambyōlch’o-ūi tae-Mong bangjaeng* [The struggle with the Mongols of the Koryō Three Special Patrols] (Seoul: Ilchisa, 2000).

<sup>73</sup> See *Koryōsa* 24: 32b–33a.

<sup>74</sup> The main activities of the Three Special Patrols consisted of destroying ship-building wharves where ships for the invasion of Japan were being built and wiping out government strongholds. In both cases the Three Special Patrols were so successful that Kublai himself made their subjugation one of his highest priorities. For a detailed /OVER

### Figure 5

Detail of a rubbing of the epigraph of Ch'oe Ch'unghōn, the first leader of the Ch'oe clan and de facto leader of the Three Special Patrols. Part of the epigraph for Ch'oe Ch'unghōn, National Museum, Tokyo (no.27412)



/description of the activities of the Three Special Patrols, the reaction of Kublai and the plight of the Koreans who had to build Kublai's ships, see W. Henthorn, *The Mongol Invasions of Korea* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1963).

<sup>75</sup> See the *Koryōsa* for these years (Wōnjong 1–10): *Koryōsa* 25: 1a to *Koryōsa* 28: 29a.

no shinkenkyū) of 1931, it is apparent that his approach to the subject strictly obeys the rules of textual criticism. The subject does not stand by itself in Ikeuchi's view; it is clearly to be placed in the larger context of the Mongol invasions of Japan. This is the first indication of the subordination of the history of Korea to that of Japan.

Ikeuchi deals with the Three Special Patrols chronologically. He starts with the origins of the Special Patrols and the Three Special Patrols, and gradually moves to their role as the “claws and teeth” of the Ch'oe and finally to their rebellion. His quotations and his use of the available sources are impeccable. Unlike Shiratori, he cannot be found misquoting or leaving out parts of a quotation in order to argue his case. So, at first glance, “On The Three Special Patrols of Koryō” would seem to bear the hallmarks of historical objectivity.

A closer look at the study, however, yields a different conclusion. The reliance on naked facts and the avoidance of theoretical constructs—so conspicuous at first sight—do not bear closer inspection. First, the concept of ‘history formed under foreign pressure’ is present in the representation of Korea as the object of other forces. Korea is absent as a separate identity and Korean politics only exist by grace of foreign intervention. This is not only indicated by the choice of the subject itself but also by Ikeuchi's description of the years between 1259 and 1269 as “a decade during which nothing happened.” Ikeuchi's intended meaning was that there were no international conflicts of significance, but he casually disregards famine, the near collapse of Koryō due to Kublai's demands, and the rise of Im Yōn 林衍 (?–1271).<sup>75</sup>

There are two reasons why the historiography of Ikeuchi and Kim on the rebellion of the Three Special Patrols deserves our attention. The first is that the themes prevalent in their oeuvre clearly surface in their respective studies of this rebellion. In this manner their articles on the Three Special Patrols can be taken as a representative part—a *pars pro toto*—of their oeuvre. The second reason is that the two historians handled this subject very similarly, and the fact that their methodology and sources were the same facilitates a comparative analysis. If one examines Ikeuchi's *On the Three Special Patrols of Koryō* (Kōrai no Sanbesshō ni suite 高麗の三別抄に就いて) of 1926 and the chapter devoted to the Three Special Patrols in his *A New Study of the Mongol Invasions* (Genkō

The portrayal of Kublai Khan is also worthy of note in this respect. One would expect the representation of Mongol power in Korea to be cast in terms such as “merciless” or “harsh.” Surprisingly, however, Ikeuchi describes Kublai as “lenient” and “magnanimous”;<sup>76</sup> but Kublai is only described in such positive terms in connection with Korea. This positive description of Kublai is all the more conspicuous when taking into account the very negative descriptions of the Three Special Patrols: they were “pirates” (*kaizoku* 海賊); their base was a “pirate’s lair” (*zokketsu* 賊穴), and they exhibited “treacherous behavior” (*bangyaku no kōdō* 叛逆の行動). In connection with Japan, however, Kublai becomes “megalomaniac” and his demands are “absurd.”<sup>77</sup>

There is, in other words, a subtle Japanization of Kublai in connection with Korea. He is more or less identified as the legitimate ruler of Korea, for he possesses all the positive qualities the Koreans so obviously lack. In connection with Japan, however, he loses this positive representation and turns into a megalomaniac warmonger. There is a subtle parallel to be found between Kublai’s power in Korea and Japanese colonial power there seven centuries later. In regard to his overlordship of Korea, he is very similar to the Japanese.<sup>78</sup>

Ikeuchi’s Manchu-Korean History background shines through when he analyzes the motives behind the rebellion of the Three Special Patrols. He saw these motives purely in terms of power and *Realpolitik*. The preservation of power was the reason the rebellion broke out; the possibility of patriotic motives is not even dealt with.<sup>79</sup> Further denial of the possibility of anything but power as motivation is found in the parallel Ikeuchi draws between this rebellion and the rebellion of Ch’oe T’an 崔坦 (the military governor who rebelled and offered his direct allegiance to the Mongols, which resulted in the creation of a separate administrative domain under his direct rule).<sup>80</sup> The emphasis on the negotiations Pae Chungson allegedly held with the Mongols in order to trade his surrender for an autonomous region in Chōllado 全羅道 serves the same purpose.<sup>81</sup>

Although the above may have given the impression that Ikeuchi was an academic puppet of the government, as far removed from objectivity as possible, such a judgment must be temporarily suspended. It is certainly true that in treating Korea as an object of the history of Japan Ikeuchi was obeying the leading trends in Oriental History at that time. As will be clear from the above, both academically (in both senses, that is institutionally and intellectually) and socially he was part of Oriental History in its broadest sense. We have to discriminate, however, between the absolute concept of objectivity which demands that the observer/interpreter of events has no relation to these events

/refer to the Three Special Patrols only in the most derogatory of terms. In this light his interpretation was far from new, but, as is shown above, it served other purposes and therefore cannot be seen as a mere repetition of the verdict of the dynastic histories.

<sup>78</sup> François Hartog has described this representational technique in historiography. See François Hartog, *Le Miroir d'Hérodote: Essai sur la Représentation de l'autre* (Paris: Gallimard, 1980), pp.229–42.

<sup>79</sup> One of the supporting arguments Ikeuchi gives for his insistence that the motivation behind the rebellion was purely power-related is that the Three Special Patrols were formed with the aim of defending Kanghwa-do against the Mongols, and that by surrendering to the Mongols and moving the capital back to the mainland the Three Special Patrols would lose their *raison d'être*. This may sound persuasive, but there is no textual evidence whatsoever to suggest that the defence of Kanghwa-do was the motivation behind the formation of the Three Special Patrols. It is more plausible that the Three Special Patrols were already in existence before the Mongol invasions.

<sup>80</sup> See *Koryōsa* 26: 25b–26a. Using strongman Im Yōn’s dethronement of the king as an excuse Ch’oe revolted, killed the commissioner of the Western Capital (Sōgyōng 西京, present day P’yōngyang 平壤) and defected to the Mongols in exchange for limited self-rule in the area under his control.

<sup>81</sup> It is not clear to what extent there were negotiations and who the negotiators were. Henthorn is of the opinion that the negotiations were mere delaying tactics. The Korean commander of the combined Korean-Mongol forces was relieved of his command on the accusation of negotiating with the enemy prior to the final successful invasion of Chindo, but was restored in time to lead it. The accusation that this commander, Kim Panggyōng, had negotiated with the Three Special Patrols cannot be verified, but neither can it be dismissed. Kim was, after all, fighting against his former brothers-in-arms. His quick restoration to his post seems to suggest that the accusations were made merely to discredit him. See *Koryōsa* 104: 6a-b.

