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Cover calligraphy Yan Zhenqing 顏真卿, Tang calligrapher and statesman

Cover illustration Okinawan *Seasar* (© photograph by Ken Yonetani 米谷建)

Lions have never been found on Okinawa, and the custom of revering them as ‘king of the beasts’ and symbols of protection is said to have originated in ancient Persia. By the time this custom reached Okinawa via China in the fourteenth or fifteenth century, the stone figures bore less and less resemblance to real lions. Early Chinese recordings of a stone ‘lion-dog’ figure placed within a shrine of the Ryukyu Kingdom (currently Okinawa) date back to 1683. From the late seventeenth century, influenced by Chinese conceptions of *feng shui* 風水, the lion-like symbols or ‘seasar’ (シーサー, also spelt *shiisaa* or *seesar*) became known for their powers of protection against fire, and could be found in front of the gates of temples or castles, at entrances to the tombs of noble families, and at the entrances of villages or sacred shrines. Today, seasars are placed to ward off any kind of evil spirit, and many different lion-like forms made not only from stone, but from clay, concrete and other materials, with varied colours and styles, may be seen on roofs, gates and at entrances to buildings across the Okinawan archipelago. (—*Julia Yonetani*)

ON THE BATTLEFIELD OF MABUNI: STRUGGLES OVER PEACE AND THE PAST IN CONTEMPORARY OKINAWA

 Julia Yonetani

“It was a struggle over history in multiple ways, with heated passions,
with feverish polemics To all history clearly mattered.
The question was, who would shape it?”

—Barton J. Bernstein, Afterword, *Judgment at the Smithsonian* (1995)

“As I stand in the sun, the voices locked in my skull from the dark
museum room burst out and release their agony into the air. In Mabuni,
the wind over the dazzling sea is heavy with the shrieks of the dying.”

—Norma Field, *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor* (1991)

Like the blistering summer sun, the official day for consoling the spirits of the war dead comes early to the archipelago of Okinawa, Japan’s southernmost prefecture. On 23 June 1999, while the rest of Japan (except for Hokkaido) was still ensconced in a particularly relentless rainy season, the recently elected Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, Inamine Keiichi 稲嶺恵一, attended ceremonies for the fifty-fourth anniversary of the Battle of Okinawa. On this day each year, a prefectural public holiday known as *Irei no Hi* 慰霊の日, or the Day for Consoling the Spirits, commemorations are held at the National Peace Memorial Park (沖縄戦跡国定公園) in Mabuni 摩文仁. Located at the southern tip of Okinawa’s main island, Mabuni Hill, or Hill 89 as it was referred to by the US military, was the scene of the last organized ground resistance by Japanese forces during World War II. On 25 June 1945, the bodies of Lieut.-Gen. Ushijima Mitsuru 牛島満, Commander of the Japanese 32nd Army stationed on Okinawa, and his Chief of Staff Lieut.-Gen. Chō Isamu 長勇 were found in a shallow grave hidden within Mabuni’s cliffs.

This article is an adaptation of “Peace wars: the politics of presenting the past in contemporary Okinawa,” Working Paper, Japan Policy Research Institute, February 2000 (available at <<http://www.jpri.org>>). I would like to thank Lewis Mayo, Maxine McArthur, Sigrid Hofmeister, Mark Selden, Hiyane Teruo, Koji Taira, Brian Victoria, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Geremie Barmé, Chalmers Johnson and Gavan McCormack for their invaluable suggestions and encouragement in the course of writing this paper, and Kurihara Tatsuo for generously contributing the photograph reproduced in Figure 5. All remaining deficiencies are entirely my own.

¹ Masahide Ōta, *This was the battle of Okinawa* (Naha: Naha Publishing, 1981), pp.76–8.

² The full text of Inamine's speech, "Fusen no inori, chikaiarata" [A renewed oath and prayer against war], is published in *Okinawa Taimusu 沖縄タイムス* [Okinawa Times] (hereafter *OT*), Evening Edition, 23 June 1999 (available at <www.okinawatimes.co.jp>).

³ As pointed out by Lisa Yoneyama in the context of Hiroshima in *Hiroshima traces: time, space and the dialectics of memory* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1999).

⁴ For a summary of competing discourses of peace in post-war Japan, see John W. Dower, "Peace and democracy in two systems: external policy and internal conflict," in *Postwar Japan as history*, ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1993).

⁵ Literally, Documentation Center for Reversing Peace, the Japanese directly connotes neither 'memorial' nor 'museum'.

⁶ From August to October 1999, over four hundred news articles and numerous editorials concerning the museum displays appeared in the two main Okinawan newspapers, *Okinawa Times* and *Ryūkyū Shinbō 琉球新報*. For a comprehensive list of all articles and editorials relating to the two museums published in local newspapers, see *Rekishi no shinjitsu wa yugametewa naranai* [Historical truths cannot be twisted], a special report on the peace museum issue edited by the Okinawa Prefecture History Teachers Association, *Rekishi to jissen* 20 (Dec. 1999). Significantly, the dispute was accorded very little notice in the mainland Japanese press, the exception being the weekly magazine *Shūkan kinyōbi* [Friday weekly], which featured several articles on the peace memorial controversy in conjunction with the Futenma Base relocation issue. These included Arasaki Moriteru, "Okinawa, Futenma kichi iten—futatabi 'Nago e' ni Okinawa no hangeki ga hajimatta" [The relocation of Futenma base, Okinawa: Okinawa's counterattack against relocation to Nago begins once more], *Shūkan kinyōbi*, no.287 (15 Oct. 1999), pp.29–33, and "Konshū no kono hitokoto" [This week's word], *ibid.*, no.283 (17 Sept. 1999), p.5.

They had committed suicide two days earlier on 23 June, since designated the Day for Consoling the Spirits.¹

On this day in 1999, in a ceremonial speech commemorating the war, Governor Inamine issued a "Declaration of Peace for the Twenty-first Century" in which he reaffirmed Okinawa's commitment to peace, and declared that the last G-8 Summit of the millennium would be of "profound historical significance." This gathering of heads of state was subsequently held in the small northern Okinawa town of Nago 名護 on 21–23 July 2000. The summit, Inamine emphasized, would provide an opportunity to convey to the world "Okinawa's spirit" (沖縄の心), and the Okinawan commitment to achieve "step by step ... everlasting world peace."²

Yet within these apparently transparent references to "peace" lie highly divergent memories, and motivations for remembrance.³ Contested ideologies of war and peace—as dialogues with the past and as visions of the future—have haunted postwar Japan.⁴ In Okinawa, where close to one-third of the local population were killed in the only ground war between US and Japanese forces fought on Japanese soil, the wounds of war remain engraved on the landscape. They also take the form of a continued large-scale US military presence on the islands, with close to twenty per cent of the main island occupied by US bases (amounting to over seventy per cent of the existing US military facilities in Japan). The promulgation of peace, as a "lesson of history" learnt through the horrors of war, is an essential creed of the anti-base movement in Okinawa. Nowhere are the tensions caused by Japan's dependence on and complicity with US-driven global military strategies and market forces as conspicuous, nor are the contradictions within the Japanese nationalist historical narrative as acute, as in this small southern archipelago. Less than two months after Inamine's declaration and barely six months since he took office, his administration found itself embroiled in a serious controversy over how Okinawa's desire for peace and its martial past should be represented. The echoes of the dispute reverberated throughout the archipelago.

The controversy arose over two different "peace memorial museums" (平和祈念資料館)⁵ recently constructed in Okinawa: the Yaeyama Peace Memorial Museum (八重山平和祈念資料館), which opened in May 1999 on the southern island of Ishigaki 石垣, and the New Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum (新沖縄県立平和祈念資料館), which finally opened one month later than scheduled on 1 April 2000 in the Peace Memorial Park, Mabuni. From August to October, 1999, a fierce political dispute arose over displays in the two museums. The Prefectural Government's alterations to displays at Yaeyama without the approval of the committee overseeing the project served to highlight surreptitious attempts to change the content of exhibits at Mabuni. The extent of attempted changes gradually became known through extensive reporting in the local press.⁶

Earlier disputes in both Japan and the US over museum exhibits planned to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II

demonstrated the difficulties involved in reflecting on the historical implications of war in a public setting. Ultimately, absences from the exhibit displaying the shiny revamped body of the *Enola Gay* at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum (NASM) in Washington, and within the polished glass showcases of Tokyo's Showa Museum (昭和記念資料館) bore testimony to missing historical complexities.⁷ Since 1995, peace museums have increasingly become the target of criticism and at times outright intimidation from a growing "historical revisionist" movement in Japan. In 1996, plans to include exhibits on Japanese military aggression in Asia within the Nagasaki Atom Bomb Museum (長崎原爆資料館) were fiercely denounced by the Nagasaki City branch of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other right-wing and nationalist groups. As a result, several hundred revisions of content were made following the museum's reopening. Similar campaigns, led by right-wing groups and supported by the LDP and conservative sections of the press, have been launched against the Sakai City Peace and Human Rights Museum (堺市平和と人権資料館), and the Osaka International Peace Center (大阪国際平和センター).⁸ In October 1996, an LDP Parliamentary Committee report on the exhibit content of local peace museums, ordered by the then Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō 橋本龍太郎, criticized the Sakai and Osaka sites, the original Okinawa Prefectural Peace Museum at Mabuni, and various other local museums as promoting a "biased ideology."⁹ It was precisely within this climate that attempted changes to the new Yaeyama and Mabuni museum exhibits took place.

The end of 1998 in Okinawa saw the anti-base pro-local autonomy administration of former Governor Ōta Masahide 大田昌秀 replaced by LDP-aligned Governor Inamine. After Inamine's election, the central government pledged to renew negotiations over large-scale economic stimulus packages for Japan's poorest prefecture. In return, Inamine was put under intense pressure to secure a site for the building of a new controversial US military base to take over the functions of the US Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma 普天間.¹⁰ The museum controversy unfolded just as Inamine's administration stepped up its campaign to ostracize anti-base activists and secure Henoko 辺野古 village in the north-east of Nago as the proposed site for the base. Journalists, intellectuals, war survivors, anti-base peace groups, and museum committee members mobilized in opposition to the prefectural administration, and struggles over history, the war, memory, and the US bases became ever more intertwined. The political stakes involved in representations of peace and the past seemed only to increase with the summer heat, as a

/American and Japanese cultural conflicts in the nuclear age (New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), which also includes an article by Ellen H. Hammond on the Tokyo memorial, "Commemoration controversies: the war, the peace, and democracy in Japan." See also Gavan McCormack, "Apologies and apologies," in *1945 War and peace in the Pacific*, ed. Peter Dennis (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1999), and Mike Wallace, "The Battle of the Enola Gay," *Radical Historians Newsletter* 72 (May 1995): 1–32. Tanaka Nobumasa reviews the final "Shōwakan" museum in "Arainagasareta 'sensō to heiwa'—kokuritsu 'Shōwakan' no sōdai na muda" [The 'war and peace' that was erased from view: the great waste of the 'Shōwakan' Museum], also featuring an interview with the head curator, *Sbūkankin'yōbi*, no.266 (14 May 1999), pp.22–5. For an early critique of US museums, see Warren Leon and Roy Rosenzweig, eds, *History museums in the United States—a critical assessment* (Urbana and Chicago, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1989).

⁸ At Sakai Museum, a planned display of history textbooks from various Asian countries was cancelled in 1997. The Committee for Correcting Biased War Documents (戦争資料の偏向を正す会), formed in Osaka in 1997, actively pursued its campaign by utilizing facilities at the Osaka Peace Center to hold a conference denying the Nanking Massacre in January 2000.

⁹ This movement is documented in Ueyama Kazuo, "Heiwa kinen shiryōkan mondai to zenkokuteki na kagai tenji e no kogeki no ugoki" [The Peace Museum controversy and recent attacks against critical exhibits throughout Japan], *Keishi kaji* 25 (Dec. 1999): 48–50; Ishihara Masaie, "Shin Okinawa Heiwa Shiryōkan tenji naiyō henkō no keii to mondaiten" [The alteration of the exhibit content at the New Okinawa Peace Museum: issues and process], *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 722 (Feb. 2000): 43–7; Nakakita Ryūtarō, "Heiwa hakubutsukan e no kōgeki o ika ni hanekaesu ka" [How can the attack on peace museums be countered?], *Sekai* 674 (May 2000): 231–5; and Okinawa Prefecture History Teachers Association, *Rekishu no shinjitsu wa yugame-tewa naranai*.

¹⁰ Negotiations over the relocation of Futenma had earlier reached a stalemate after Ōta rejected Tokyo's proposals to build a new offshore base in the prefecture.

⁷ For an analysis of the different issues raised by these two disputes, see Yui Daizaburō, *Nichibei sensōkan no sōkoku* [Discrepancies in the perception of war between the US and Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1995). There have been a number of books published on the Smithsonian dispute, including Philip Nobile,

/ed., *Judgment at the Smithsonian—the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki* (New York: Marlow, 1995); Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt, *History wars: the Enola Gay and other battles for the American past* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996); and Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds, *Living with the bomb—*

battle of a different kind began to rage over the cliffs of Mabuni. The conjunction of historical and political struggles within the ensuing dispute had serious implications for both the future of democratic processes in Japan, as well as for Okinawa's search for local political, historical, cultural, and economic autonomy. History was in the making. Who would shape it?

Constructing Peace and Recollecting War in Okinawa

¹¹ Hein and Selden, *Living with the bomb*, Introduction. As sites by which the nation may be remembered and authenticated, they also contribute to naturalizing the state of nationhood in the landscape. See Marshall Johnson, "Making time: historic preservation and the space of nationality," *Positions* 2.2 (Fall 1994): 177–249.

¹² A forgotten maze of tunnels remains under the reconstructed Shuri Castle 首里城, a remnant of the original structure's final purpose as the headquarters for the Japanese army during the war. South of Naha, in the half-concealed "Abuchiragama" caves, where some civilians and Japanese soldiers hid for several months after the end of the war, piles of bones, broken pots and decaying medicine bottles lie beside recently-placed offerings to the spirits. This contrasts with the nearby bustling car park of the Himeyuri Monument, erected in honour of conscripted schoolgirls who were killed in service. See Arasaki Moriteru et al., eds, *Kankō kōsu de nai Okinawa* [Okinawa off the tourist track], revised ed. (Tokyo: Kōbunkan, 1996), pp.129–31.

¹³ Ōta, *This was the battle of Okinawa*.

¹⁴ Many remains were taken from perhaps the first monument and burial site created to console the spirits of the war dead, Konpaku no Tō 魂魄の塔, completed in February 1946, south of the East gate of the Himeyuri Monument. Before removal, the remains of up to 40,000 were said to be buried here. Relatives still pay respects and place spiritual offerings at this original burial place (Arasaki et al., *Kankō kōsu de nai Okinawa*, pp.130–1).

¹⁵ Ōta Masahide, *Okinawa no ketsudan* [Okinawa's decision] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 2000), p.144.

Museums and memorials, as Laura Hein and Mark Selden remind us, are major organs of the state "dedicated to the instruction and edification of the public"¹¹ that have served as a means to control the act of commemoration. Yet as public spaces involved in the reproduction of memory, they remain inherently contentious. This is nowhere more true than in Okinawa, which in its tumultuous modern history maintained an unequal status within Japan for decades after the forceful abolishment of the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1879, and following the war was placed under US forces until 1972. Across the landscape Ryukyu/Okinawan and Japanese histories converge and compete, and the grim scenes of decaying remains in half-concealed caves contrast starkly with the glittering monuments dedicated to the heroic and noble spirits of war.¹² On the main island, the site of the most protracted fighting during the Battle of Okinawa, it is perhaps least of all the dead who are at rest—and in the National Peace Memorial Park at Mabuni competing narratives speak in their name.

Mabuni is a rugged coral ridge which rises some 300 feet above the water's edge on one side, boasting extensive views over hills to the west and the sea below.¹³ The memorial park spreads across the ridge, and contains over forty separate monuments. The Battle of Okinawa War Dead National Cemetery (国立沖縄戦没者墓苑), where remains from various local tombs have been gathered since reversion, lies at the top of the park above the Mabuni Hill of Peace (平和の丘).¹⁴ Across both sides of the cemetery's Sacred Path (霊城園路), elaborate stone memorials commemorate the war dead of each prefecture. Above, at the summit of the hill, stands the memorial Reimei no Tō 黎明之塔, or Break of Dawn Monument, built in honour of Lieut.-Gen. Ushijima and his Chief of Staff Lieut.-Gen. Chō. It is said that the monument's shape was envisaged to evoke *harakiri* (*seppuku* 切腹), the traditional Japanese form of suicide, and its name, 'Break of Dawn', was designated by the late Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru 吉田茂.¹⁵

The cemetery has been severely criticized in Okinawa for glorifying war and adulating Japanese militarism,¹⁶ and it was precisely as a reaction against this trend that Okinawa's former Governor Ōta Masahide vowed to build a monument "unlike any previous one" within the park's grounds.¹⁷ The massive Heiwa no Ishiji 平和の礎, or Cornerstone of Peace, was constructed for the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Battle

of Okinawa in 1995. The Cornerstone, entitled “Everlasting Waves of Peace,”¹⁸ is composed of concentric arcs of wave-like black granite walls on which are engraved the names of the war dead.¹⁹ The collection of names marks the first time a large-scale investigation of the war dead has been carried out on the island.

The title of the project, “Heiwa no Ishiji,” draws attention to the unique Okinawan culture and identity by the use of the distinct Okinawan pronunciation of the Chinese character for ‘cornerstone’ (literally ‘foundation’ 礎—that is, ‘*ishiji*’ instead of the Japanese ‘*ishizue*’). The decision not to employ the Japanese imperial calendar nor play the anthem “Kimigayo” 君が代 at the official opening ceremony indicates a refusal to sanction symbols of Japanese imperialism. The commemoration date inscribed on the monument is 23 June 1995, yet the names engraved on the Cornerstone’s walls also extend to all those who died of war-related afflictions within a year of 7 September 1945—in tacit recognition of the fact that for many the Battle of Okinawa did not end with the suicide of Lieut.-Gen. Ushijima.²⁰

A unique characteristic of the memorial is its gesture towards memorializing all war casualties, regardless of nationality or status as combatant or civilian.²¹ This is in line with Ōta’s perception of Okinawan identity as detailed in his numerous academic works. Citing Okinawa’s desire for peace, Ōta directly challenges the Japanese imperial army, the US military presence in Okinawa, and prevailing official notions of national security as in any way providing protection for the people. “We often hear,” wrote Ōta in his book *Okinawa—War and Peace*, “outspoken proponents of the theory of ‘autonomous defence’ (*jishu bōei* 自主防衛), promoting the necessity of increases in defense powers in order to protect Japan’s ‘liberal society’ from outside enemies. However if war became imminent, and a state of emergency were declared, judging by the experiences of Okinawa one can only be dubious

昭 the issue of whether or not 23 June is designated as the day of remembrance is no less than one of “whether war is to be viewed from the perspective of the ‘Emperor’s military’, or fully examined from the viewpoint of the people” (“Okinawa-sen kenkyū no nijūnen” [Twenty years of research on the Battle of Okinawa], Okinawa Prefecture History Teachers Association, *Rekisbi no shinjitsu wa yugametewa yaranai*, p.7).

²¹ The site and its aims are set out in both English and Japanese on the ‘Cornerstone of Peace’ site at <www.pref.okinawa.jp/ishiji.html>.

¹⁶ Arasaki et al., *Kankō kōsudenai Okinawa*, in particular pp.110-15.

¹⁷ Ōta, *Okinawa no ketsudan*, pp.144-8.

¹⁸ Initial conceptions for the fiftieth anniversary memorial were formed as early as May 1991, and in September 1993 the then Governor Ōta Masahide announced a Cornerstone of Peace Design Competition, which attracted 274 entrants in total.