<sup>76</sup> See, for example, Ikeuchi, *Genkō*, pp.23–4.

<sup>77</sup> See, for example, *ibid.*, p.282. Ikeuchi followed the examples set by the dynastic

/histories of Koryō and Chosōn. *The History of Koryō* [Koryōsa], the *Essentials of the History of Koryō* [Koryōsa chōryō] and the *Veritable Records of Chosōn* [Chosōn wangjo shillok] all

except as a neutral observer (whether this is possible or not), and the more popular conception of objectivity according to which objectivity is a quality which enables one to look at the facts directly, and not distracted or misled by hypotheses and theories. It hardly needs to be said that this second kind of objectivity is not real objectivity, but merely a watered down, practical version of the concept of absolute objectivity. It presupposes that the facts are able to speak for themselves, which practically speaking means through the supposedly neutral observer (who in fact functions as an interpreter). The absolute concept of objectivity is never realized—indeed, the very possibility of realizing it, even only in theory, is nowadays seriously doubted. The more popular notion of objectivity may often be realized—but the drawback of this presumed objectivity is that it is a concept that can be measured and compared. It is a notion that is active *within* a larger structure. Within the structure it is objective, according to the rules set for objectivity in that particular structure, but it cannot make any claim to being a philosophically absolute objectivity. It does, however, invoke the authority of absolute objectivity. It remains an “ideal to be pursued by individuals, policed by the collectivity,” as Peter Novick has succinctly characterized it. In other words, it obeys the rules that have—arbitrarily—been set for what has been labeled objectivity, although it may lack any connection with the concept of absolute objectivity. It is subjective and relative, and is only named ‘objectivity’ because it has been ascribed the authority of absolute objectivity. It is subjective with regard to the larger structure it is derived from, relative to other possible kinds of neutrality belonging to other structures. And as it is “policed by the collectivity,” it cannot but possess strong ties to society and its characteristics, needs and taboos.

It has become clear from the above analysis of the historical vision of Ikeuchi Hiroshi that the methodology he employed does not meet the standards of absolute objectivity. There can be little doubt that he failed in his attempt to approach the past “without preconceptions” and to “let the facts speak for themselves.” But this is a charge that can be leveled against any historian of any place and time, and does not bring us any further than the observation that Ikeuchi did not travel this road as far as he could have. It is more helpful to look at him within the framework of Oriental History, to examine the methodology he employed in comparison with that of his colleagues and teachers. It will then be apparent that there are other dimensions to Ikeuchi than the easy definition of biased colonial historian.

Part of Ikeuchi’s oeuvre was dedicated to the early history of Japan, and this was characteristically written by incorporating the early histories of Korea and Manchuria within Japan’s history. Ikeuchi’s study of the ancient history of Japan, *Nihon jōdaisbi no ichi kenkyū*, published in 1946, is an excellent example of his methodology, and offers us an insight into the relationship between himself and Oriental History. In this work Ikeuchi discussed, amongst other things, the imperial family’s line of descent and the expedition of

Empress Jingū 神功皇后 (r. 201–269) to Shilla. In both cases he concluded that his research findings could not support popular belief regarding these matters. Evaluation of the textual evidence did not leave him any other choice than to conclude that the existence of the first fourteen emperors could not be proven and that the expedition to Shilla, which was one of the legitimations for the annexation of Korea often cited by the Manchu-Korean History historians, had never taken place.<sup>82</sup> As a *coup de grâce* he also asserted that neither the *Chronicles of Japan* (*Nihon shoki* 日本書紀) nor the *Records of Ancient Matters* (*Kojiki* 古事記) could be considered a reliable historical document, since both had been written primarily for the political use of the imperial family and the ruling class.<sup>83</sup>

Ikeuchi was not the only one to have doubts on the authenticity of the historical events recorded in Japan's most revered ancient histories. Tsuda Sōkichi, his distinguished colleague, had already run into trouble with the authorities on account of such doubts. In 1913, Tsuda had published *A Study of the Japanese Classics* (*Nihon koten no kenkyū* 日本古典の研究), in which he had tried to show that the *Nihon shoki* and the *Kojiki* could not be considered reliable historical documents. Based on philological research, he concluded that these two histories were politically effective fabrications for the benefit of the power of the imperial house. He concluded also that the existence of the first fourteen emperors, from Jimmū 神武天皇 (660–585 BC) to Chūai 仲哀天皇 (192–100 BC), could not be established. Although he added that this did not necessarily have any consequences for the divine status of the imperial family, since it was the belief therein that mattered, he came under attack from right-wing nationalists because of his growing reputation as a subversive intellectual.<sup>84</sup> After much harassment this resulted in an indictment for *lèse majesté*, an official ban on four of his books and finally, in 1942, his conviction and the conviction of his publisher, Iwanami Shigeo 岩波茂雄 (1881–1946).<sup>85</sup> The sentence was never carried out, owing to technical errors on the side of the prosecution (and no doubt also because of his reputation and advanced age), but the damage had already been done. The public humiliation and harassment were intense. So even without formal punishment, Tsuda's case served as a stern warning to other potentially subversive scholars.

The often unintended clashes<sup>86</sup> between ideology and scholarship created a dilemma for the average academic. Ikeuchi was not exempt from this dilemma, as the publication history of *A Study of Japanese Antiquity* readily testifies. Most of the book had been written as far back as 1918, and by the time Ikeuchi retired in 1939 it was completely finished—but he did not dare publish it, even though “he regretted this deeply from a scientific point of view.”<sup>87</sup> Understandable as this decision may be, it tells us two things about Ikeuchi. First, it is clear that as far as his historical research was concerned, he was guided by his own sense of proper research and not necessarily by what was thought proper by the authorities. Second, it tells us that Ikeuchi was prepared to self-

<sup>82</sup> See Ikeuchi, *Nihon jōdaishi*, p. 51. Whether or not the Shilla expedition of Empress Jingū actually took place has been a hotly debated issue in Japanese and Korean historiography, and the verdict usually takes shape along nationalist lines. Nationalist Japanese historians saw this expedition not only as historical proof that Japan had always been Korea's superior, but also as a legitimation of—and precedent for—renewed expeditions to Korea. Korean historians, on the other hand, vigorously denied this assertion. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the majority of Japanese historians advocated the theory that Empress Jingū had invaded and subjugated Korea, but historians like Tsuda and Ikeuchi, thoroughly trained in Rankean methodology, were of the opinion that there was not enough textual evidence to support this theory. Inaba Iwakichi—who had been trained to use the same methodology as Tsuda and Ikeuchi and was in fact a colleague of theirs—supported the Shilla expedition theory. See Hatada, *Nihonjin*, pp. 185–6; Tanaka, *Japan's Orient*, pp. 74, 171; Cho, *Han'guk ūi yōksaga*, vol. II, p. 309.

<sup>83</sup> See Ikeuchi, *Nihon jōdaishi*, p. 110.

<sup>84</sup> This attack was led by the ultra-nationalist Minoda Muneki 蓑田陶喜 (1894–1946), professor of law at Tokyo University and founder of a number of nationalist magazines in which he denounced ‘anti-nationalist elements.’