¹⁹ See George Figal, “Historical sense and commemorative sensibility at Okinawa’s Cornerstone of Peace,” *Positions* 5.3 (Winter 1997): 748.

²⁰ For historian Aniya Masaaki 安仁屋政

Figure 1

Reimei no Tō, located at the summit of Mabuni Hill, National Peace Memorial Park, Itoman City 糸満市, Okinawa
(© photograph by Ken Yonetani 米谷建)



²² Ōta Masahide, *Okinawa sensō to beiwa* (Tokyo: Asahi Bunko, 1996), p.24.

²³ Ōta Masahide, *Okinawa beiwa no ishiji* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1996), p.25.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.ii.

²⁵ Muratsubaki Yoshinobu, "Okinawa-sen no 'kioku' to aratana 'shima-gurumi' tōsō" [The 'memory' of the Battle of Okinawa and a new 'island-wide struggle'], *Impaction* 95 (1996): 33.

²⁶ "Message to the People" issued by both the Japanese Prime Minister and US President Bill Clinton, "Meeting the challenges of the 21st century," *Japan Times*, 18 April 1996, as originally laid out in the EASR (US Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region) report released by the US Defense Department on 27 February 1995. This report confirmed that the US would maintain service members deployed in the region at approximately the current level of 100,000.

²⁷ Ernest Renan, "What is a nation?" in Homi K. Bhabha, *Nation and narration* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), p.19.

²⁸ Prasenjit Duara, "Historicizing national identity, or who imagines what and when," in *Becoming national—a reader*, ed. Geoff Eley and Grigor Suny (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.168.

²⁹ The Cornerstone of Peace has similarities with the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, both in relation to design conception (the engraving of names of war dead onto the memorial stone), and as an ambiguous commemorative space. Albert Boime does not classify the Vietnam Memorial as a "national icon" but rather cites it as possessing a "conspicuous lack of patriotic symbols." He asserts: "The Vietnam Memorial thus grows out of a publicly contested history and was from the outset a highly politicized controversy. Its aesthetic and political ambiguity is singularly demonstrated in the failure of President Clinton to use it as a staging platform for propaganda on Memorial Day 1993 when he was persistently heckled for having avoided the draft during the Vietnam era." See Boime, *The unveiling of the national icons—a plea for patriotic iconoclasm in a nationalistic era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.13.

as to the means by which such a questionable freedom would be enforced on the people."²²

Ōta himself was enlisted at the age of nineteen as a military messenger in the local Okinawan Imperial Infantry of Blood and Iron (鉄血勤皇師範隊) student army, one day before the US military landed on the shores of Yomitan village 読谷村 in central Okinawa on 1 April 1945. After the 32nd Army was forced to withdraw from its headquarters at Shuri 首里, he too headed south towards the caves of Mabuni. Following the defeat of the last organized Japanese resistance, Ōta recounts how he was almost killed by an armed Japanese soldier who initially suspected him of being a "local spy." Injured and near-starving, Ōta spent close to three months hiding in the cliffs of Mabuni, dodging snipers and the US military onslaught while scavenging leftover supplies from US soldiers. Of his experience Ōta asserts, "on the battlefield of Mabuni, what I saw around me was in every respect completely incongruous with such righteous causes (of the war), a scene of nothing but carnage of the worst kind, where people literally became less than human."²³

In his book of the same title, the then Governor Ōta described the construction of the Cornerstone of Peace as "the largest event which took place to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the war." Furthermore, he continued, "it would not be an exaggeration to say that the motivation which led to the building of this 'Cornerstone of Peace' has also become the basis for the people of Okinawa devoting heart and soul, night and day, to solving the military base issue."²⁴ In an incisive article questioning the connections between memories of the Battle of Okinawa and the upsurge of protest and anti-base sentiment in Okinawa in late 1995, Muratsubaki Yoshinobu 村椿嘉信 similarly states that "the fact that the 'Cornerstone of Peace' was constructed with the support and participation of many local residents is vital. To the extent that the people of Okinawa do not forget the horrors of the war, and continue to question why it occurred, the 'Cornerstone of Peace' ... will remain an expression of anti-base, anti-Emperor-system, pro-peace causes."²⁵ On a more literal though perhaps unintended level, the Cornerstone also provided a competing dialogue to the "Japan-US security partnership." The latter was described by the then Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō and President Bill Clinton in their April 1996 joint security declaration as providing the "cornerstone of achieving common security objectives ... for the Asia-Pacific Region as we enter the 21st Century."²⁶

Ernest Renan remarked in 1982 that national memories and a sense of history, of "sharing, in the past, a glorious heritage and regrets, and of having, in the future, [a shared] programme to put into effect," are "essential conditions for being a people."²⁷ Yet, complicit with the formation of the idea of nation though it is, history may also provide an avenue through which those on the margins of a nation seek to organize a "counternarrative of mobilization."²⁸ In Okinawa and on the cliffs of Mabuni, tensions between competing pasts as envisioned in the Cornerstone of Peace and the Break of

Dawn Monument remain unresolved. At least in the eyes of Japanese government officials, the Cornerstone does not constitute as “sacred” a place to console and commemorate the heroic spirits of war as this shrine-memorial. On his visit to the park in August 1995, the Emperor laid a wreath of flowers at the Mabuni Hill site, while he merely “observed” (*goran ni narareta*) the Cornerstone. He is yet to attend the official ceremony held annually at Mabuni on the Day for Consoling the Spirits of the war dead.²⁹

Envisioning a New Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum

Yet, while it undoubtedly challenges a militaristic state-centric version of history, the Cornerstone of Peace also reveals many of the contradictions associated with the display of war and peace in Okinawa. In spite of the immense effort involved in gathering a total of 234,183 names of war dead by the time of the official opening, ‘absences’ from the monument spoke of the difficulties involved in trans-nationalizing the act of commemoration.³⁰ Many Korean names were hard to trace, and some Koreans resisted inclusion. Other people indicated that the act of inscribing all the names of the war dead without distinguishing combatant and civilian was a way of avoiding the question of responsibility for the war. From the perspective of some Okinawans, the inclusion of the names of Japanese combatants alongside those of civilians was inappropriate for a war in which the Imperial Army not only failed to provide protection, but committed atrocities against the local population.³¹ Still others suggested that not only the names of victims, but information on their cause of death, age, sex and place of origin should be included.


Many of these criticisms were placed before the Cornerstone planning committee in the process of gathering names for the memorial. In response, the committee explicitly stated that the Cornerstone should be viewed in conjunction with exhibit plans for the new Prefectural Peace Museum at Mabuni. While the Cornerstone was to remain a symbol dedicated to the war dead in the name of peace, the museum should display in detail the “realities of war,” and include information useful for the “study and research of peace.”³²

In conjunction with the planned

³⁰ See Figal, “Historical sense and commemorative sensibility,” pp.745–7.
³¹ Muratsubaki, “Okinawa-sen no ‘kioku’ to aratana ‘shima-gurumi’ tōsō,” p.34.
³² Cited in Ōshiro Masayasu, “Kenjū wa dare ni mukerareta ka” [At whom was the barrel of the gun aimed?], Okinawa Prefecture History Teachers Association, *Rekishhi no shinjitsu wa yugametewa naranai*, pp.34–5.

Figure 2

The names of Korean war dead engraved on the granite walls of the Cornerstone of Peace. Each year new names are added as surviving relatives are located and permission received (© photograph by Ken Yonetani)



³³ Special Edition *Tokushū* 1, “Heiwa gyōsei no suishin to kichi mondai nado no kaiketsu sokushin” [Promotion of the peace administration and a solution to the base issue], published on the Okinawa Prefecture website, <www.pref.okinawa.jp>.

³⁴ Ōshiro Masayasu, “Kenjū wa dare ni mukerareta ka”—also repeated in his presentation at the third ‘Symposium on the new Prefecture Peace Museum,’ held at Okinawa Prefecture Women’s Center, 28 April 2000.

³⁵ Kang Sang-jung and Yoshimi Shunya, “Konseika shakai e no chōsen” [The challenges of society in this century], *Sekai* 674 (May 2000): 165–8.

³⁶ Maezato Yasuyama, “1978 nen kaikan ni itaru made no keii” [The process towards (exhibit) revision in 1978], in Okinawa Prefecture History Teachers Association, *Rekishi no shinjitsu wa yugametewa narumai*, pp. 9–11.

³⁷ Guidebook to the original Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, *Heiwa e no sbōgen* [Testimony for peace], revised ed. (Naha: Okinawa Prefecture, 1991).

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.2–3. See also Shima Tsuyoshi, *Okinawa-sen o kangaeru* [Thinking about the Battle of Okinawa] (Naha: Okinawa Bunkō, 1983), esp. pp.148–56.

Okinawa Peace Research Center, the Cornerstone and the new Prefectural Museum constituted the major components of the Ōta administration’s “peace promotion” policy. All three projects were to be highly integrated, and were to progress hand-in-hand with the prefectural “action program” for the return of military-base land and for the curtailing of the US military presence in Okinawa.³³ The new museum, projected to be a massive nine times the size of the original and to cost an estimated 8 billion yen, was to be erected on a more prominent site than the original building, on the northern side of the Peace Memorial Park facing the Cornerstone. In the words of Ōshiro Masayasu 大城守保, a member of the museum planning committee, while the Cornerstone was “a place of prayer” and a “symbol” of peace, the museum was to be “a site of learning” wherein “the irrationality and brutality of war must be displayed.”³⁴

The original Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum was officially opened in 1975, ironically in comparable circumstances to the newly-constructed museum and in a similar atmosphere of fervent dissent. As with the new museum and the Year 2000 G-8 Summit, the original museum was rushed to completion in preparation for another highly-publicized international event, the Okinawa International Ocean Exposition of 1975. The first large official gathering since Okinawa’s reversion to Japan in 1972, the Expo excited much publicity and brought a windfall of mainland Japanese public-works investment in Okinawa, ironically resulting in unprecedented damage to surrounding coral reefs through sediment run-off.³⁵ In anticipation of the arrival of Prince Akihito 皇太子 and his wife for the event, plans for the Prefectural Museum progressed with little or no public debate or input from professional historians and researchers. Management was entrusted to the Okinawa Prefectural War Dead Memorial Committee (沖縄県戦没者慰霊奉賛会), a nationalist remembrance foundation.³⁶

The entrance to the resulting exhibit featured a large Rising Sun flag suspended from the museum’s wall, complete with a photo of Lieut.-Gen. Ushijima and a poem dedicated to his memory. Outraged, various peace groups and research committees protested to the prefectural assembly and relevant authorities. In this case the prefectural government was quick to respond. Over two years later, a completely revamped peace memorial was reopened to the public. The museum’s newly-established founding principles cited the Battle of Okinawa as “unique in that the number of civilian victims far outweighed military casualties.”³⁷ Some of these victims, the passage continued, were “driven into taking their own lives, some fell from starvation or malaria, and some were sacrificed at the hands of the Japanese army.” The people of Okinawa “experienced with their own flesh and blood the horrors and absurdity of war,” and this experience formed the basis of the “Okinawan spirit,” fostered in the post-war period while “opposing the oppressive control of the US military.”³⁸ The modified museum featured military documents, propaganda posters including a poster campaigning against “espionage activities” on Okinawa, photographs depicting the US military

onslaught, and a large darkened room devoted to the display of vivid oral testimonies of the war. Here, reading page after page of oral history records, one could learn, as Norma Field observes, that “even Japanese soldiers didn’t die shouting *banzai* to the emperor.”³⁹

Yet, even revamped, the original museum structure had serious limitations in terms of storage facilities and availability of space. Governor Ōta released an outline for the relocation of the Prefectural Museum in 1995 in which it was ensured that in the construction of the new facilities, the spirit of the original museum’s “Founding Principles” would be respected, and the “realities of the Battle of Okinawa” would be depicted “without omissions.” The new museum’s exhibits were also to include an account of “the historical process leading to war, including the histories of the countries of the Asia-Pacific, taking into account (Japan’s) responsibility for inflicting suffering on the countries of Asia.”⁴⁰ While the original museum concentrated on the battle for the main island of Okinawa, these displays would encompass the entire war in Asia and the Pacific, from the period of the “fifteen-years war” starting with the Manchurian Incident, and including material on the postwar US occupation. A supervisory planning committee comprised of thirteen historians was formed in September 1996, and the committee visited many war museums in Japan and abroad in the process of devising plans for the new museum. An extension of the oral history component of the displays was to constitute a vital part of the museum. By May of 1998, over 210 interviews or “testimonies” accounting experiences of the war had been recorded on video as part of the permanent exhibit.⁴¹

The official ceremony that initiated the construction of the new complex took place on 7 November 1997. This endorsement of the site, however, revealed the conjunction of competing claims to public space and a collective past. Before work on the four-story building, complete with an Okinawa-style red-tiled roof, had begun, the question of how “peace” should be construed had emerged as a contested issue. In a revealing editorial contribution to the *Okinawa Times*, a schoolteacher from mainland Japan criticized the inclusion of a Shinto purification ceremony for being a manifestation of “State Shinto” (*kokka shintō* 国家神道), which should be a target for criticism in a site that purportedly sought to document the “imperialization” (*kōminka* 皇民化) of education in pre-war Japan. Such a cere-


³⁹ Norma Field, *In the realm of a dying emperor—Japan at century’s end* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), p.85. Lisa Yoneyama adeptly analyses the intricacies of oral testimony in her masterwork *Hiroshima traces*, where she observes that “narrators’ testimonial practices often have the effect, whether intended or not, of unsettling the world that listeners accept as self evident” (p.115). For an analysis of the conjunction of oral testimony, history and politics see also the Popular Memory Group, “Popular memory: theory, politics, method,” in *Making histories: studies in history-writing and politics*, ed. Richard Johnson et al. (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).

⁴⁰ *OT*, 10 November 1997. See also Miyagi Etsujirō, “Shin Heiwa Kinen Shiryōkan kensetsu no kei” [The process leading to the construction of the New Peace Memorial], in Okinawa Prefecture History Teachers Association, *Rekisbi no shinjitsu wa yugame-tewa naranai*, pp.27–8.

⁴¹ *OT*, 1 May 1998.

Figure 3

View from the roof of the New Okinawa Peace Memorial Museum across the Cornerstone of Peace to the old museum, featured in the background
(© photograph by Ken Yonetani)



⁴² *OT*, 17 November 1997.

mony, the schoolteacher wrote, sits uneasily in the context of Ryukyuan culture, which has a unique set of rituals and beliefs, and contradicts the constitutional principles of separation of state and religion.⁴²

Disclosure of Alterations and the Ensuing Controversy

⁴³ For an outline of the problems facing Okinawa as host of the Summit, see “Insecurities mount as Okinawa prepares to greet the world,” *Asahi Shinbun*, 2 November 1999 (<www.asahi.com/english/news/enews.html>); and Arasaki, “Okinawa, Futenma kichi iten.”

The prominent Okinawan scholar, commentator, and anti-base activist Arasaki Moriteru 新崎盛暉 describes the months following the gubernatorial elections in November 1998 as a kind of honeymoon period. On the Japanese mainland, the question of the “base issue” versus “economic stimulus policies” was largely perceived as a specifically “Okinawan” problem. In Okinawa, though the new Governor Inamine Keiichi was backed by the LDP, the Pentagon, and Okinawan business interests, his pre-election pledge against a US heliport and a “fifteen-year lease limit” for any new joint-use civilian/military airport seemed to ensure that his position would not sit comfortably with the agendas of either the Japanese or US government. The policy taken by the central government in Tokyo was, interprets Arasaki, hesitant, and concentrated on ensuring a socially and economically conducive environment before seriously tackling the relocation issue. On 29 April, to the surprise of virtually everyone, the late Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō 小渕恵三 announced Okinawa Prefecture, jointly with Miyazaki Prefecture in Kyushu, as the winning site to host the G-8 Summit Meeting of the world’s leading industrialized nations in the year 2000. This was despite the fact it reportedly ranked last in terms both of existing facilities and security capacity levels.⁴³ The Heads of State Meeting was to take place in Nago, a small economically depressed town in northern Okinawa. This district also includes the east coast village of Henoko, proposed site for the new military airfield. Arasaki Moriteru suggests that the summit was to be the government’s “trump card” in securing support for a relocation site, a policy which seems to have succeeded, at least temporarily. At the end of December 1999, under immense pressure from Inamine and the central government and after a nineteen-hour debate, Mayor Kishimoto Tateo 岸本建男 and Nago City Assembly agreed to accept the relocation of the base.

For the time being, however, with the summit announcement Inamine’s honeymoon came to an end. Tokyo’s attempts to secure a relocation site swiftly while denying that there was any connection between holding the summit in Nago and securing a military base relocation site there were apparently uncoordinated with the United States. The Clinton administration promptly declared that it wanted the relocation issue to be solved well before Clinton arrived in Okinawa. The intentions and machinations of the LDP were then met with further suspicion after it was revealed that the Inamine administration had been tampering with the contents of the Prefectural Peace Museum. In early August, newspaper reports revealed that the prefectural government had secretly attempted to alter the displays within the New

Prefectural Peace Museum without the knowledge or approval of the supervisory planning committee entrusted with devising the exhibits. By the end of the month, local newspapers had obtained evidence which clearly implicated the government in attempts to alter the substance of displays. The integrity of the Inamine administration was seriously challenged.

The alteration issue was compounded by two other events. In late June 1999, it was reported that Inamine had indefinitely delayed plans to construct an International Peace Research Institute in Okinawa, purportedly due to a lack of funds. This institute had been designed to manage the Cornerstone of Peace and the new Peace Museum, as well as conduct research on “war and history in the Asia-Pacific, with an emphasis on the Battle of Okinawa.”⁴⁴ Moreover, by June 1999 it became clearly evident that the prefectural administration had tampered with the contents of another exhibit at the new Yaeyama Peace Memorial Museum, located on the southern island of Ishigaki. The museum had been constructed to commemorate victims of “war malaria,” namely local inhabitants of the southern Yaeyama islands who had contracted the fatal virus after being expelled to malaria-infested areas by the Japanese army.⁴⁵ The Okinawa Relief Committee for Forcefully Expelled Malaria Victims (沖繩戦強制疎開マラリア犠牲者援護会) was founded in 1988 to seek compensation from the central government for the bereaved families of malaria victims, who unlike surviving families of military draftees did not receive any form of pension. Eight years later, while unsuccessful in their claim, the committee agreed to accept a concession that the government allocate 300 million yen to the construction of a monument and a museum in remembrance of the victims.

The Yaeyama Museum opened on 28 May 1999 in the midst of fierce wrangling between committee members entrusted with planning the exhibit and the staff from the Department of Peace Promotion. On the public opening of the exhibit, it became apparent that eleven captions out of a total of twenty-seven for photos and diagrams in the exhibit had been significantly altered without the knowledge of Hosaka Hiroshi 保坂広志, the Ryukyu University professor who had originally supervised the work. Alterations included replacing the phrase “forced expulsion” (*kyōsei taikyo* 強制退去) with “ordered to take refuge” (*binan meirei* 避難命令).⁴⁶ The caption underneath a photograph panel thought to depict a scene of collective suicide was altered from “purported death by collective suicide” to “victims of the Battle of Okinawa,” after earlier attempts to completely withdraw the photo had been met with opposition by the museum committee. A 5 x 3-meter panel outlining the chronology of Battle of Okinawa and “war malaria” was also omitted, purportedly due to a “risk of fire.”

Both the revoking of plans for a peace research center and alterations to the Yaeyama Museum exhibit seemed to hint at a change in direction in prefectural “peace promotion” policies. Alterations to the Yaeyama Museum were concentrated in those sections depicting relations between the Japanese army and Okinawan civilians during the war. They suggested a concerted

⁴⁴ After this news was reported peace groups fearing also for the museum’s future had actually demanded the prefectural administration publicly display the exhibit content in July. The three peace groups, Okinawa Peace Network (沖縄平和ネットワーク), Battle of Okinawa One Foot of Film Movement (沖縄戦記録フィルムムーブメント), an organization involved in gathering film footage and material on the war; and the Prefectural Historians Council (県歴史教育者協議会) were highly active in opposing the prefectures proposed plans.