<sup>85</sup> See Tam Yun-tai, “Rationalism versus nationalism: Tsuda Sōkichi,” in Brownlee et al., *History in the Service of the Japanese Nation* (Toronto: University of Toronto and York University, 1983). Tsuda's conclusions collided with the system of worship of the Imperial House that the Meiji oligarchs had devised. This system emphasized the constitutional sanctification of the Imperial House, and was supported with a consistent and well thought-out policy consisting, among other things, of the compulsory worship of the Imperial House and its ancestors, the compulsory worship of meritorious subjects, and the sanctification of the *Nihon shoki* and the *Kojiki*. The policy's goal was, in short, the generating of national sentiments under the banner of the divine emperor. See Miyachi Masato 宮地正人, *Tennōsei no seijishiteki kenkyū* [A political study of /OVER

/the imperial system](Tokyo: Azekura Shobō, 1990), p.154.

<sup>86</sup> Byron Marshall concludes that the majority of academics in pre-war Japan tried to employ their academic freedom for the benefit of the state. They tried to design better policies through criticism; disagreement with the authorities did not automatically imply disagreement with the state. The Meiji constitution and the Meiji emperor were supported by most academics. Even those academics who had been labeled subversive by the government did not think of themselves as subversive, but rather as critical in a constructive way. This kind of criticism was often misinterpreted by the state, resulting in harsh measures against the perceived subversive academics. See Byron K. Marshall, "Professors and Politics: The Meiji Academic Elite," in *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 3.1 (1977): 71–97; Marshall, *Academic Freedom and the Japanese Imperial University, 1868–1939* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1992).

<sup>87</sup> See Ikeuchi, *Nibon jōdaisbi*, Introduction.

<sup>88</sup> See Dale, *Myth*, p.5.

<sup>89</sup> Shiratori's methods prompted Tsuda to remark that "he [Shiratori] first formulated a hypothesis and then fitted in the facts." See Tsuda, diary 3 October 1911, cited in Goi, *Kindai Nibon*, p.80.

<sup>90</sup> Perhaps the best illustration is the article "Kōkaido Ō hi hakken no yūrai to hiseki no genjō [The origins of the discovery of the stele of King Kwanggaet'o and its present condition], in *Shigaku zasshi* 49:1 (1937): 193. This article, which must have represented the highest achievable historical objectivity for Ikeuchi, is a minute description of Kwanggaet'o's stele in which the voice of the observer is almost inaudible.

<sup>91</sup> See note 89.

cancel the results of what he regarded as proper research when they had the potential to clash with the official line. He performed, as Peter Dale has put it, "critical self-lobotomization."<sup>88</sup>

Two levels can be discerned in Ikeuchi's historical methodology. The first is that of Ikeuchi's textual criticism. There can be little doubt that Ikeuchi was a historian fairly close to the ideal of the Rankean tradition. Even though contemporary circumstances forced him to seek refuge in "critical self-lobotomization," his historical studies are examples of rigid textual criticism. As opposed to Shiratori, whose historical and linguistic studies are sometimes marred by a neglect of Rankean methodology,<sup>89</sup> Ikeuchi cannot be caught sinning against the commandment to look at the facts first and foremost. In a sense Ikeuchi was more rigid in his methods than even Ranke had been. Whereas Ranke was given to the construction of grand narratives, Ikeuchi kept himself far from anything that might resemble theoretical constructs. But there is another side to his historical vision too. Although Ikeuchi himself can be said to have "let go of all ideology," an analysis of his historical vision shows it to be invested with concepts and *a priori* assumptions that do not stand the test of historical objectivity. Ikeuchi kept himself to the facts;<sup>90</sup> his research was purely *inductive*. Keeping away from theories and grand historical hypotheses, he worked from the facts and nothing but the facts. This method won him a reputation as a purely objective scholar but, as with most reputations, it is deceptive because although Ikeuchi may have been a zealous practitioner of historical objectivity, this was only so within the larger structure of Oriental History. The presuppositions of Oriental History influenced him from both without and within. As noted, he employed a range of *a priori* concepts adopted, whether consciously or not, from Oriental History (such as 'history formed under foreign pressure,' the assumed absence of sovereignty in Korea, or Korea's perceived stagnancy and heteronomy). Further influence from within can be distinguished in his selection of subjects. Ikeuchi's choice to study the history of conflicts—legitimate as the subject is—relates clearly to the theoretical background formed by the above-mentioned themes. Apart from the influence that Oriental History exerted directly on his studies, there is also the issue of the influence it exercised by virtue of being a large, enveloping academic and semi-social structure. Even if we assume that it would have been possible for Ikeuchi to write truly objective histories, his position as a historian affiliated with Oriental History would have placed those histories within the framework of Oriental History and would have made their objectivity futile. Ikeuchi's studies had been appropriated by the structural aspects of Oriental History before they had even been written. The paradox is that Ikeuchi used inductive methods in a largely deductive structure. As was noted and criticized by Tsuda, Shiratori usually worked *from* a hypothesis *to* the facts, while Ikeuchi did the exact opposite.<sup>91</sup> Therefore despite Ikeuchi's avoidance of theoretical constructs, his historical research was objective only according to the rules and demands of Oriental History.

The deductive nature of the general narrative cut short the inductive nature of the partial narrative. The consequences of this approach to Korea as a historical object of Japan were also twofold and paradoxical. Korea was first 'normalized' so that it could be studied on the same terms as Japan. Then care was taken to ensure that there were some fundamental differences with Japan, differences that would explain Japan's annexation of Korea legitimately and in a way that made it historically inevitable. This, in other words, is the rule of colonial difference. The question is now how Korean historians reacted to the results produced by this rule of colonial difference.

### *Kim Sanggi*

The career of Kim Sanggi 金辛基 began in the colonial period when he went to Waseda University to study history under the guidance of Tsuda Sōkichi. After four years there, he returned to Korea upon graduating in 1931. Since the colonial situation made it very difficult for Koreans to obtain positions at universities, Kim chose to become a teacher of history and to devote his spare time to his historical research. His first publication was the result of his research at Waseda; in 1931 he published his study of the Tonghak rebellion (Tonghaknan 東學亂) in serial form in the *The Tonga Daily* (*Tong-A Ilbo* 東亞日報). His name as a historian was quickly made, thanks to this study that excelled in rigid textual criticism and drew upon previously unused sources. In 1934, he joined the select group of historians that founded the CAA. He frequently contributed to its journal, the *Chindan hakpo*. When the CAA was declared an illegal organization in 1942, in the wake of the incident with the Association for Research in the Korean Language, publication of the journal ceased. After liberation, Kim went on to become a lecturer and later a full professor at Seoul National University (*Sōul Taebakkyo* 서울대학교 (established in 1945)). He combined his position as a professor with several high-school teaching positions and became a member of the National Institute for Korean History (*Kuksa py'ŏnch'an uiwŏnho* 國史編纂委員會).

Three major themes are immediately discernible in Kim Sanggi's oeuvre. The majority of his studies can be characterized as belonging to one of three categories, namely the origin of the Korean people, international trade and cultural exchange in Korean history, and revolts in Korea. As I will argue, these three themes are intimately connected in Kim's historical thought and together form a coherent vision of Korean history, although a less objective one than he claimed.

When analyzing Ikeuchi's view of history and the task he assigned himself, it is clear that he can be characterized, to some degree at least, as a colonial historian. In the case of Kim the opposite would be expected, as history placed him in a position quite opposite to that of Ikeuchi. It is not

<sup>92</sup> See Kim Sanggi, *Tongbangsa nonch'ong* [Essays on Korean history] (Seoul: Sōul Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'anbu, 1974), Introduction.