⁴⁵ The history of “war malaria” is summarized in Aniya Masaaki, “Sensō mararia” [War malaria], in *Sbitte okitai Okinawa* [Okinawa: a reader], ed. Historians Council (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1998). A detailed account of the local inhabitants of Hateruma Island 波照間島 is given in Ishihara Masaie, *Mōhitotsu no Okinawa-sen—mararia jigoku no Hateruma-jima* [Another Battle of Okinawa: malaria hell on Hateruma Island] (Naha: Okinawa Bunko, 1983).

⁴⁶ In an article in the *Okinawa Times*, Ōta Shizuo states that the term “expulsion” emerged at the time the inhabitants of Yaeyama met their deaths, and “is essential to clarifying war responsibility and breaking down the government’s (*kumi* 国) impenetrable stance on the malaria compensation issue, which refuses to recognize [expulsion as] a military order.” Similar contentions over wording occurred earlier in relation to the epitaph of a monument as part of the same “War Malaria Compensation Project.” Ōta condemns the suggestion (made by the head of the Okinawa Development Agency) that local inhabitants were forced into refuge to “escape from the ravages of war.” Such a view, he argues, shifts the blame onto the local population and constructs an “elegiac sense of history” (*eirei shikan* 英霊史観). *OT*, 5 October 1999.

⁴⁷ Therein still refusing to recognize that prefectural heads had “instructed” the changes as such.

⁴⁸ Deputy Governor Ishihara’s statement was published in full in *Ryūkyū Shinpō*, 8 October 1999, p.2.

⁴⁹ See *Okinawa Times* for a summary of conversations between members at the two meetings. Makino expressly states the difference in perceptions between the two groups.

attempt on the part of the prefectural government to alter the way in which the Battle of Okinawa was presented to the public. They also cast serious doubt on the reliability of the government’s protestations that alterations were only at a “deliberating” stage, and that the committee members’ opinions were to be “strictly adhered to” in the case of Mabuni.

The prefectural administration continued to deny that a coordinated plan to change the exhibits existed, or that such a plan had been instigated by the Governor or at the Governor’s behest. Yet throughout the summer of 1999 local newspapers reported other changes that were unauthorized by the supervisory planning committee and revealed documents that implicated Inamine and his two deputies (Ishikawa Hideo 石川秀雄 and Makino Hirotaka 牧野浩隆) in a plan to make comprehensive alterations. As the issue exploded into a political fireball, the administration’s earlier stance became untenable. On 4 October, opposition parties refused to participate in parliamentary proceedings on the grounds that the government had failed to answer parliamentary questions with integrity after local newspapers reported that further documents had been obtained that implicated the governor. The following day, the leading coalition parties agreed to disclose all administrative documents relating to the museum, and proceedings were normalized.

On the morning of 7 October, a large number of relevant internal papers were handed out at a parliamentary committee hearing, and deliberation on the issue continued for almost ten hours. For the first time since the surfacing of alleged changes, Deputy Governor Makino acknowledged that prefectural heads had played a decisive role in the process. Second Deputy Governor Ishikawa conceded that comments on the administration by the governor and his deputies had been taken “with utmost seriousness” (重く受け止めた) by bureaucrats within the Prefectural International Bureau and Department of Peace Promotion, who had then ordered detailed alterations.⁴⁷ He assured people that all deliberative proceedings over suggested alterations had since ceased, and apologized for inciting the distrust of the people and the parliament.⁴⁸

The documents submitted to the parliamentary hearing and published in the press the following day revealed that prefectural heads had referred to fundamental differences in “perceptions of the state (*kokka* 国家)” between themselves and members of the museum’s supervisory planning committee.⁴⁹ The minutes of the meetings of prefectural heads and bureaucrats were in note form and lacked full details. Yet it was undeniable that as early as March 1999, Governor Inamine had stated that the exhibits “should not be too anti-Japanese,” and that as Okinawa “only amounts to one prefecture within Japan,” commentaries on the war should take into account “museum displays elsewhere in the country.” At a subsequent meeting on 23 July, Inamine chided the bureaucrats for not changing the exhibit content enough, commenting that the plans still hardly varied from the originals “in spite of the change in government.” He further pointed out that “various people”

throughout Japan, who presumably may take offense at explicit historical museum displays, were to visit Okinawa in conjunction with the G-8 Summit. In the same meeting, deputy Makino had even suggested that a totally new planning committee should be set up in order to devise the necessary changes.

From the Barrel of a Gun—Shaping and Reshaping the Tenets of History

The attempted changes in content fell into three broad categories: those relating to the Battle of Okinawa, those depicting World War II in general, and those depicting the post-war US occupation of the islands.⁵⁰ The most blatant censorship occurred with respect to displays of Japan's military role in Asia during World War II. The prefectural monitors ordered that the entire section entitled "Japan's aggression as depicted on film" be eliminated, including pictures of Japanese forces "closing in on Nanking," a scene showing Unit 731 (the Kwantung Army's euphemistically-entitled "Epidemic Prevention and Water Supply Unit") experimenting with and producing biochemical weapons, and photographs of the excavation of victims in Singapore. Historical documents and materials concerning popular opposition to Japanese rule, and a stamp in commemoration of Korean resistance were to be withdrawn. Material on the comfort women issue, and territorial disputes such as the Kurile and Senkaku Islands, were also marked for removal.

Lisa Yoneyama observes that the complicitous relationship between Japan and the United States during the cold war affected the LDP's stance on the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, particularly in regional geopolitical terms.⁵¹ In the case of Okinawa, the conservative forces in Japan continued to maintain a direct interest in legitimizing the US military presence on the islands. Prefectural administration documents explicitly stated that the museum should include material on the "role that the US-Japan treaty has played in maintaining security" in the Asia-Pacific region, and that an "anti-Security Treaty" (*han anpo* 反安保) stance should be avoided. On the sensitive question of accidents and crimes involving the US troops and Okinawans, it was suggested that "the fact that there are more accidents/incidents in Okinawa not involving the US military than base-related occurrences must be taken into account within the displays." On 7 August, just prior to the disclosure of attempted alterations in the local press and less than three weeks after being chided by Governor Inamine for not changing the exhibits enough, prefectural bureaucrats ordered that a timeline depicting all US military-related incidents since reversion in May 1972 should be integrated into a general display on the history of post-reversion Okinawa and not featured separately.⁵² It was decided that documents on controversial issues relating to the presence of the bases—such as manuscripts of the 1997

⁵⁰ The changes were subsequently outlined in *Ryūkyū yū Shinpō*, 7 October 1999, following the public disclosure of the relevant material.

⁵¹ *Hiroshima traces*, p.25. In an article on the Smithsonian issue, she also explores this issue of complicity more broadly, observing that "insofar as such national assumptions remain unquestioned, it will not be possible to recognize that during most of the twentieth century, the conservative elite in the United States ... and the conservative forces in Japan ... are in many respects complicit with each other in their capitalist and nationalist desires." "Critical warps: facticity, transformative knowledge, and postnationalist criticism in the Smithsonian controversy," *Positions* 5.3 (Winter 1997): 797.

⁵² *RS*, 9 October 1999.

⁵³ This report confirmed the return of Futenma Air Station with the proviso that an alternative heliport be built within Okinawa at an unspecified location.

⁵⁴ The “Emperor’s Message” refers to two reports purportedly conveying the Japanese Emperor Hirohito’s view on the US occupation of Okinawa, sent to General Douglas MacArthur and the US Secretary of State by William Sebald, a US State Department resident in Tokyo, in September 1947. The coming to light of the existence of this “message” in an article in the Japanese journal *Sekai* in April 1979 had a strong impact in Okinawa and beyond, leading to a profound questioning of the Emperor’s complicity in Okinawa’s fate under US administration after the San Francisco Treaty of 1952, and skepticism towards Japanese government policy towards Okinawa during the early occupation period. Challenges to this view have recently been made by historian Robert Eldridge (“Shōwa tennō to Okinawa—tennō messēji no saikōsatsu” [The Shōwa Emperor and Okinawa: a reconsideration of the Emperor’s message], *Chūōkōron* 114.3 [March 1999]: 152–710. John Dower’s analysis focuses on the message as illustrative of the Showa Emperor’s active role in Post-War Japanese policy making (“Tennō minshū-shugi no tanjō [The birth of imperial democracy], *Sekai* 667 (Sept. 1999): 221–32); also “A message from the Showa emperor,” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 31.4 (1999).

⁵⁵ *OT*, 19 April 2000. These omissions were first brought to my attention by Professor Tessa Morris-Suzuki.

⁵⁶ *OT*, October 5, 1999.

⁵⁷ Yoneyama, *Hiroshima traces*, pp.63.

⁵⁸ On the environment and public works in Okinawa, see Gavan McCormack, “Okinawan dilemmas: coral islands or concrete islands?”, in *Okinawa: cold war island*, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff, Calif.: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999).

Tokusobo legislative amendment that empowered the central government to forcibly lease land for the US military, an outline of the final report of SACO (the US–Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa set up after the rape incident of September 1995) on proposed military facility reductions in Okinawa,⁵³ and former Governor Ōta’s testimony before the Supreme Court in 1996 following his refusal to act as a proxy in signing leases for base land—should be replaced by a display on the peace-making role of the United Nations.

Proposed alterations also extended to displays on the US occupation period, where prefectural heads suggested replacing a sample of a hypothetical “Ryukyuan National Flag,” a picture of the document addressed to the US State Department known as the “Emperor’s Message,”⁵⁴ and documents depicting the suppression of political groups under US military administration with the “positive” consequences of the US occupation, such as infrastructure development and the establishment of the Ryukyu Bank. Even following the museum’s opening in April 2000, omissions in the English translation of display captions, particularly within the exhibit content relating to the US occupation of Okinawa (for example the confinement of Okinawan civilians in camps), became the subject of particular controversy.⁵⁵

The theme was to be, in other words, that of a “natural” peace. In the entrance to the museum, plans for a map illustrating the US military advance in the Battle of Okinawa were scrapped in favour of a design displaying the sea and mountains. After the controversy broke out, some Liberal Democratic Party representatives in the prefectural assembly actively defended censorship of the museum and promoted the need for an “image change” in Okinawa. During parliamentary questioning, LDP representative Ajitomi Osamu 安次富修 asserted that peace should be envisaged as something “positive and bright” (*akarui 明るい*), in congruence with the promotion of Okinawa as a “tourist destination.”⁵⁶ The LDP’s position was similar to that which Lisa Yoneyama found the municipal government of Hiroshima taking with regards to that city’s history—an emphasis on “lightheartedness” and a civic culture that “privileges ‘atmosphere’ and images over substance, that constantly transforms knowledge into mass commodities, and that incessantly flattens and trivializes history.”⁵⁷

Since reversion, and particularly in the last two decades, Okinawa’s lush and fragile natural environment has been overrun by a peculiar mix of uncontrolled public works projects and massive tourist resort developments.⁵⁸ With the prefecture’s transformation into a “resort island” of hotels and golf courses, Okinawa’s geo-historical landscape also holds the danger of being overwhelmed by the tourist industry’s insatiable appetite for self-gratification and the narcissistic appropriation of exotica. In accordance with the impulses of capitalist consumption, the Inamine administration is seeking to promote a self-image more conducive to mainland tastes and a collective national amnesia and one that is in harmony with the islands’ status as popular tourist

spot for money-spending leisure-seekers.⁵⁹ “It is natural,” LDP representative Ajitomi continued, “that alterations and compromises should be made given the fact that many people will visit the exhibition, including people from mainland Japan.” This reinvented tourist resort image of Okinawa does not dwell on the “lessons of history” but emphasizes the island’s iridescent future: “rather than lamenting over the past, it is better to firmly grasp the future.”⁶⁰ “We cannot forget,” asserts Kakazu Noriaki 嘉数昇明, head of the LDP Prefectural Association, “to also look ahead to the future.”⁶¹

The aspect of war most irreconcilable with such an image are depictions of the *gama*, the dark and cavernous caves that dot the Okinawan landscape and that were used as air-raid and battle shelters during the war. Revered in Ryukyuan legends as the home of spirits, these caves were the scenes of some of the most horrific occurrences in the Battle of Okinawa, including numerous cases of so-called “collective suicide” by the terrified civilians hiding in them. By far the most widely-reported incident in the controversy over Mabuni concerned alterations to a life-sized diorama depicting enforced suicide within a recreated scene of the *gama*. The diorama was to portray a Japanese soldier pointing his rifle at an Okinawan mother and ordering her to kill her baby because the baby’s cries might be heard by the invading US military. Another scene showed a medical officer forcing cups of condensed milk laced with potassium cyanide onto injured soldiers. However, when Hoshi Masahiko 星雅彦, a member of the supervisory committee, visited the workshop on the eve of the outbreak of the revelations over the attempted changes, he found that the soldier no longer had a rifle but was merely staring at the family hiding in the cave. The soldier with cyanide had disappeared altogether.

In the case of *Enola Gay*, one of the items planned for the Smithsonian exhibit that the pro-atom bomb lobby groups had vehemently opposed was the image of a disfigured metal lunch box owned by a Japanese school girl and victim at Ground Zero, displaying the neatly packed contents that were still inside. Confronted with this far too personal image, John Dower notes that spectators would inadvertently begin to envisage the owner’s charred remains.⁶² In the context of Okinawa, perhaps it is the very “murkiness” of the stories from the caves and the controversies surrounding the undeniably tragic scenes of collective suicide which are the most disturbing. In 1983, seven years before his election as governor, Ōta Masahide was one of four historians who testified against the Ministry of Education in a highly controversial case on textbook revisions. The ministry’s claim was that while references to collective suicide contributed to an “objective understanding” of the Battle of Okinawa, these took place as a result of the local people’s “own volition” and were to be distinguished from the unsubstantiated claims of civilian killings or massacres. In response, Ōta, Aniya Masaaki and others asserted that “collective suicide in the original sense of the word did not exist,” but consisted of killings which had “taken place by coercion or

⁵⁹ Matt Allen addresses the issue of tourism and contesting representations of Okinawan identity in his “Making Meccas: ‘natural’ paradises and ‘unnatural responses’ in Okinawa,” unpublished paper.

⁶⁰ *OT*, 5 October 1999.

⁶¹ *OT*, 5 September 1999. Significantly, the Cornerstone’s discourse of “trans-national” commemoration was also appropriated within this framework. Soon after the drafted changes became publicized, Vice Director of the International and Cultural Affairs Bureau cited his desire that the Peace Memorial be “at one” with the Cornerstone as the reason for devising alterations. According to this line of thought, the Cornerstone is a place “where those who died in the Battle of Okinawa lie together, not as allies or enemies” (*RS*, 20 August 1999).

⁶² “Triumphal and tragic narratives of the war in Asia,” in Hein and Selden, *Living with the bomb*, pp.37–51.

⁶³ This debate is outlined in Arasaki Moriteru et al., *Kankō kōsu de nai Okinawa*, pp.153–5. Proceedings of the court are fully examined in Aniya Masaaki, ed., *Sabakareta Okinawa-sen* [The Battle of Okinawa taken to the courts] (Tokyo: Banseisha, 1989). Koji Taira provides a very useful analysis of the nuances of Japanese terms in the debate in “The Battle of Okinawa in Japanese history books,” in Johnson, *Okinawa: cold war island*, pp. 39–49.

⁶⁴ *In the realm of a dying emperor*, p.67. In the context of the *Enola Gay* exhibit, historical debates raged over the hypothetical number of US soldiers that would have been killed had a ground war occurred in mainland Japan. For a summary of this debate see, for example, Mike Wallace, “The battle of the Enola Gay,” and Martin J. Sherwin, “Hiroshima at fifty: the politics of history and memory,” *IHJ Bulletin* 15:4 (Autumn 1995). Sherwin states: “for fifty years the public debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been framed—and distorted—by a non-event: the invasion of Japan” (p.7).

⁶⁵ Ōshiro Masayasu, “Kenjū wa dare ni mukerareta ka,” p.35.

⁶⁶ *RS*, 11 November 1999.

induction through the overwhelming force of the Japanese Army.”⁶³ In the Supreme Court appeal, the Ministry of Education slightly altered its position by insisting on the need to include the fact that many more civilians died by “collective suicide” than those “murdered” by the Japanese Army, and the court sided with the ministry. Exploring the murky waters between force and complicity, suicide and murder, Norma Field suggests instead the paradoxical phrase “compulsory suicide,” as reflecting the “dark inmixing of coercion and consent, of aggression and victimization at work in the story of the caves.”⁶⁴

Museum planning committee member Oshiro reflected on the meaning of the Japanese soldier diorama in the reconstructed *gama* staling:

The gun on the footsoldier at the entrance to the cave is not pointed towards any one person in particular, but towards all the civilian refugees. The gun symbolizes the rationale of the military, which holds the power of life or death over the civilians. At any moment, the civilians may be murdered, they may commit mass suicide, or they may be blasted by flame throwers from the US army’s indiscriminate onslaught. An extreme situation, where you have no idea what is going to happen next—this is what we reenacted in the *gama* display.⁶⁵

Work on the diorama ceased after the alterations became publicly known. Following Deputy Ishikawa’s apology, the museum planning committee ordered that the gun be restored but agreed to slightly lower its position so that it did not point directly at the mother. A month later, the Bereaved Families Association, trustees of the Break of Dawn Monument, met Inamine to submit a formal complaint about the soldier display and its potential to “discourage national sentiment.”⁶⁶

In the Name of Peace—Memory and Protest in Okinawa

⁶⁷ John Dower, *Embracing defeat—Japan in the wake of World War II* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press), p.521.

⁶⁸ Moreover, particularly after 1980, as Carol Gluck has noted, the collective rhetoric of peace gradually broke down, heterogeneous experiences became more widely recognised in Japan, and a more complex conjunction of war memories surfaced in public memory (Carol Gluck, “Past and present,” in *Postwar Japan as history*, ed. Andrew Gordon [Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1993], pp.71–6).

In his epic work, *Embracing Defeat*, John Dower traces the process through which Japan as a defeated nation came to remember and atone for its dead. The emergence of a rhetoric of democracy and peace was, he observes, in many respects a “nationalistic plea to forgive the dishonored dead”; a “smoke screen” which obscured the horrendous realities of Japanese war atrocities, and inevitably worked upon a sense of victim consciousness.⁶⁷ Yet though the ideology of the peace movement in Japan was from the outset tied to a nationalist narrative, its critical stream of thought should not be underestimated nor discounted.⁶⁸ This is especially pertinent in the case of Okinawa. Based on firsthand knowledge of the horrors of war and the imperial forces as well as the uninterrupted US military presence in the postwar period, the Okinawan peace movement has accommodated a complex conjunction of at times contradictory elements—encompassing both a sense of victimization and a radical critique of Japanese nationalism. At the core of emotional pleas for peace lies the haunting question of

Okinawa's political place within Japan, both in the past and the present, and the contradictions between a Japanese national commemorative History and the many ghosts of Okinawa's past.⁶⁹

Critics spoke out against the Inamine administration's alteration plans for the Mabuni Museum as soon as they were made public. The protests focused on four related issues: the secrecy surrounding the attempted alterations, the lack of consultation with the respective oversight committees, the government's continual denials that alterations had been made, and the attempts to alter the "truth" of the Battle of Okinawa. Notions of truth or the "real situation" which made up the Battle of Okinawa were encompassed within the adopted phrase "*Okinawa-sen no jissai*" 沖縄戦の実相, although in reality the decisive feature viewed as encompassing the "truth" of the Battle of Okinawa was not always the same. A shared collective memory and sense of critical thought, however, undoubtedly existed, working to ensure solidarity within the disparate groups which make up the "peace movement" in Okinawa.