<sup>93</sup> The comparative explicitness of Kim's statement can be explained by the fact that he wrote it in 1948, when Japanese colonialism in Korea was at an end.

<sup>94</sup> See Kim Sanggi, *Tongbang munbwa kyoryusa non'go* [Essays on cultural exchange in East-Asia] reprint ed. 1951 (Seoul: Sōul Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'ansa, 1976), preface. This book contains articles written for the *Chindan bakpo* before 1942.

<sup>95</sup> See Goi, *Kindai Nihon*, pp.138–43; for a discussion of Tsuda's view on cultural exchange, see Ōkubo Toshiaki, *Nihon kindai*, pp.185–92.

surprising, then, that he defined his task as a historian as:

The rectification of the historical facts—and especially those facts related to the field of international relations—that have been distorted by Japanese state historians, and the elucidation of the inherent independence of Korea.<sup>92</sup>

This is an explicit reformulation of the goals the CAA had set itself.<sup>93</sup> Here Kim's preoccupation with foreign relations, the *Primat der Außenpolitik*, also surfaces, but his conception of it differs drastically from Ikeuchi's. A heavy emphasis on the history of conflicts would have led Kim into the pitfall that Ch'oe Namsōn had not been able to avoid. Instead, he reinterprets the *Primat der Außenpolitik*:

Culture is something that is propelled forward by mutual cultural exchange. I do not think that any country in East Asian history has enjoyed such close cultural ties with China from ancient times as Korea has. And cultural exchange with this highly developed continental country has been going on continuously from time immemorial. Nowadays there are many things in Korean culture that are peculiar to Korea, but there are also many things that can be traced back to the continent or that have been influenced directly or indirectly by the continent. On the other hand, the Korean culture that has flowed to the continent and enriched continental culture is not to be underestimated either. [...] The elucidation of the circumstances of cultural exchange, and furthermore the clarification of essential cultural achievements and the examination of the form and aspects of cultural exchange from this point of view, is what I see to be my task. I will commit myself with all my resources to research on the cultural and political interaction of the different countries in East Asia.<sup>94</sup>

Though the prose is somewhat mystifying, Kim is giving his definition of the *Primat der Außenpolitik*. The influence of Tsuda Sōkichi is clearly perceptible. Kim also makes a distinction between “indigenous culture” (*honrai bunka* 本来文化)—Tsuda's term—and “imported” culture (*gairai bunka* 外來文化)—also Tsuda's term—and attaches the same importance to this distinction as Tsuda did. His use of the word “exchange” (*kyoryu* 交流) instead of “accommodation” (*suyong* 受容) is indicative of his view that the relations between China and Korea had been more equal than the Manchu-Korean History historians believed. Cultural relations with China based on reciprocity also implied the existence of an independent and original Korean culture. Kim did not go as far as Tsuda who denied any substantive Chinese influence on the Japanese mode of living and thinking,<sup>95</sup> but he did give Korea a more important place in the Sino-Korean relationship than it had been accorded before. As a further testimony to his debt to Tsuda and Oriental History, he situated this cultural exchange clearly in a cultural sphere reminiscent of ‘the Orient’ (*tōyō*), although he usually referred to it by the name of *tonghang* 東方 (Jap.: *tōbō*), sometimes also using the designation *tongyang* 東洋 (Jap.: *tōyō*).



Kim did not go about reconstructing Korea's history without first trying to obtain a firm foundation. A part of his oeuvre was dedicated to research on the origins of the Korean people. In his article "On the Tung I, the Huai I and the Hsü Jung" (*Tong I-wa Hŭi I, Söyung e tae hayö 東夷와 淮夷·西戎에 대하여*)<sup>96</sup> he discussed these origins and reached a twofold conclusion. He concluded that the roots of the Korean people could be found in China (clearly separating the people he designated as the authentic Tung I 東夷 from the Han Chinese). He reconstructed their route of migration until they settled down in northern China, Manchuria and Korea. He further sought to establish the longstanding relations of the Tung I with the Chinese by stressing the international trade connections these two peoples had always enjoyed. Continuity is the keyword here; he found continuity in the Koreans as a people with a distinct culture and also in the international contacts they had had. These international contacts testified to the active history of the Koreans, affirming them as the subject of their own history. He once again stressed the *exchange* between the Chinese and the Tung I. Kim's reconstruction of the origins of the Korean people is reminiscent of Ch'oe Namsön's attempts at doing the same thing. But Kim's attempts are more sophisticated and are based on known source materials.<sup>97</sup> Like most of the Oriental History historians, Kim worked with the *a priori* assumption of the ethnic homogeneity of the Koreans. Although his own research indicated that there had been a considerable inflow from the Puyö—which he did not deny—he seems to ignore this in his conclusion. This work is not as thorough and well-argued as his other work, which leads one to suspect that it was merely meant to provide a historical setting for what really mattered to him, namely the continuity of the historical tradition and the *Primat der Außenpolitik*.

After redefining Korea's foreign relations as forms of mutual cultural and economic exchange, Kim embarked upon a new interpretation of the tribute system, the former focus of the nationalist fury of Ch'oe Namsön. He identified it as a form of international trade, regarding "serving the greater" (*sadaejuŭi* 事大主義) essentially as a ritual excuse for international trade.<sup>98</sup> His positive appreciation of the tribute system and of the concept of "serving the greater," which according to him gave an ideological umbrella to cultural exchange,<sup>99</sup> made it possible for him to view the Koreans as a historically active people and to see this trading activity as one of the reasons why Shilla flourished.<sup>100</sup>

Kim thus avoided the pitfall of negativity that Ch'oe had fallen into by giving a cultural interpretation to something that had hitherto been regarded as purely political. This interpretation was made possible by the phase into which cultural nationalism had moved in the 1930s. In this respect Kim can be compared to An Hwak 安廓, who wrote a history of Korea based on its political institutions and who had also been able to come to a positive appreciation of Korean culture without having to focus exclusively on its failures.<sup>101</sup>

Kim may have reinterpreted the *Primat der Außenpolitik*, but the notion

<sup>96</sup> See Kim, "Tong I-wa Hŭi I, Söyung e tae hayö" in *Tongbanghakchi* [Academic Journal on Korea] 1–2 (1954–55). This article was later republished in Kim's collection of essays *Tongbangsa nonch'ong*. See note 92.

<sup>97</sup> Ch'oe used Tung I as a synonym for *Purbam*. He connected the Koreans and the Tung I by pointing out the form of Heaven-worship (*paech'ön* 拜天) they had in common. Ch'oe found this Heaven-worship all through Asia and saw it as the descendant of the worship of Tan'gun. Ch'oe's *Purbam* zone is in fact a less sophisticated, somewhat simplistic forerunner of Kim's view of the Tung I. But whereas Kim does not lose himself in historical hypotheses and tries to stay with the documented facts, Ch'oe is easily convinced by superficial similarities and easy etymologies. See Ch'oe, *Purbam munbwa non* (1926), pp.65–7 in *Yuktang Ch'oe Namsön chönjip*, vol.II; Ch'oe, *Chosön sangshik* [Common knowledge of Korean history] (1937), pp.202–69 in *Yuktang Ch'oe Namsön chönjip*, vol.III.