Shimabukuro Muneyasu 島袋宗康, committee director of the Socialist Popular Party, stated that the inescapable historical truth of the Battle of Okinawa lay in the fact that "the Japanese army had directed their guns towards the people of Okinawa prefecture, and that the atrocities of collective suicide occurred."⁷⁰ In an emotional meeting with high-level prefectural bureaucrats who had monitored the alteration process, the Director of the Okinawa Prefectural Teachers Association, Aragaki Hitohide 新垣仁英, condemned their actions as "a serious betrayal of the people of Okinawa."⁷¹ On 18 September, a symposium was organized by peace groups in protest of the attempted alterations, entitled "How should the Realities of the Battle of Okinawa be Portrayed? Urgent Symposium on the New Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum Issue." At the gathering, anti-base peace activists, often the most vocal at such meetings, fell solemnly silent while survivors from the war took the stage and recounted their personal experiences. In his paper given at the symposium, Professor Aniya Masaaki asserted that "a determined stance which perceives objectively the realities and causes of the war, which brings to light the injuries incurred by the people, and which prosecutes those who inflicted this harm, is needed. Otherwise, the distortion of the Peace Memorial will prevail."⁷²

In another well-reported act of protest, Kudeken Kentoshi 久手堅憲俊, a local historian and collector of war memorabilia, visited the original Mabuni museum and retrieved the first portion of the 150 items that he had donated to it, including an iron canteen dented with bullet holes, army documents containing regulations for the administration of "Comfort Women" stations in Okinawa, and a wedding dress made from a parachute. Asked why he was withdrawing the items, Kudeken stated: "I have heard that the Governor is prohibiting any displays which may conflict with the central government. As all my material conflicts with the government, it has become at odds with the exhibit content advocated (by the prefectural administration)."⁷³

⁶⁹ History with a capital 'H' is used here to refer to "official history" as referred to by Carol Gluck in "Past and present." See also Mariko Asano Tamanoi, *Under the shadow of nationalism—politics and poetics of rural Japanese women* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), p.5.

⁷⁰ ●T, 1 September 1999.

⁷¹ RS, 2 September 1999.

⁷² RS, 19 September 1999.

⁷³ RS, 11 September 1999. Also reported in the *Okinawa Times Weekly*, 21 August 1999.

⁷⁴ *RS*, 5 October 1999, "Opinion," available at <http://www.ryukyushimpo.co.jp/dokusha/koinde.html>.

⁷⁵ Brian Ladd citing a comment made by historian Reinhart Koselleck in relation to controversies over the building of the Neue Wache memorial in Berlin, in Ladd, *Ghosts of Berlin* (New York: W. W. Norton/New Press, 1999), p.221.

⁷⁶ *OT*, 29 September 1999, "Opinion," p.5.

An editorial piece in the *Okinawa Times* deliberating on the meaning of the attempted alterations illustrated succinctly how critical perceptions of historical agency have induced a radical self-reflection in Okinawan conceptions of war and peace in stating:

In issues relating to the Battle of Okinawa, the presence of a strong sense of victimization has been the target of frequent criticism. However, from this debate the view has emerged that the people of Okinawa were also the aggressors in Japan's wars. Simultaneously, in the years following the war, Okinawans realized that the truth of the Battle of Okinawa lay in the fact that, in the face of a relentless ground war, the army, who are supposed to protect the civilians, can turn against their own people. From there, people reflected on war as something carried out by states and by people. These are the vital factors which form the basis of "Okinawan pacifism."

A poem entitled "The Battle of Okinawa and Consoling the Spirits" (沖縄戦と慰霊) contributed to *Ryūkyū Shinpō* by Shimabukuro Tetsu 島袋哲, is a highly critical rendering of war, reflecting anger and remorse as part of its call for the necessity of remembrance. It begins:

The 32nd Division was the 'sacrifice' offered
by Imperial headquarters and the Emperor.
It was just as in Saipan and Iōjima.
They were the 'sacrifices' placed into the hands of the US military
as a means of biding time, in the face of imminent defeat.
Soldiers who killed the defenseless in China
now, in Okinawa, were themselves killed by overwhelming forces,
Embroidering Okinawan civilians into the battle, even more defenseless.
It was just as in the Philippines.

The last four lines read:

The irresponsibility, recklessness, terrorism, stupidity, debauchery,
amorality, and cruelty of the Imperial Army had no confines.
Do not tell lies to those fallen.
If you want to console the spirits,
Speak to them of the true rationale for their deaths.⁷⁴

Of the readers' contributions on the peace memorial issue published in local newspapers, the one which most succinctly avoided a "traffic accident" version of war (one that made out that no one wanted it and that everyone was a victim),⁷⁵ and related the notion of responsibility to present-day politics in Japan, was a letter to the *Okinawa Times* submitted by a construction worker from Urasoe City 浦添市, Okinawa. The letter directly related the obscuring of responsibility for the war in Japan, the object of criticism by other countries in Asia, to the institutionalization of unaccountability in domestic politics—a system to which the people of Japan seem oblivious. The contributor concluded that the prefectural government should take responsibility for having attempted changes to museum exhibits, as a step towards breaking free of this system.⁷⁶

Much of the protest centered on the Inamine administration's attempts to curry favour with the Japanese government. Unlike the textbook dispute of 1983, in which the Okinawa prefectural government had fought against the Ministry of Education's dictates, this time the OPG itself appeared to have instigated the changes. For many, this was the most alarming aspect of the dispute—the symbol of a historical and political Rubicon which Okinawa seemed on the brink of crossing. Calls for the relocation of Futenma base to Nago issued first by Governor Inamine and then Mayor Kishimoto in late December 1999 signified the first time in the history of Okinawa that elected representatives had, albeit under immense pressure from Tokyo, actually requested that a US base be built on the islands.⁷⁷

A sense of apprehension towards Okinawa's impending political situation was compounded by the fear that the number of remaining war survivors—the last direct connection to the war dead—was dwindling. *Hibakusha* 被爆者 survival testimonial practices, observed Lisa Yoneyama, resurrect the deceased and endow them with the ability to speak. At the moment when the voices of the dead are translated by survivors into “languages that are intelligible for those who listen,” there “can be no appropriation and co-optation of memories of the dead by existing dominant discourses.”⁷⁸ But what happens when these survivors themselves pass away, and their memories become mere lines on a page or faces on a video, traces of the past?

⁷⁷ Julia Yonetani and Gavan McCormack, “Hot summer could get hotter for G-8 in Nago,” *Asahi Evening News*, 27 February 2000.

⁷⁸ Yoneyama, *Hiroshima traces*, p.143.

Picking up the Pieces: a New Peace for the Twenty-first Century?

Ironically, the most tangible position taken by Inamine throughout the controversy (apart from denying he had anything to do with the alterations) was a relativist or even “post-modernist” one. There are, he suggested at the end of August, “various choices available in conveying the realities of the Battle of Okinawa,” because there are “various ‘truths’ of the war” (*sensō no jissō wa iroiro aru* 戦争の実相はいろいろある). While the truth was always to be conveyed, the issue of which opinion was “the best” was “a matter of choice” (*sentaku no mondai* 選択の問題). However, Inamine never clarified the substance of these different “truths.”⁷⁹ Far from encouraging historical debate on the issue, the process of alteration was conducted behind closed doors and, until public outrage made it untenable, in the utmost secrecy. Beneath the banner of pluralism lay an attempt to reinstate a history which complied with the central government's “official” version, and thereby suppress all else.

The most alarming aspect of the unfolding events was the secrecy that surrounded the entire alteration process and the undemocratic means by which policy was determined and implemented. A veneer of relativism did

⁷⁹ A point observed by historian Yakabi Osamu 屋嘉比収, *OT*, 29 September 1999, p.7.

⁸⁰ Similar issues regarding Inamine's policy and democracy in Japan are explored in Takashima Nobuyoshi, "Rekishishūseishugi no dōkō to heiwa hakubutsukan" [The movement towards historical revisionism and peace museums], in Okinawa History Teachers Association, *Rekishino shinjitsuwayugametewanaranai*, pp.55-8.


⁸¹ In drawing on this analogy, Okinawan historian Hiyaue Teruo 比屋根照夫 warned that at the extremities of such a self-induced neo-assimilationist erasure of

little to hide the arbitrariness of attempts by prefectural heads to censor potentially "offensive" displays—namely any content which questioned or opposed the role of the Japanese state either during the war or in the last fifty-five years. Inamine's privately expressed aversion towards anything "anti-Japanese" in the exhibits was, in promoting a political absolutism that sought to distinguish and alienate any form of opposition or dissent, itself only too reminiscent of drives against "anti-nationalist" elements in Okinawa prior to and during the war.⁸⁰ The imposition of Okinawa as "just another prefecture," at the expense of any historical incongruities that may suggest otherwise, was also comparable to the policies of "historical amnesia" which accompanied Okinawa's forced assimilation into Meiji Japan in the early twentieth century.⁸¹

Inamine's policies were formulated not in isolation but at a time in which

Figure 4

The newly-completed Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum (© photograph by Ken Yonetani)



the Japanese government, spurred on by right-wing power groups, had been making a particularly formidable effort to shore up a sense of national belonging. It is unknown whether the governor's actions were solely "self-induced" or instigated from within centralized LDP policy-making institutions. Yet it is undeniable that the Okinawa Peace Museum controversy occurred within a nationwide climate of increasing intolerance that was clothed in a rhetoric of compromise and liberalism.⁸² As a distinctively post-war regime fails to emerge from the rubble of the economic stagnation and social malaise that have characterized Japan's 'lost ten years' since the financial crash of 1989, a truncated form of neo-nationalism increasingly seems to provide solace in the face of uncertain global forces and the persistent malfunctioning of the political system.⁸³

Yet the Peace Museum at Mabuni is one site at which opposition to this nationalist tide had at least some effect. Needless to say, a myriad of problems still face the museum at Mabuni: the planning committee's inability to assess the final stages of the exhibit, uncertainty about arrangements that can ensure the museum's smooth operation in the future, dissatisfaction with compromises over the Japanese soldier diorama and an accompanying sense that the exhibit still fails to capture fully the horrors of the caves, as well as the ensuing controversy over omissions in the English captions. Yet in spite of all of these persisting issues, the new Mabuni museum, more than either the Tokyo or Smithsonian displays previously, was able at least to partly honour the intentions of the original planning committee, and its 'sense of history'. The greatest triumph was the insurmountable interest and support which people of Okinawa displayed, in numerous contributions to local newspapers and with their feet. Within the first two weeks of its opening, the new Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum had already clocked up twice the average annual number of visitors compared the earlier museum had enjoyed.