<sup>98</sup> "In Korean antiquity, trade existed in two forms. One form was the formal trade that took place under the name of tribute; in this way the formal exchange of goods between Korea and the highly developed continental nations took place. The other was the individual trade between the envoys of different peoples, private trade which despite official prohibition took place according to economic needs." See Kim, "Kodae ūi muyök hyöngt'ae-wa Na Song ūi haesang palchön-e tae hayö: Ch'onghaejin taesa Chang Pogorŭl chungshim-ŭro [On the form of ancient trade and the development of maritime trade between Shilla and the Song: focusing on Chang Pogo, Governor of Ch'onghaejin], in *Chindan bakpo* 1, p.86. The second part of the article was published in *Chindan bakpo* 2.

<sup>99</sup> "The essential and even fundamental reasons for this 'tribute,' which represent its hidden side, seem to be located in the importation of highly-developed cultural assets from the continent, stemming from utilitarianism." See Kim, "Kodae ūi muyök hyöngt'ae," p.87.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, p.94.

<sup>101</sup> See An Hwak, *Chosön munmyöngsa* [Cultural history of Korea] (Seoul: Hoedong Sö'gwan, 1923).

<sup>102</sup> Kim's study misses the religious component that is so important in Ch'oe's study of the Tonghak rebellion, but he agrees with Ch'oe's conclusion about the Tonghak being directly caused by exploitation by the upper classes and increasing foreign intervention in Korea. See Ch'oe Namsön, *Chosön yöksa kanghwa in Yuktang Ch'oe Namsön chönjip*, vol. 1, p. 56. Once again Ch'oe seems to have set an example for Kim to follow; but Ch'oe was not the only example Kim followed. Shin Ch'aeho, for example, had written a number of articles and books on Korean heroes. Although Shin's historiography was still influenced to a considerable extent by the so-called 'history of heroes,' he was the first to analyze the Myoch'öng rebellion of 1135 as a conflict between the sinocentric Kaegyöng faction led by Kim Pushik and the nativist faction of Myoch'öng. Kim followed Shin in this respect. See *Tanje Shin Ch'aeho chönjip* [Collected works of Tanjae Shin Ch'aeho] (Seoul: Hyöngsöl Ch'ulp'ansa, 1976), vol. III, pp. 111–18.

<sup>103</sup> In Russia, Kye wrote an article called "Tonghakdangp'oktong" in which he praised Kim for his study. See Cho, *Han'guk üi yöksaga*, vol. II, p. 73.

<sup>104</sup> See Kim, "Sambyöchl'o-wa kü üi nan e ch'wi haya (1–3)," in *Chindan bakpo* 9, 10 and 11; Kim, "Myoch'öng üi ch'öndo undong-gwa ch'ingje könwön non e tae hayö," in *Kuksasang üi chemunje* 6 (Seoul: Kuksa P'yönl'han Wiwönhoe, 1960); Kim, "Tan'gu-wa üi hangjaeng," in *Kuksasang üi chemunje* 2 (Seoul: Kuksa P'yönl'han Wiwönhoe, 1959).

<sup>105</sup> Japanese historians tended to characterize major Korean revolts as failed resistance against foreign powers. See, for example, the opinion of the Japanese historian Hayashi Taisuke 林泰輔, member of the *Chösenshi henshükai*. He used the Tonghak rebellion as an occasion to expose the incompetence of Korean administrators and the chaos at the Korean court; without Japanese intervention, according to Hayashi, a disaster would have taken place. He describes the Tonghak rebels as infected by madness and violence. At the sight of the Japanese army, they scattered like "wild animals and beasts." See Hayashi Taisuke, *Chösenshi tsüshi* [A /OVER

of "history formed under foreign pressure" still stood unchallenged. Kim did not meet this challenge directly, but used an evasive manoeuvre by focusing on revolts, rebellions and resistance. His study of the Tonghak rebellion is representative of the way he approached this subject. Instead of treating it as a more or less isolated historical event, Kim situated the Tonghak rebellion in a distinct tradition of resistance and revolt. He connected it to the March First Movement by concluding that the Tonghak had given rise to the revolutionary ideology of the masses (*minjung üi hyöngmyöng sasang* 民衆의革命思想) that had set them in motion in 1919, and further stated that the 1894 reforms had prompted it. He agreed with Ch'oe Namsön that the roots of the revolt lay in the corruption of the upper classes and the increasing penetration of foreign powers into Korea.<sup>102</sup> The tragic failure of the Tonghak did not deter Kim from making a positive evaluation of this expression of resistance by the Korean people. He labeled the enormous number of casualties "unintentional bad results" (*muüi üi akkwa* 無意의惡果). The Tonghak rebellion was, despite its casualties, a necessary and positive stage in the history of Korea. Ironically, this first historical study of Kim's has the distinct air of Marxist influence about it (the revolutionary ideology of the masses, and the Tonghak as anti-thesis that solves the problems that faced Korean society); so much so, indeed, that it earned Kim the praise of Kye Pongu 桂奉瑀, a Marxist historian living in exile in Shanghai and Russia.<sup>103</sup>

The mode of interpretation displayed by Kim in his analysis of the Tonghak returns in his treatment of other revolts and rebellions in Korean history. His mildness towards the disastrous tragedy in which the Tonghak rebellion ended is repeated when he describes the destruction that the Three Special Patrols wrought upon Korea as "unintentional." Thematically, this mode of interpretation characterizes a large and important part of Kim Sanggi's historical writings. Studies focusing on revolt, rebellion and resistance, such as "The Three Special Patrols and their revolt" (*Sambyöchl'o-wa kü üi nan e ch'wi haya* 三別抄와그의亂이就하야), "Myoch'öng's movement to transfer the capital and his proposal to adopt the title of emperor and Korean reign names" (*Myoch'öng üi ch'öndo undong-gwa ch'ingje könwön non e tae hayö* 妙清의遷都運動과稱帝建元論에對하여) and "The resistance against the Khitan" (Tan'gu-wa üi hangjaeng 단구와의항쟁) belong to this category.<sup>104</sup> Kim's interest in revolts can be traced back to his reinterpretations of Korean history. His positive reappraisal of the tribute system, for instance, is as much an essential component of his historical vision as his positive appreciation of revolts and resistance in Korean history.<sup>105</sup> His reinterpretation of the *Primat der Außenpolitik* is related to his reinterpretation of the Tonghak rebellion, the rebellion of the Three Special Patrols and the rebellion of Myoch'öng. Kim did not see these as 'rebellions' as such, but as resistance or revolution; he simply used the established designation for each of the above-mentioned events.<sup>106</sup>

Kim tried to give a radically different interpretation of ‘history formed under foreign pressure,’ in which foreign power and aggression were still central themes, but in which the focus had shifted from invasion to resistance. In this way he tried to give Korea back its autonomy (*chuch’ēsōng* 主體性), to be the subject (*chuch’e* 主體) of its own history. At the same time he introduced a strong contemporary significance for it, and the message of his reexamination of rebellions and resistance against foreign powers did not fall on deaf ears; the parallels with the contemporary situation were too obvious to ignore. Retrospectively, Kim justified resistance and revolt against foreign invaders. This strategy was one of the very few permitted by the Japanese Government-General (*Sōtokufu* 總督府), and was also a strategy typical of cultural nationalism. Nothing is gained by a frontal collision; the indirect approach is therefore preferred.

A closer examination of Kim’s study of the rebellion of the Three Special Patrols will bring out his *modus interpretandi* in more detail and will also clarify the relationship between Ikeuchi and Kim. Kim sets the tone for his study of the Three Special Patrols on the very first page:

The rebellions of Myoch’ōng 妙清 and Chōng Chungbu 鄭仲夫 were no more than domestic rebellions, but the rebellion of the Three Special Patrols was, apart from being a complicated domestic incident, also a kind of resistance movement against foreign pressure. And the outcome of this rebellion was more intimately connected to the growth and stagnation of foreign powers than it influenced the domestic state of affairs. If we look once again at these three great rebellions in their shared coherence, then I believe that the self-awareness of the people of Koryō that expressed itself in the rebellion of Myoch’ōng also surfaced in the anti-Mongol ideology of Im Yōn 林衍 and Pae Chungson 裴仲孫. I also believe that the despotic military mentality which Chōng Chungbu *cum suis* gradually came to embrace gave direction to the Three Special Patrols. If we look at this connection in this way, it will become possible to regard the rebellion of the Three Special Patrols as a rebellion that came forth out of the combination of the rebellions of Myoch’ōng and Chōng Chungbu.<sup>107</sup>

Continuity in the historical tradition is one of the most important characteristics of the Korean history that Kim tries to establish. In this case the continuity is particularly significant because of the importance of the tradition in question, that of resistance against foreign aggression.

The first parts of “On the rebellion of the Three Special Patrols” are virtually identical to Ikeuchi’s “On the Three Special Patrols of Koryō.” Some of its chapters indeed seem to have been copied *verbatim* from Ikeuchi. It is no wonder, then, that Kim should refer to Ikeuchi, with whom he “agrees on the main points.”<sup>108</sup> Kim’s treatment of the subject is slightly more detailed, for example when he discusses the fighting tactics of the Three Special Patrols,

/comprehensive history of Korea] (Tokyo: Shinkōsha, 1944), pp.568–9.

<sup>106</sup> In the preface to *Tonghak-kwa Tongbangnan* [The Tonghak and the Tonghak rebellion] he says the following about his use of the usual designation “nan 亂” in the case of the Tonghak: “In this study I have called the Tonghak revolution of 1894 the Tonghak rebellion according to its current designation.” See Kim, *Tonghak-kwa Tongbangnan* (reprint of the earlier serialized ed.: Seoul: Taesōng Ch’ulp’ansa, 1947).

<sup>107</sup> See Kim, “Sambyōlch’o,” pt.1, p.2.

<sup>108</sup> See *ibid.*, pt.1, p.4, pp.15–16.



Figure 6

Detail of Kim Sanggi's study of the revolt of the Three Special Patrols. From Kim Sanggi, "Sambyŏlch'o-wa kŭ tŭi nan e ch'wi baya (3)," in *Chindan hakpo* 11, p. 1

but his conclusions on the formation of the Patrols are similar to those of Ikeuchi. Significant differences seem to be absent from the first two chapters of "On the Rebellion of the Three Special Patrols," but this changes when Kim discusses the period leading up to the rebellion. An indication of the direction his argument is going to take is furnished by his treatment of Im Yŏn, the military strongman who temporarily deposed King Wŏnjong and took charge of the struggle against the Mongols. Im has always been considered as a power-hungry usurper who did the Koreans more harm than good,<sup>109</sup> but in Kim's view he represented an important part of the Korean military heritage as well:

[...] The goal of the dethronement of Wŏnjong by Im Yŏn was the preservation of his political power and the repulsion of the Mongols (as I have already argued, these two goals cannot be seen as separate from each other); therefore, Im Yŏn must have prepared himself from the beginning for a confrontation with the Mongols.<sup>110</sup>

This incident [i.e., the dethronement of Wŏnjong] meant that he no longer recognized Wŏnjong, who had surrendered to the Mongols, as king. Im Yŏn's dethronement of Wŏnjong and his further plans can be seen as consistent; this is because for the struggle against the Mongols one national administration was needed.<sup>111</sup>

Im Yŏn, then, was not a mere despot eager to preserve his power. Although not unequivocally 'good,' he is not entirely 'bad' either. He is a patriot in a sense, albeit a despotic one, whose dethronement of the ruling king was consistent with his anti-Mongol strategies. The characterization of Im as a patriot/despot and as the leader of the anti-Mongol faction is important for Kim's argument. He sees Im's plans as the immediate preparation for the rebellion of the Three Special Patrols. In other words, the resistance against the Mongols was not a series of haphazard, individual undertakings, but rather the result of a distinct Korean will to win.<sup>112</sup> Korean resistance is not represented as a kind of monolithic, ever-present quality. It is something inherent in the Koreans, yet at the same time it is mingled with other motives, the instinct for the preservation of power being one of them. The traditional mentality of the military, who led the struggle, was another one:

Thanks to their traditional warrior mentality and the desire to protect their position and power, they persevered in their battle against the Mongols.<sup>113</sup>

<sup>109</sup> The *communis opinio* of both Japanese and Korean scholars was and is that Im Yŏn was a power-hungry despot; he is denied any motive other than trying to preserve his own power. See, for example, Pak Yongun 朴龍雲, *Koryŏ sbidae sa* [A history of the Koryŏ period] (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1988), pp. 426–8; Kuksa Py'ŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe, *Han'guksa* [The history of Korea] (Seoul: Kuksa Py'ŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe, 1994), vol. XX, pp. 211–62.

<sup>110</sup> See Kim, "Sambyŏlch'o," pt. II, p. 46.

<sup>111</sup> See *ibid.*, pt. III, p. 36.

<sup>112</sup> Kim repeatedly emphasizes continuity in the resistance against the Mongols, by stressing the fact that Pae Chungson, the leader of the Three Special Patrols, was a member of the Im faction. He states: "The dethronement of Wŏnjong and the enthronement of a new king by Im Yŏn was the prelude to the rebellion of the Three Special Patrols," and "[t]hat the Three Special Patrols did not obey the order to move the capital back to the

/mainland, rebelled, declared Marquis On to be the new king and set out for the islands in the South-East, was all was the result of the plans

/of Im Yŏn." See Kim, "Sambyŏlch'o," pt. I, p. 2, pt. II, pp. 44, 48, 58.

<sup>113</sup> See *ibid.*, pt. III, p. 74.

[...] The dethronement incident of Im Yŏn was caused by his opposition as a warrior to the conciliatory policies of the civil service. Would the rebellion of the Three Special Patrols, which broke out as a result of moving the capital to the mainland, not also have originated from such a mentality?<sup>114</sup>

<sup>114</sup> See *ibid.*, pt.II, p.43.

<sup>115</sup> See *ibid.*, pt.III, p.70.

Kim saw the rebellion of the Three Special Patrols as the historical heir of both the military regime and the nationalist, nativist rebellion of Myoch'ŏng. In this way the Three Special Patrols embody an important part of Korean history. Kim says as much when he concludes:

[...] The reasons for the emergence and development of the Three Special Patrols cannot be separated from the successive generations of military strongmen. This gave the Three Special Patrols a special character. Seen from the point of view of foreign relations, it was mainly the Three Special Patrols who continued the policy of anti-Mongol resistance of the successive generations of military leaders, through their appearance at exactly the time of the Mongol invasions. That is why the history of resistance in Koryŏ is the history of the Three Special Patrols.<sup>115</sup>

The Three Special Patrols as a symbol of Koryŏ resistance: this is essentially the *Leitmotiv* of Kim's study. The concept of resistance is not just an important historiographical theme in his oeuvre. No one with more than a fleeting knowledge of the predicament of the Koreans during the colonial period could fail to observe a certain similarity with Mongol times. Kim's analysis of the rebellion of the Three Special Patrols thus served two ends. On the one hand, he tried to create a history of resistance in Korea that formed an essential part of Korean history, so as to counter the claims of Japanese colonial historians. By doing so, he tried to give Korea back its autonomy. On the other hand, he provided his readers with a mirror in which the past was reflected in a way that was most reminiscent of the present. By legitimating this past, he indirectly legitimated resistance in the present as well.