However, even after the museum's opening there remained a broad consensus amongst intellectuals, activists, journalists, and all those fragmented elements that relate in some form or other to the 'peace movement' in Okinawa, that their struggle was far from over. On 14 October 1999, Inamine came closest to apologizing for tampering with the museum's exhibits by expressing "regret" that these alterations had "generated misunderstanding on the part of the people of Okinawa." He further concluded that "though the (museum's) supervisory planning committee must take responsibility within their jurisdiction, ultimately the responsibility for operating and managing the museum and its exhibits lies with its founder, the prefectural governor." Inamine's evasion of a direct apology and reaffirmation of the powers of his office hinted at further designs to neutralize critical history and anti-base opposition in Okinawa.

On 28 April 2000, less than a month after the museum's opening, an article appeared in a local newspaper written by the head of the Okinawan branch of the Society for the Making of New School Textbooks in History (新しい

/history) a only spiritual and mental impoverishment. Hiyane Teruo, "Rekishii inmettsu-saku' no muzan na ronri" [The pitiful logic of the 'policy to conceal history'], *OT*, 15 October 1999, p.16.

⁸² In 1999 a new law declaring the Rising Sun and "Kimigayo" respectively as the official national flag and anthem of Japan was accompanied by assurances from the LDP ruling coalition that reverence to these symbols was not obligatory. Liberal minded teachers, students, professors and principals were subsequently faced with the 'choice' of adhering to school procedures regarding the flag or face the consequences--disapproval, intimidation or even dismissal. At the tenth anniversary celebrations of Emperor Akihito's enthronement at the end of 1999, popular celebrities congregated at a special concert for this auspicious event, one designed to bridge the gap between post-war and "generation-X" Japan. Okinawan super-idol Amuro Namie 安室奈美恵 was subsequently reprimanded by now Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō 森義郎 for not even making an effort at pretense by mouthing the words to the anthem. Mori reasoned, in cold-war-inspired logic, that Amuro's generation had not had the opportunity to learn the revered song because all Okinawan media and teacher's unions were 'communist.'

⁸³ Gavan McCormack, "Nationalism and identity in post-cold war Japan," *Pacifica Review* 12.3 (Oct. 2000): 249-65.

Figure 5

Former Governor
Ōta Masahide
standing in front of
the newly-completed
Prefectural Peace
Museum (photograph
by Kurihara Tatsuo
栗原達男)



⁸⁴ Kinjō Hideyoshi, “Kodomotachi ni akuei-kyo—jigyakuteki seshin ni tsuranu-kareru” [A bad influence on children: getting over a masochistic mentality], *RS*, 28 April 2000.

⁸⁵ Gavan McCormack “The Japanese movement to ‘correct’ history,” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 30.2 (1998): 16–23.

歴史教科書をつくる会), Kinjō Hideyoshi 金城英興.⁸⁴ In the manner developed by the society’s founder, Tokyo University Professor Fujioka Nobukatsu 藤岡信勝, Kinjō stressed the importance of family values and the concept of a heroic national history, and he denounced the museum at Mabuni as the epitome of what “revisionist” historians have branded “masochistic” (*jigyakuteki* 自虐的) historiography. Like his notable forerunner, underlying Kinjō’s affectation of rational historical analysis lies an emotional commitment to a mode of reasoning which is both intolerant and anti-rational.⁸⁵ While questioning the historical validity of exhibits such as the Japanese soldier diorama, ultimately Kinjō’s condemnation of the museum seemed to rest on an argument that there is a need to protect children from the “obscure” depictions of human remains which are found throughout the Battle of Okinawa display. Reappropriating the ideology of peace into a nationalist framework of self-absolution, Kinjō cited none other than the Meiji Emperor himself as patron of the peace for which Okinawa’s heroic student defense brigades sacrificed their lives.

Kinjō’s article appeared on the same day that the third “Symposium on the New Prefectural Peace Museum” was held at the Okinawa Prefectural Women’s Center to consider the matter of the museum’s exhibits for the first time since its opening. As over two hundred people crowded into a small room to discuss the remaining issues facing the museum with planning committee members, the atmosphere was fraught with anger, tension, and a fierce determination to ensure the “horrors” of the Battle of Okinawa be

fully portrayed in the future. Condemning Kinjo's article and the nationwide movement to "correct" history, peace-group representative Fukuchi Hiroaki 福地曠昭 warned fellow activists that a "time of reckoning" between members of the peace movement and advocates of a sanitized "revisionism" was sure to come. Yet even Fukuchi may not have anticipated the speed and force with which the onslaught of historical revisionism would arrive. Less than a month after his forewarning, Okinawa became embroiled in another controversy over what was referred to as the "Okinawa Initiative." This "initiative" was in fact two different but interrelated declarations. The first was a presentation made by Inamine's "brains," professors Takara Kurayoshi 高良倉吉, Ōshiro Tsuneo 大城常夫, and Maeshiro Morisada 真栄城守定 at the Asia Pacific Agenda Project forum in Okinawa at the end of March. The other was a more detailed report compiled by a committee of four members including Takara and chaired by Shimada Haruo 島田春雄, a professor of Keio University who has been a vital conduit enabling the central government to implement policies on Okinawa underhandedly.⁸⁶ This offensive clearly had its genesis in Tokyo, and was intimately connected to central government attempts to placate Okinawa's anti-base movement through a massive influx of "compensation" and public works funding.

Directly prior to the Okinawa G-8 Summit, the pace was also stepped up to integrate the Cornerstone of Peace within both a Japanese nationalist narrative and a pro-US–Japan security treaty stance. On *Irei no Hi* or the Day for Consoling the Spirits in June 2000, Inamine invited the Commander of US Forces in Okinawa to commemorations at Mabuni. There, under the sweltering sun, Inamine and Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō 森喜郎 presented flowers in front of a large rising sun motif. Less than a month later, on the eve of the summit, US President Bill Clinton made a historic speech in front of the Cornerstone of Peace. In a bold attempt to appropriate the tenets of Okinawa's peace movement, and with sweat pouring down his face, Clinton cited a famous poem said to have been read out by the last Ryukyuan king, Shō Tai 尚泰, before he was banished to Tokyo in 1879: "The time for wars is ending, and the time for peace is not far away. Do not despair. Life is a treasure." "May Shō Tai's words," Clinton concluded, "be our prayer as well as our goal here today." The desire for peace was translated as the maintenance of the US presence in East Asia and the US–Japan military alliance, and it was in the name of such a "peace" that Okinawa's modern history was rewritten.

The day before Clinton's momentous visit, the former Okinawan governor Ōta Masahide denounced the Japanese and US governments' intentions in an article in the *Japan Times*. He condemned the attempt to "reaffirm the importance" of the US military presence in Okinawa in front of the Cornerstone of Peace as a "desecration" of the dead, and contrary to "the spirit of the monument." The Cornerstone of Peace, he reiterated, was built "so that we could admonish ourselves, be sure to lend an ear to the voices of the dead

⁸⁶ Specifically, he was chair of the "Informal Council on Okinawa Municipalities Hosting US Bases" (*Okinawa heigun kichi shozai shichōson ni kansuru kondankai* 沖縄米軍基地所在市町村に関する懇談会), also known as 'Shimada's Group' or *Shimada-kon* 島田懇, purportedly established by prime ministerial aide Okamoto Yukio 岡本行夫 under the direction of then Cabinet Chief Secretary Kajiyama Seiroku 梶山静六 and Hashimoto in November 1996 as a personal advisory organ to the cabinet. This group worked to placate local Okinawan politicians whose district was host to US bases through a "special compensation fund" of 100 billion yen. The organization which compiled the initiative (entitled "Okinawa inishiatebu—Okinawa, Nihon, soshite sekai" [Okinawa initiative: Okinawa, Japan, and the world]) was The Japan Productivity Center for Socio-economic Development (JPC-SED), see <<http://www.jpc-sed.or.jp/index/html>>.

Figure 6

An Okinawan
'seasar' シーサー,*
located at the
museum's
entrance to
ward off evil
(© photograph by
Ken Yonetani)



⁸⁷ "My thoughts on Okinawa as host," *Japan Times*, 20 July 2000, p.B6.

* See note on p.iv to the cover illustration.

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beyond, onething may be grasped for certain: the way in which global hege-monic forces intersect with and impact on the fight for political, historical and economic autonomy in Okinawa has vital implications for the future of Okinawa, Japan and beyond. While struggles for autonomy, difference, and democracy invariably intertwine with fierce contention over militarization, nationalism, imperialism, and the meaning of war, peace, and the past, the restless ghosts of Mabuni look set to haunt Okinawa's volatile political landscape for some time to come.

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and look squarely at the stark fact that war leaves bereaved family and friends with irreparable scars and unfathomable sorrow for as long as they live, no matter whether they are victor or loser."⁸⁷

What is to be envisaged and contained within an Okinawan "peace for the twenty-first century," and what precisely is to be Mabuni's "message of peace"? What role, if any, is the Japanese soldier to play in the construction of this peace, its past and its future, and at whom will his gun be pointing? As the curtain closed on the Okinawa summit and the world leaders of the G-8 countries waved their last farewells, a typhoon which had been brewing in the Pacific edged ever closer to the island. At the cliffs of Mabuni, a strong wind rose up from the crashing waves below and howled through the granite walls of the Cornerstone of Peace, coursing up Mabuni Hill and across the glistening red tiles of the new Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum. Gazing past the blazing Fire of Peace monument out to the raging sea