The above analyses of the respective historical visions of Ikeuchi Hiroshi and Kim Sanggi show that their trust in historical objectivity was not justified. The influence of nationalism—both Japan's imperialistic nationalism and Korea's colonial nationalism—cannot be discounted. This is, of course, hardly surprising. A certain influence from nationalism was to be expected, since for both historians the nationalist cause was inextricably tied to their historical research. Yet neither of them can simply be characterized as a colonial historian who bent, twisted and distorted the facts to his liking. Although more than a few historians on both sides were less than scrupulous when trying to prove their point, in the case of Ikeuchi and Kim the problem does not lie in the handling of their sources. The origin of their differences lies in the ends they set for themselves. A history of conflicts, formed under the pressure of continuous foreign invasions: that is roughly Ikeuchi's view of Korean history. This 'history formed under foreign pressure' denied Korea the status of

subject of its own history. Kim Sanggi tried to counter this vision by revising and reinterpreting Korean history using the concept of “resistance/revolt.” His reinterpretation of the *Primat der Außenpolitik* should be seen in the same light. The *Primat der Außenpolitik* as the *Primat des Außenhandels* does not essentially differ from the reinterpretation of ‘history formed under foreign pressure’ as a history of resistance and revolt.

### Conclusion

<sup>116</sup> See Günther Birtsch, *Die Nation als sittliche Idee: Der Nationalstaatsbegriff in Geschichtsschreibung und politischer Gedankenwelt Johan Gustav Droysens* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag Köln Graz, 1964), p.18. History as the well-spring of ethics was an idea well received by Shiratori, and history as the understanding of one’s own kind maybe even more so.

<sup>117</sup> Both Ranke and Shiratori were looking to construct “grand narratives” that would explain history. Shiratori was looking for the general trends (*taisei*) in history. Tanaka, *Japan’s Orient*, p.28.

<sup>118</sup> See Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, p.53.

History has often been understood as an example from which people learn. It is, as Johan Gustav Droysen put it, the “Gattungsbegriff und Quell der Sittlichkeit” (the understanding of one’s own sort and the wellspring of ethics)—or so it was conceived by the historians affiliated with Oriental History.<sup>116</sup> The institutional history of Oriental History is a good example of the importance that was attached to historiography by the state. One of the main characteristics of the Rankean methodology—the study of the particular—reflected itself in what had become the most important object of historical study, the particular nation state. The association of the Rankean methodology, the nation-state and the concept of historical objectivity goes back to Ranke himself, although his approach to the nation state was more relativistic than that of his successors often was. The heritage of Enlightenment thinking was still present, though, in the tendency to use the study of the particular to obtain knowledge about the universal.<sup>117</sup> The increasingly strong entanglement of nation and historiography made historiography a medium well suited to the expression of nationalism—both inward-looking as a consolidating and stabilizing force, and outward-looking as a legitimating force. For Oriental History, Japan’s territorial expansion (which ushered in the phase of colonialism) entailed the institutionalization it needed in order to develop further and achieve national and international significance. Legitimation for the narratives constructed by Oriental History was provided by a claim upon the concept of historical objectivity. This concept—ideally the description of historical facts “as they really happened”—was not realized in an ideal way. On one hand, the structure of Oriental History consisted of the adopted Rankean methodology, often simplified to the equation of factual research with historical objectivity (this factual research was accompanied by the establishment of archives—which established what was fact and what was not—and academic journals).<sup>118</sup> On the other hand, the structure of Oriental History was formed by its object, ‘the Orient,’ and the *modus interpretandi* that belonged to it. This meant that the mode of interpretation was inextricably tied to the object of interpretation. Within ‘the Orient,’ the histories of China, Korea, and Manchuria were not treated on a par with that of Japan. There was no equal application of the standards of objectivity. This inequality in the mode of interpretation formed specific sets of interpretative possibilities tied

to specific regions. The theories of stagnation, heterodoxy and so forth are the results of these interpretative schemes. The status of Japan as a subject of history and of non-Japan as an object of history was also caused by these interpretative schemes.

Among Japanese academicians, considerable differences in individual interpretation existed, but Oriental History as a structure never came under attack.<sup>119</sup> The absence of any structural discussion led to a situation where Oriental History came to be associated with historical objectivity, although there is no compelling logical reason for this to have happened. Manchu-Korean History, its derivative and less subtle version, carried both the claim to historical objectivity and the tie between mode of interpretation and object of interpretation to extremes. Manchu-Korean History—in fact the academicization of Japanese colonial policy—was institutionally tied to the Japanese state; its narrative was officially sanctioned in the form of the Korean History Compilation Society. Its goals can be located in the acquiring of useful knowledge about the colonies, the construction of a usable past for the Japanese<sup>120</sup> and the construction of usable pasts for the colonies. In other words, Manchu-Korean History tried to prove the rule of colonial difference. As a complement to Oriental History in terms of providing a usable and understandable past to Japan's colonies, Manchu-Korean History in a sense annexed the past and the present of the colonies.

The reactions of Korean historians to the Japanese version of Korean history were not uniform. Just as Oriental History enjoyed considerable authority—but not hegemony—in Japan, the history of Korean historiography encompasses several (often simultaneous) schools of historiography. The historiography that entered the direct debate with the Japanese textual-critical tradition was at the same time the historiography that was most greatly influenced by it. The Korean textual-critical tradition went through a number of clearly distinguishable phases. The first phase—represented by, amongst others, Ch'oe Namsŏn—was strongly derivative of the Japanese version. The copying of the structure of Oriental History by Ch'oe resulted in a substantially negative view of Korean history; the Koreanization of this essentially Japanese historiography through the replacement of the central concepts with Korean equivalents could not obscure the fact that Ch'oe's version could not stand on its own two feet.<sup>121</sup>

The second phase in the development of the textual-critical tradition was reached during the era of cultural nationalism. Mainly represented by the historians of the CAA, this second phase was characterized by a more flexible attitude towards Korean culture and history. It relied heavily on the structure of Oriental History, manifested more consistently than in Ch'oe's work. The historians of the CAA, all professionally trained historians (either in Japan or at the Imperial Japanese University in Keijō (Seoul)), established a platform for the academic discussion of Korean history, the *Chindan hakpo*. The extreme

<sup>119</sup> Goi's book is in fact a charge leveled at what he sees as the heirs of pre-war Oriental History. He asserts that *tōyōshigaku* had not been criticized structurally; the main difference from pre-war Japan was simply the absence of imperialistic language and such. See Goi, *Kindai Nihon*; Tanaka, *Japan's Orient*, p.27.

<sup>120</sup> The need for the construction of a "useful past" was held in common with every colonial power. See, for example, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp.21, 67.

<sup>121</sup> According to Han Yōngu, "The essence of this *Chosŏnbak* [Korean studies] was not so much in the repairing of trust in the history of the nation or in the cultivation of a consciousness of independence, but rather originated from the idea that he (Ch'oe) would have to get the upper hand in the discussion with the Japanese and (the essence of the *Chosŏnbak*) was in fact nothing more than the expression of his plans to let Oriental History develop in this direction." See Han, *Han'guk minjokchu'ui yŏksabak*, p.17.

<sup>122</sup> This did not mean that the CAA historians did not publish in Japanese as well. Yi Pyōngdo, for instance, continued to publish in Japanese in the *Seikyū gakusō*, the academic historical journal of the Imperial University of Keijō. Although different phases can be distinguished, their exact boundaries are blurred.

<sup>123</sup> See Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, p.27.

imitation—or the extreme imitative reversal—of Japanese concepts of the first phase gave way to a one-sided debate with Japanese historians ('one-sided' because though the Koreans might react to Japanese historical studies, the reverse was not necessarily true). In this debate, Korean historians tried to revise Korean history by laying emphasis on aspects that were different from those that had been studied by Japanese scholars. The CAA historians knew that an academic discourse published in Korean would not be read by the Japanese. Still, they chose Korean as a medium as if to underscore their rightful re-appropriation of their language and culture. It was deemed more important to "lay a claim to the inner domain of culture" than to adapt to the Japanese.<sup>122</sup> These developments in Korean historiography—which tended to become more cultural—laid the foundation for the third phase, the New Nationalist History (*shinminjokchuūi yōksabak* 新民族主義歴史學) of Son Chint'ae. The cultural nationalists' gradualism and evasive resistance made it possible for the CAA historians to formulate their answer to Manchu-Korean History without lapsing into a negative historiography. It also meant that they had to balance carefully on the line between moderate resistance and moderate collaboration. Their attempt to keep a balance on this thin line has often been mistaken for collaboration; but as the above analysis has shown, this view is naïve. As testified by the goals the CAA historians had set themselves and their working methods, they were committed to the nationalist cause, but not in a way that was approved of by other nationalist groups.

The development of Korean textual-critical historiography can be characterized as a struggle to conquer the concept of historical objectivity, the greatest attraction and at the same time the most feared weapon of Japanese historiography. Korean historians first copied it, then learned how to deal with it; finally they officially relegated it to second place with the development of New Nationalist History. The close tie between Rankean methodology and Oriental History had become historically conditioned as the boundaries between historical objectivity as a means and historical objectivity as legitimation were obscured. This close connection was hard to break, which led some Korean historians to adopt the structure of Oriental History.

The connection is easily observed in the historical thought of Ikeuchi Hiroshi. Ikeuchi's historical objectivity does not go beyond the presumed objectivity that Oriental History allowed within its structure. Michel-Rolph Trouillot has analyzed how "objective" history is written, and concludes that there are four distinguishable levels. The first is the moment of fact creation ('which part of history is worth looking into?'), the second is the moment of fact assembly (the creation of archives such as the *Compendium of Japanese historical sources* (Dai Nippon shiryō 大日本史料), the third one is the moment of fact retrieval (the selection of source materials), and at the end comes the moment of retrospective significance (interpretation of the facts).<sup>123</sup> Ikeuchi was only active at the last two levels. Oriental History as a structure pre-empted the first two; it had been built as a historical narrative at the first




two levels and was thus able to exercise enormous influence on its historians. The *a priori* assumptions identified in Ikeuchi's historical studies which make his history of conflicts an advocate of the rule of colonial difference are located on the two first levels; his objectivity was located on the last two.

Kim Sanggi shows the same connection between methodology and object of research. As indicated in his own words—he was trying to ‘undo’ the distortions of historical facts by Japanese historians—he did not attack Oriental History structurally. He merely sought to refute wrong interpretations within the Oriental History framework. He adopted the Rankean methodology, the same method of reasoning, and the same object of research, but put the emphasis on different *foci*. He did this creatively, thus indirectly countering the ‘history formed under foreign pressure’ approach with his concept of ‘resistance/revolt.’ Kim personified the ambiguity of his generation as he reached the moment of manoeuvre, the most crucial moment that demands the greatest amount of creativity, the moment in which the claim on the inner domain of the native culture is made *vis-à-vis* the colonizer. He worked in a clear replica of the structure of Oriental History, but shared the goals of Korean nationalism. It becomes possible, therefore, to say that Oriental History by way of Manchu-Korean History gave rise to Korean textual historiography. The study of the Three Special Patrols is very illuminating in this respect. It exemplifies the differences and similarities between Ikeuchi and Kim as no other study does. The methodology and its practical application were virtually the same, but the starting points and ends differed greatly. For Ikeuchi the manifestations of resistance were the prologue to the Mongol invasions of Japan, while for Kim they constituted an important moment of resistance against foreign invaders. Their respective conclusions can be traced directly back to the themes that characterize their historical writings. Given the limiting structure of Oriental History and its derivative Korean version, both Kim and Ikeuchi achieved a high degree of objectivity in their historical scholarship, but their objective scholarship was tied to the nation. In effect, they contested the validity of the other's objectivity. Ikeuchi's *A New Study of the Mongol Invasions* (Genkō no shinkenkyū) clearly aims at describing the Mongol invasions “as they actually happened.” Kim's *History of Koryŏ* (Koryŏ shidae sa 高麗時代史) has a similar purpose: in this detailed history of the Koryŏ period he states that it is his purpose to give an objective view of this period.<sup>124</sup> Providing that the historian was competent, he was able “to let the facts speak for themselves.”

“History is the struggle between us and those who are not us”: Shin Ch'aeho's famous statement also applies to historiography. Historiography was often the battleground for the struggles between “us” and “those who

**Figure 7**

*The revised edition of Kim Sanggi's comprehensive history of Koryŏ. It is still widely used because of the many source materials in it that are quoted verbatim. Cover of Kim Sanggi, Koryŏ shidae sa (Seoul: Tongguk Munhwasa, 1961)*



<sup>124</sup> He states: “In this study I have tried to present the historical facts chronologically, so the reader can understand the concrete historical facts instead of abstract historical theories. Concerning the use of the sources I have also tried to avoid subjective choices and to select sources as *broadly as possible in order to leave criticism and understanding with regard to the sources to the reader.*” See Kim, *Koryŏ shidae sa* (Seoul: Tongguk Munhwasa, 1961), Introduction.

are not us.” And objectivity was the weapon both sides claimed to wield. But the concept of “us” does not go together well with the notion of objectivity. Japanese and Korean historiography tried to accommodate the often contradictory demands of nationalism and objectivity, which resulted in the creation of a subjective structure in which room was made for a kind of presumed objectivity that did not actually go beyond a form of neutrality within a larger structure. This was done at the macro-level as well as the micro-level of Ikeuchi and Kim. Looked at from this perspective, the two were rigid textual-critical historians who excelled in objective research.

The phased development of the textual-critical tradition in Korea clearly shows its roots in the nationalist discourse. It is not possible to maintain that the quest for objective historiography on the part of the historians of the CAA replaced their nationalist efforts. On the contrary, as has been shown, the pursuit of objectivity was to be used for the sake of the nationalist cause. The distinct trait of the CAA is that its historians were not prepared to simply surrender their pursuit of objectivity to the nationalist cause. Their research is permeated with a continuous sense of striving for objectivity, though not at the cost of their partisanship. An uneasy compromise was reached in which nationalist motives formed an important basis; and it was upon this basis that objectivity operated. The derivative nature of Korean textual-critical historiography gave the CAA its ambivalence. On one hand, it made them more intimate with Japanese academia than might have been desirable; on the other, the mere act of adopting the Japanese model in itself shows what the CAA historians ultimately had in mind.

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